1	IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH
3	
4	
5	GRAND JURY No. 1 PROCEEDINGS
6	Case No. 69
7	Conducted by:
8	David Hannon, Deputy District Attorney
9	Melissa Marrero, Deputy District Attorney
10	
11	
12	November 30, 2018
13	
14	PPB Case No. 18-346005
15	
16	DA Case No. 2390489-2
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	Katie Bradford, CSR 90-0148
22	Court Reporter Portland, Oregon
23	(503) 267-5112
24	Proceedings recorded on wma audio recording;
25	transcript provided by Certified Shorthand Reporter.

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1
    Death Investigation
     PPB Case No. 18-346005
 2
    DA Case No. 2390489-2
 3
    Deceased: Samuel Rice
 4
     Incident Date: October 10, 2018
 5
 6
    Location: Del Rancho Motel,
 7
                7622 SE 82nd Avenue, Portland, Oregon
 8
 9
              (Friday, November 30, 2018, 8:37 a.m.)
10
                      PROCEEDINGS
11
                 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were
12
      held before Grand Jury No. 1:)
                 MR. HANNON: I'm going to call the case,
1.3
14
       now.
15
                 All right. Good morning. We are here in
       the death investigation of Portland Police Bureau Case
16
      No. 18-347005, DA Case Number -- excuse me --
17
18
                 A GRAND JUROR: 69.
19
                 MR. HANNON: -- Grand Jury Case No. 69,
20
       DA Case No. 3 -- 2390489. And we are resuming with
21
       testimony and I'll hand it over to Ms. Marrero, who
2.2
       will take the next witness.
23
                 MS. MARRERO: Can we just pause for just a
24
       second?
25
                 MR. HANNON:
                              Sure.
```

1	(Recess taken, 8:38 a.m 8:39 a.m.)
2	(TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Testing audio
3	recording equipment, 8:39 a.m 8:43 a.m.)
4	MR. HANNON: All right. Good morning. We
5	are back on the record in DA Case No. 2390489, Grand
6	Jury Case No. 69, death investigation. We are
7	recalling the case just to confirm we didn't have any
8	technical difficulties with the recording system.
9	We're ready to proceed with our next witness.
LO	MS. MARRERO: The State's next witness will
L1	be Todd Gradwahl.
L2	THE WITNESS: Good morning.
L3	TODD GRADWAHL
L4	Was thereupon called as a witness; and, having been
L5	first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
L6	<u>EXAMINATION</u>
L7	BY MS. MARRERO:
L8	Q Good morning. Can you please state and
L9	spell your first and last name.
20	A First name is Todd, T-o-d-d. Last name is
21	Gradwahl, G-r-a-d-w-a-h-l.
22	Q Thank you. And can you please tell the
23	grand jury how you're employed.
24	A I'm employed at the Portland Police Bureau.
25	I'm a homicide detective. And I'm also a detached

member of the Special Emergency Reaction Team, which is also referred to as SERT.

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Q Thank you, Detective Gradwahl. Can you tell the grand jury just briefly a bit about your background, your training and experience.

A I've been a police officer in Portland for 24 years. I've been a member of Special Emergency Reaction Team for 19 years. As a member of the team, I've attended a lot of training, done a lot of training.

We train every other week for two days, so approximately 25 percent of our time for our normal training cycle, but we do additional training, too, like a week at a time every fall and attended other conferences and working with other teams throughout the -- the Northwest.

And also team members may travel, train with other teams throughout the United States. And we'll practice tactics, maybe learn from those trainings or those interactions. So over the course of my career, I've had a lot of training between the team training and then also the standard police training that I receive.

Q Okay. Thank you. Were you working on October 10th of 2018?

1	A Yes, I was.
2	Q In what capacity were you working on that
3	particular day?
4	A That day, I was assigned to work for the
5	Special Emergency Reaction Team. We had planned
6	missions being search warrants to serve on that day.
7	And we were just finishing up the second search
8	warrant that we did that day in that capacity when
9	this incident started evolving.
10	Q And can you tell the grand jury how you
11	became notified of this incident and sort of the
12	process in which you began to head towards the Del
13	Rancho.
14	A Yes. I was on the previous search or the
15	search warrant we were finishing up in the area of
16	Northeast 50th and Killingsworth.
17	We were finishing up that warrant when we
18	started getting some stuff coming over our radio from
19	members of the team that there's an incident occurring
20	on 82nd Avenue that officers were on and that we may
21	be transitioning to assist with that.
22	Q And when you're hearing this information
23	come over the radio, is that a full activation yet or
24	is that just information that you're hearing at that

25

time?

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A It's information that everybody stay with their equipment, stay with -- we had armored vehicles out there and let's keep ourselves engaged. We were just finishing clearing the apartment, making sure there was no additional threats before we handed that scene over.

But that way, people wouldn't start unloading weapons and things like that and thinking that they're done for the day, that this other incident is evolving rapidly it sounded like from my memory that we may immediately be going from one location to the other rather than going back to the precinct, at least for me, personally.

There are some people, I believe, may have went back to the precinct, but the group I was with, that we were going to possibly jump back in the armored vehicle we were in and go to this new location.

Q What information were you receiving?

A That there was somebody that had been involved in a incident, where either, I think initially we were told they stabbed somebody and that now was in a motel room and had his wife or pulled her in with a knife and threatened to kill her or something along those lines.

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In my mind, I was thinking, this person has already done one crime and now it's potentially -- or sounding like a hostage situation, at that point.

That was the initial information I had.

Q Okay. And so given that initial information, did your team start heading towards the hotel, even though you hadn't been fully activated yet?

A Yes. A decision was made that let's just start moving that direction in case it turns into an activation that we're closer than we are now, because this was in the early morning hours, traffic was going to be heavy, and it was quite a ways away from where we were.

We were at the 5500 block north and this is going to be, I think, the 7600 block of south. So that's -- if you add those together, that's a lot of distance to cover in rush-hour traffic.

Q Okay. And while en route or -- well, at some point, did you become fully activated?

A Yes. I believe we were somewhere in the area of 82nd and Johnson Creek Boulevard when we received that we are activated. And that's when we proceeded northbound on 82nd Avenue toward the location.

Q And when you arrived at the location, what was your role?

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A My initial role when we arrived, there was -- things were happening pretty quick. There was a lot of officers and -- and traffic was getting blocked. And there, you know, was initial stages of, you know, trying to get everything set up, you know, 'cause all this -- all these other resources are now coming.

There was some rooms that hadn't been evacuated. So one of my -- my first role was to help get some of these rooms cleared out, you know, so whatever direction this went, that we were minimizing the people at harm in that location being the Del Rancho Motel.

So myself and other officers, including uniform officers, were trying to get people out of the rooms that were surrounding the location.

Q Okay. And once those folks were out, what was the next role that you took on?

A So the next role, we had some officers being SERT officers to the west location. I met back up with them and a plan was kind of getting put in place that if we have to go in this room, you know, who -- what order we're going to go in, who's going to do

what.

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Shortly after that, there was -- we were told that we were going to move over to the apartment just to -- or the motel room just to the east of the target apartment.

So the group of us went around through the apartment -- or the motel parking lot, and moved to Room 17, which is the room directly to the east of Motel Room 16 where the incident was occurring.

Q Okay. And walk us through what you did.

A One of the other operators, Sergeant Frankus (phonetic), had a, like a master-type key that gave us access into Room 17. So at this point, we're trying to be quiet, because we know we're right next door. There's only a wall in between us.

We're also, as we're trying to get into that room, the door that we're going in, we're, you know, just right next to the room they're in, so worried about somebody maybe popping out of that room, being the -- the suspect that's -- that's armed.

So we made access into that room. It had already been either evacuated or the person that was in that room had already left, 'cause there was -- there was nobody in there, but there was stuff that was evident that somebody was staying in that room.

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We put our people, once we got everybody in the room, got -- made sure our order was straight and who was going to do what. So we had Sergeant Frankus was the sergeant that was in the room.

Officer Townley was going to go first,

Sergeant Frankus was going to go second, myself going third into the room if we needed to and deploy a flash-bang, which is a FSDD, a flash sound diversionary device, which will make a loud flash, make a loud noise. They also, some smoke will come off those.

Officer Griffin and Officer Trella was the two officers that were going to use a -- a large metal ram to -- they can swing it back and then come forward and that will assist in opening the door, a locked door or force it open.

Officer Sparling had a tool to break a window out next to the front door of the motel room.

There was blinds and stuff in there. And then

Officer Corno (phonetic) was going to assist him with that.

Q Okay. And is this sort of team of officers, what is that called?

A At that point, we were a hasty rescue team at that point or sometimes called hasty assault,

depending on, you know, the situation, but at this point, we were doing a hostage rescue. This was our hasty team to do it.

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When I say "hasty," it doesn't diminish it, what -- what the -- what the job is. It's not like hasty, like, ah, we'll do this, threw it together.

This is -- this is organized and we practice in this.

And it just means that we can let somebody know we're ready to go if -- if something happens.

And then later, as you can develop a more deliberate plan, which it would be called, which is, you know, maybe you have -- if it's like a bigger structure with multiple doors, it's like, okay, now we have five different doors we're looking at making entry, and it's like it's really hammered down.

But all plans are always evolving. You are always looking to make things better, 'cause information changes or whatever it may be; but at that point, we had that team set up and if we had to go, we were ready to go.

Q Okay. Thank you, Detective. When you were in that room and when you all were getting set up, can you describe what you were hearing from the other -- from the other side of that wall?

A Yes. We heard some -- some kind of crashing

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and banging. There was some information broadcasted that it looked like a mattress was against a window, which is -- for me, is an indication that whoever's in there is trying to -- to barricade.

That's -- that's something that would prohibit us from either getting a visual look into the room, but more, making it harder for us to get in there. And then we start hearing some other, it sounded like furniture sliding around.

The room we were in had some, you know, furniture and bed and stuff, so I figured it was similar. And from where we were, it sounded like that something was getting pushed against the front door area, you know.

So, in my mind, and the conversation we were having in there that, you know, he's barricading it to make it hard for us to get in this room, which is not good.

Q And what were your concerns about a barricade at that point?

A That if we needed to go, if we started hearing screaming or -- or something indicating that the female in the room was being harmed, that we weren't going to be able to get in there as fast as we wanted to because the door was going to be blocked by

1	a piece of furniture or beds or bed frames or whatever
2	it may be. And that's why, you know, another reason,
3	you know, we had this window getting broken out, too.
4	Q Okay. And while you were hearing these
5	items moving around inside, did you hear the female
6	at all?
7	A I don't remember hearing the female. I
8	remember hearing the male voice.
9	Q And could you hear what he was saying?
10	A I heard, like, screaming. Like or it
11	was kind of like not like a screaming for help type
12	of scream, but more just like an anger, kind of
13	guttural kind of like yelling. And this is as stuff's
14	getting moved around in there.
15	Q Okay. And so as you're hearing that, what
16	are you all doing?
17	A Well, we're thinking that, you know, there's
18	on some of these situations like this, you know, the
19	tone is maybe like somebody's calming down. This
20	didn't sound like he was calming down at all. It
21	seemed like, you know, he's really amped up.
22	There's information being broadcasted over
23	the radio that he said he's going to kill her. We
24	knew he was armed. We were already told that he had
25	drug her in the room against her will.

So, in my mind, in my experience over the years, this is moving really fast and this is a significant threat. It's unlike, you know, a lot of our call-outs that we get where it's more of a toned-down kind of a thing.

- Q Okay. So at the point that you're in the room, had you heard at that point that he had made threats that he would kill her?
 - A Yes.
 - Q Okay. And had that come out over the radio?
- 11 A Yes.

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Q And at that -- at what point did you hear the gunshot?

A It was -- it was shortly after that, 'cause we were talking amongst ourselves like, you know, "Let's get ready to go." You know, we were concerned about the door.

We were -- I had actually taken off, like,
my gas mask to make myself thinner, 'cause I carry
that on my back. You know, so, in my mind, you know,
as -- as we were talking amongst ourselves and I
believe some other guys were trying to make themselves
as thin as possible to get in this room that -- you
know, so in our head when we took off, we believed
this was going to be barricaded and that -- that it

was going to be difficult to get in the room.

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So as we're having those discussions, heard a gunshot. It was announced that it was a sniper shot. And, at that point, the execute command was given and we moved up to that door, which was close to us, 'cause we just came right out our door, went to that door.

And as the Officer Trella (phonetic) and Officer Griffin started using the battering ram, it took three times before it was open enough that I could get a flash-bang in the room.

And after that went off, that's when

Officer Townley and Officer Frank -- or Sergeant

Frankus started to make entry into the room. And we had to fight through a mattress that was -- and a dresser that was holding the mattress up against the door. And it -- we had to, you know, really work to get through there, but we did.

Made entry into the room. Saw a female to the back right as we made entry and then somebody was announcing that the -- the male suspect was down in the bathroom area.

And as we came around, saw, you know, that officers were dealing with the female and I just went toward where the male was and saw that he was down on

the ground at that point in the bathroom area. 1 Okay. And was -- a question? 2. 3 A GRAND JUROR: So what time was the hasty 4 team, I guess, ready? 5 THE WITNESS: Well --6 A GRAND JUROR: 'Cause you said you were 7 preparing, so at what point would you -- would you 8 guys say that you were kind of set? 9 THE WITNESS: Well, we were set already. We 10 were -- but it's -- you know, it's -- you're 11 constantly like what can we do, you know, like, for 12 instance, take the gas mask -- you know, so it's 13 you're always trying to, you know, think of what's --14 what more you can do. 15 But when we were -- right when we -- we had 16 the plan of who was going to do what for the most part 17 before we even left to get into that room. So we had 18 a hasty team. The first hasty team that we had was 19 the one when we were all to the west. 20 So why -- while I was helping evacuate some 21 of the rooms, other operators were -- already had a 2.2 hasty team. So as soon as we got there, shortly after 23 we got there, there was, you know, the first stages of 24 a hasty team put together at that point. 25 Then it just kept on getting a little bit

1 better, I guess. But when we went to the room, it 2 was -- we knew what we were going to do. 3 BY MS. MARRERO: 4 And so I guess to clarify a little bit 5 further, when you form a hasty team, is the goal to be 6 able to make a -- a fast entry --7 Α Yes. -- if need be? 8 So if -- if right when we get there, if 9 10 it's, you know, three or four people, five people and it's like, okay, we -- we're here. We got a hasty 11 12 team. 13 If all of a sudden at that point, we needed 14 to go, we could go. But then as time goes on and 15 other people start showing up, you may swap people out 16 because somebody has a -- a discipline that they're 17 more experienced in or whatever it may be. 18 So the -- the team, just like the situation, Q 19 is constantly evolving? 20 Yes. I mean --21 Would that be accurate? 2.2 It could be on a different situation where 23 maybe you even have somebody that's not on the team, a 24 uniform officer, like, "Hey, you're going to be the 25 one that tries to knock this door in." And it's like,

okay, we -- you have sort of a hasty team at that point and then as team members start showing up, you may replace those other officers.

Q Okay. And when you went in and (indiscernible). And we're going to pull up some photos and I'll ask you a few more questions about the room and the location of those.

A Okay.

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Q But when you went in and when you saw the female, did she appear to be unharmed?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And all right. So I've got some photos up on the screen here for you Detective Gradwahl. Can you sort of explain to the grand jury what they're looking at in terms of the furniture and any sort of debris that we see in those photos.

A There's, on the picture on the left, that would be if you -- if the front door was -- if you're standing in the front door looking straight back to the -- to the south. But our vantage point when we came in, there was mattresses blocking that.

But there's the dresser off to the left.

There's part of the bed frame, I believe in that

picture. And then straight back is the bathroom with

the suspect on the ground. And then to the right of

that picture, there's a -- you see part of an opening 1 2. that goes to another room. 3 So the middle picture, you'll be able to --4 you can see the other room to the right-hand side of 5 that picture and the female was back in that area. 6 Okay. And she -- I'm sorry. She was back in this area? 7 8 Yes. 9 Okay. And was she able to be safely evacuated from the room? 10 11 Α Yes. 12 Just a few other things before we move on. 13 Can you talk to the grand jury about these holes that we see in the walls and just tell them that what is. 14 Those are holes in the wall that the team 15 16 next door. They were to the room to the west. 17 were holes that they made that they -- they would be 18 able to look in and help the team make an entry. 19 They could either, you know, get eyes on the 20 threat first and take whatever action they need or 21 needs to be done or they can relay the information to 2.2 us and provide us with updates of what they're seeing 23 while we're trying to get into the room if they were 24 able to do that first.

Q Okay. And --

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I know timewise it's going 1 A GRAND JUROR: 2 to be hard to say, but from the first hit of the 3 battering ram, would you say how long -- how many 4 seconds would you say before you were effectively 5 truly in the room? 'Cause it sounded like you had 6 three hits and then you got to get through the 7 barricade. 8 THE WITNESS: Ten seconds, maybe. 9 you know, somewhere in that general time frame. 10 MR. HANNON: Sorry. We have another 11 question from the grand jury. 12 A GRAND JUROR: Kind of a back-up question. 13 When you guys were already basically set and ready, at 14 that point, are you waiting for someone to say go or 15 is it your -- essentially your choice of when you try 16 to get into that room? 17 THE WITNESS: Well, at that point, I 18 believe, at least in my mind, that if it is a sniper 19 shot taken, that we're going to support that sniper 20 shot. And that's pretty standard. 21 And so if we knew that ahead of time and I 2.2 believe the execute command was given, but I think we 23 were -- once we heard sniper shot, you know, starting 24 to creep out the room at that point. And so, yeah.

And then the ten seconds could be two or

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1	three seconds less than that, but, you know, just
2	picturing, you know, one, two, three with with the
3	ram and then flash-bangs, but, you know, there's going
4	to be a slight delay before that goes off, but we're
5	going to be going in pretty much on top of that. But,
6	yes.
7	BY MS. MARRERO:
8	Q And when you entered the room and sort of
9	took stock of where everything was and where everybody
10	was, did you personally observe Mr observe
11	Mr. Rice?
12	A Yes, I did.
13	Q And is the photograph in the center here
14	consistent with what you saw when you entered?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Was there anything notable in either of
17	his hands?
18	A Yes. I saw a black-handled, silver-bladed
19	knife in his hand.
20	Q And once the victim was removed from the
21	room, were medics called in?
22	A I believe the medics were called in, you
23	know, maybe while she was still in there. I mean, it
24	was it was fast. We that we had medics come in;
25	and, you know, during that time frame, I believe the

medics were coming in and people were trying to get her out of the room.

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Q Okay. Can you discuss what -- well, can you explain to me what are -- what does the term "rules of engagement" mean to you?

A Rules of engagement, depending on the situation, may come from -- it's usually whoever's the highest ranking person on scene. You know, at some -- as some point, maybe a sergeant of the scene may dictate the rules of engagement for whoever's there.

And then as, you know, like on these type of call-outs where, you know, more and more people start showing up, you know, generally, it's -- you have to be on scene to be able to dictate what going on.

So once the incident commander shows up, which is usually, you know, a lieutenant, captain, commanders or higher that are -- occupy those roles that they'll announce that, you know, "I'm here, I'm in charge and I'll be, you know, making the decisions from here on out."

And so decisions they make, it's not going to be all the decisions. You know, if -- if we're in the room, we don't need to ask every little thing we do. "Can I, you know, take the gas mask off here," or whatever. But they're going to be dictating what

the -- what their expectations are for rules of engagement.

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For example, on a hostage situation, it may be that it's standard rules, which means just -- standard rules we always follow. If we feel that somebody's an immediate threat of death or serious physical injury, you have to make that decision what you're going to do.

It's up to the operator or the officer. If it's -- it could be more than that, though. It could be the shot of opportunity that they -- they give because they have information coming in from all different sources. You know, the operators in the room, they're limited to what they're hearing on the radio and what they're able to talk amongst themselves.

They're not at the command post hearing what -- what maybe the negotiation team is hearing, what we're saying, what they know on a criminal, you know, history of somebody. All those things may play into their decision and their expertise of being an incident commander to authorize something like that.

Q And so you mentioned standard rules, so is this something that's present in, essentially, every situation that you encounter unless something has

changed?

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A Yes. And that's every day we head out of the office or on our way to work, whatever it may be, it's standard rules.

Q Okay. Had you received any order -- any orders modifying the standard rules of engagement at that point?

A From what I remember, there was talk on the radio that I heard and that we had talked amongst ourselves that if -- if there's screaming heard or we believe that she's being injured, that it's likely that we're going to go at that point or that we are going to go.

And I believe I heard that from Sergeant
Livingston. I can't remember if I heard -- if
somebody else, the commanders or somebody else may
have said that on the radio. I know that the
sergeants sometimes will talk to the lieutenant back
at the command post on the phone at times.

I can't remember exactly how that was relayed, but my understanding was and that we were prepared to, when we got the execute, that if we hear screaming or believe that she's being injured in the room, that we were going to go, which, you know, so that was -- I felt that that -- there was a high

likelihood that could be happening.

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- Q Okay. And so as this is happening, are you hearing constant updates over your radio?
- A Yes. We're hearing -- hearing updates.

 And, you know, for -- for these types of situations,
 this one, you know, my 19 years on the team, this was
 moving really fast from the first word we heard of it
 at 15 Killingsworth to, you know, when the shot was
 taken, it was a -- a very short time frame for these
 type of call-outs.
- Q And can you go through the different updates you heard in terms of the information that was coming in that elevated your concern?
- A Yeah. I believe there was -- there was talk that -- or that I'm hearing over the radio and what I'm hearing personally through the room and the barricading that -- that things were -- were escalating as far as his demeanor and -- and then the threats to kill her.

Those seemed like they were elevating, not declining, like in some of the other situations I've been involved in. And so that's the kind of stuff that I was hearing over the radio. The mattress is covering the window.

And then we're hearing barricading and then

1	that he's going to kill her. And so that's kind of
2	what I was operating under, those things that I was
3	hearing.
4	MS. MARRERO: Okay.
5	BY MR. HANNON:
6	Q Detective Gradwahl, just one follow-up
7	question. You mentioned a shot of opportunity when
8	there's information coming in from the CIC or the
9	critical incident commander, who's getting information
10	from other sources, the Crisis Negotiation Team, the
11	SERT team and that's being dispelled over the radio.
12	That quote, unquote, "shot of opportunity,"
13	that is something that is higher than the standard
14	rules of engagement. Is that accurate?
15	A Yes.
16	Q So, in other words, the standard rules of
17	engagement would allow an officer, any uniformed
18	officer, to follow the normal rules and protocols if
19	someone is in mortal danger, they themselves are in
20	mortal danger, but the shot of opportunity
21	authorization is something that would be escalated
22	beyond the standard rules of engagement?
23	A Yes. And and that was just an example of
24	a type of rules of engagement that you could encounter
25	or train in or whatever it may be, not not specific

1	to this event.
2	Q Right.
3	A But the the standard rules, you know,
4	are are something that the individual themselves
5	comes to that conclusion.
6	BY MS. MARRERO:
7	Q And do the standard rules allow you to
8	take to take action if you have concern about
9	somebody's safety and specifically that they are at
10	risk of death or serious bodily injury?
11	A Absolutely, yes.
12	MS. MARRERO: Are there any questions from
13	the grand jurors?
14	Okay. May this witness be excused? The
15	State's next witness will be Tom Snitily.
16	Please raise your right hand.
17	TOM SNITILY
18	Was thereupon called as a witness; and, having been
19	first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
20	<u>EXAMINATION</u>
21	BY MS. MARRERO:
22	Q And can you please state and spell your
23	first and last name.
24	A Yeah. Tom Snitily, T-o-m, S-n-i-t-i-l-y.
25	Q Thank you. And can you tell the grand jury

1	how you're employed.
2	A As a Portland police officer.
3	Q How long have you been in law enforcement?
4	A Coming up on 17 years.
5	Q Thank you. And can you detail for the grand
6	jury your background, training and experience.
7	A Yeah. I went to the basic academy and
8	Monmouth. I then completed the advanced academy with
9	Portland. In-service training every year. And then
10	in 2011, I was assigned to the SERT team and trained
11	with them until now.
12	Q Okay. So you've been with SERT since 2011?
13	A Yes.
14	Q And were you working on October 10th of
15	this year?
16	A Yes, I was.
17	Q And in what capacity were you working on
18	that day?
19	A With the SERT team.
20	Q And did you respond to the Del Rancho Motel?
21	A I did.
22	Q And can you tell the grand jury how you
23	became aware of an incident unfolding at the Del
24	Rancho Motel.
25	A Yeah. We were just finishing we served

two search warrants that morning and we were just 1 2. finishing our second search warrant. And I was -during that search warrant, I was assigned to the 3 4 BearCat piece of armor. 5 And what is -- what is the BearCat? 6 Oh, sorry, it's one of our armored trucks 7 that we use on search warrants to drive us around and --8 9 0 Does it --10 -- that gives us protection. 11 -- transport the -- the SERT team and any 12 gear that you need to have with you? 13 Yeah, we have two different ones. One's a 14 BearCat and one's a Bear truck. 15 Okay. And can you describe sort of the 0 16 information that you heard as you --17 Α Yeah. 18 -- as this started to unfold? 19 On that warrant, I happened to be assigned 20 to the BearCat with -- Sergeant McConnell was the 21 person in charge of that BearCat. And so he started 2.2 to get phone calls regarding a call that was taking 23 place that patrol was dealing with on 82nd Avenue at 24 the Del Rancho Motel. 25 And so he asked us, somebody to turn on

1	radio to their radio net so we could start to hear
2	what was happening. So that's when I first kind of
3	learned that it was going on.
4	Q Okay. With what did you hear over the
5	radio?
6	A Just heard that they were dealing with a
7	person that had either stabbed someone or attempted to
8	stab someone at a mini-mart and then gone over to a
9	hotel and had taken a woman inside a hotel room and
10	wasn't allowing her to leave. And it was kind of
11	their initial response to that.
12	Q Okay. And that the team that you were on,
13	were you ultimately activated to that location?
14	A Yes.
15	Q And can you tell me what your role was when
16	you arrived on scene.
17	A When we got there, I got immediately
18	assigned to start working on breach plans while the
19	other guys went up to make what we call a hasty team
20	or a crisis team.
21	Q Okay. So were you separate and aside we
22	just heard from Detective Gradwahl. You weren't part
23	of his team?
24	A No. They they took off to do that and my
25	job was to to be a breach breach team.

1	Q And what does that mean, to be a breach
2	team?
3	A To come up with the best way to get inside
4	the location, if need be.
5	Q And so where did you locate?
6	A I got assigned to we had another breach
7	arrive that got assigned to work for with the front
8	door. The only there was only one door to the
9	room. And so I got assigned to go into a room next
10	door to see if there was a way to create a hole in
11	the wall.
12	Q And which room did you go into?
13	A No. 15. It was one to the west.
14	Q Once you got in there, did you take any
15	actions to try and make it possible to to go
16	through the wall?
17	A I did, yeah.
18	Q And what did you do to do that?
19	A I immediately saw that we'd be able to get
20	a, I believed, a view port. So I wanted to work as
21	fast as I could to give us options to hopefully help
22	the situation. So I hung up a charge on the wall to
23	get a view port in there.
24	Q And can you describe to the grand jury what
25	a view port is

1	A Just a a hole in the wall, just so
2	somebody can see from one side to the other.
3	Q You indicated that there was only one door
4	in and out of the hotel room where Mr. Rice had
5	barricaded?
6	A Yeah. It faced the one door facing the
7	parking lot, if you look at the map there.
8	Q So there weren't any doors, like between the
9	hotel rooms, anything like that?
LO	A No. No common doors.
L1	Q Okay. And what was your understanding of
L2	the situation as you were setting up?
L3	A I was hearing radio traffic that he'd pulled
L4	this woman back into the the hotel and he'd also
L5	made threats to kill her if the cops came in. And
L6	then updates were coming in that I believe he either
L7	stabbed or attempted to stab. There was some sort of
L8	altercation at, I think it was a mini-mart across the
L9	street, like a 7-Eleven.
20	Q And so are you receiving these updates sort
21	of as the situation is developing?
22	A Yeah. As I'm doing what I'm doing. I'm
23	just picking them up on the radio.
24	Q Okay. Did you hear anything when you were
25	in Room 15, when you were adjacent?

1	A Yeah. After I got that first charge up, I
2	could hear, it sounded like in Room 16, furniture
3	being moved. And it was my belief it sounded like he
4	was barricading the door with furniture.
5	Q And was this something that you continued to
6	hear? Was this something that you heard very briefly
7	and then it went away?
8	A I heard it for just you know, you could
9	hear like the scaping of furniture moving towards what
10	would be, I thought, my wall away. The door actually
11	was more towards the far wall.
12	Q Okay.
13	A So like being moved away and that kind of in
14	my mind was like, yeah, he's barricading the door.
15	Q Did you hear any voices thin room?
16	A I did. I could hear a male voice yelling.
17	I couldn't really tell what he was saying, but just
18	like hearing through walls, like a male voice. And I
19	don't know if he was, like, yelling outside at people
20	or if he was yelling on a phone or yelling to someone
21	else, but
22	Q Did you hear a female voice at any point?
23	A I never heard a female voice, no.
24	Q At some point, did you request additional
25	equipment to assist?

1	A Yes.
2	Q And did the situation, ultimately, result in
3	a gunshot before all of that equipment even got
4	to you?
5	A Yes.
6	Q So was this fairly quick occurring?
7	A Very fast, yeah.
8	Q Okay. At what point did you hear a gunshot?
9	A I don't you mean exact time or
10	Q Yeah. Were you still setting up in the room
11	at that point?
12	A Yeah. I was, you know, always trying to,
13	basically, increase our likelihood of success to try
14	and save her, so I continually thinking of stuff I
15	could do to help that out.
16	Q And so had you set up so that you could
17	create a porthole?
18	A Yes. I'd set that up. I was actually
19	moving to create more to give us additional looks
20	inside.
21	Q Were you were you able to get as many set
22	up as you had hoped?
23	A No. I wanted at least another one to gain
24	advantage, hopefully to go to another part of the
25	room, 'cause I felt like the one I had would only go

into the main living space and I wanted one to go to the bathroom, 'cause I felt like that would give us -- you know, with the door being barricaded, I thought there might be a real time delay.

And with that, if I could have -- the more eyes we could have had in there, the more likelihood that we'd get a view and hopefully protect her.

- Q But the -- the situation escalated before you were able to get fully set up?
 - A Yeah.

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- Q And what -- what occurred after you heard the gunshot?
- A I heard the shot and our radio transmission just so we confirmed that it was us that took the shot, is Zulu, Zulu, Zulu. And I heard that come over the radio, which made me know that a sniper had taken a shot.

And they said side three, so I knew it was our -- I don't know if they've already talked about our numbering, but that means it's the back side that that shot came from.

And our protocol is based on when a sniper takes a shot, we're going to support that with an entry to the room to -- to save -- save the female inside just in case that hadn't had the effect it

Examination of Tom Snitily

needed to and he was still able to then change the 1 2. event, that he might be attacking her right then. 3 so I know to launch -- initiate my charges and we're 4 going to launch entry. 5 And did you do that at that time? 6 Yes. 7 0 And were those successful in creating the 8 holes in the wall? 9 Yes. And what -- what were you able to see when 10 11 you looked through? 12 When I got up there, I was looking into the 13 main living area. And I immediately looked to my 14 right and could see what looked like an open door to the bathroom. 15 16 And I could see just a hand laying on the 17 ground motionless and I believed that was the suspect. 18 And so I was -- I could hear that the guys were kind 19 of hung up at the door trying to fight through the 20 barricade. And I was trying to yell to them, "Head to 2.1 the bathroom, head to the bathroom. That's where I 2.2 think it's going on." 23 And the whole time, I was trying to find 24 her, hoping that she might be somewhere near to my

side of the wall, that I could protect her until they

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Examination of Tom Snitily

1	could get in there.
2	Q And did you see her?
3	A I never saw her in the room, no.
4	Q Did you ever make entry into Room 16?
5	A No, I didn't.
6	Q At any point, had you heard a more specific
7	threat that he had made regarding her?
8	A Yeah. Almost real close to when the shot,
9	just a little bit before, it felt like. You know, I'm
10	sure I missed a lot of radio traffic with how much I
11	was doing, but I remember there was a transmission
12	that was coming either from intel or our negotiators
13	that says he's threatening to slit her throat.
14	Q And you heard that over the radio?
15	A Yeah.
16	Q Would any members of the team have been able
17	to hear that as well?
18	A Everyone should have. It came over our net.
19	Q Okay.
20	A It was something of that nature, like he's
21	threatening to cut her throat or slit her throat or
22	Q And with regard to the porthole that was
23	created, can you just describe how big that that
24	hole is and whether or not a person would be able to
25	get through that as they're having trouble getting

Examination of Tom Snitily

1	through the front door?
2	A You can look through it. It's a view port.
3	You wouldn't be able to walk through it.
4	Q Okay.
5	A But, yeah.
6	MS. MARRERO: Are there any other questions
7	from grand jurors?
8	May this witness be excused? Okay.
9	THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
LO	MS. MARRERO: Thank you.
L1	MR. HANNON: Are the grand jurors okay to
L2	proceed with the next witness?
L3	Great. We'll call Sergeant Donald
L4	Livingston.
L5	Just stand right there and raise your right
L6	hand and he'll swear you in.
L7	DONALD LIVINGSTON
L8	Was thereupon called as a witness; and, having been
L9	first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
20	<u>EXAMINATION</u>
21	BY MR. HANNON:
22	Q Hello. We're going to start first by
23	stating your name and spelling it for the record.
24	A My name's Don Livingston. First name is
25	D-o-n; and last name and L-i-v-i-n-g-s-t-o-n.

1	Q And what is your current occupation?
2	A I'm a sergeant with the Portland Police
3	Bureau.
4	Q And how long you been with the Portland
5	Police Bureau?
6	A Ah, 21 years.
7	Q And what is your current assignment with the
8	Portland Police Bureau?
9	A I'm a sergeant assigned to the Special
10	Emergency Reaction Team, which is part of the tactical
11	operations division. It's basically the SWAT team for
12	the Portland Police Bureau.
13	Q And is that an on-call position or a
14	full-time position?
15	A For me, it's a full-time position, but I am
16	on call 24-7 in regards to call-outs for anything, any
17	business in the Portland Police Bureau.
18	Q And we heard your position as sergeant
19	you're sergeant of the SERT team?
20	A There's two full-time sergeants, so in terms
21	of hierarchy, I am SERT 2. Jim Darby is SERT 1. He
22	is the team leader. He oversees the entry side. And
23	my primary responsibility is to oversee the inner
24	perimeter, which includes containment or sniper
25	observer officers.

Q	And how long in addition t	o being a
sergeant,	how long have you been part o	f the SERT team
or been ac	tive with SERT?	

A Two years.

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Q And is there any training that goes along with being a member of the SERT team?

A Yes. There's -- initially, you have to go through a basic SWAT school, which is a one-week school put on by the Oregon Tactical Officers

Association. I also went through the basic sniper school, which is also one week put on by -- one week school put on by the Oregon Tactical Officers

Association.

There's ongoing training, so every other week, we train two days as a team. And, annually, we train one week as a team down at Camp Rilea, which is in Warrenton, Oregon, near Astoria.

And then, you know, I'm also required to go outside training, kind of seek training in specific areas to see what's out there aside from what we do specifically in Portland, just to make sure that what we are doing meets the national standards and current practice.

Q And in addition to that, just being a sergeant with Portland Police Bureau, is there

training that you have to rise to that level of a position with the Portland Police Bureau as well?

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A Yes. As an officer, we're all required to go through quite extensive training. It starts out with the basic police academy. For Portland, the advanced academy. I actually started my career with the Metro Police Department. There, we had training once a month as a -- as a department.

Here with the Portland Police Bureau, we have annual in-service training. The State requires so much training in order to maintain your certification. Portland Police Bureau actually goes above and beyond that.

So I have attended annual in-service training through the City for my entire 21 career -- 21-year career. Additionally to that, I'm -- I've worked in the Training Division for six years as an instructor.

I specifically taught defensive tactics, which is now called control tactics. I was a firearms instructor and also taught patrol tactics, which is now referred to as patrol procedures.

Q Thank you. Were you acting as sergeant for the SERT team going back to this incident on October 10th, 2018?

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A Yes. On October 10th, I was actually the team leader that day. Sergeant Darby was on vacation, so I assumed the role of team leader for the events that day.

It was actually kind of a busy day. We had two warrants that we served prior to getting called out for this. And my partner that day, who oversaw the inner perimeter, was Sergeant Pete McConnell.

Q And just for clarification then, so where in the timeline of your day did this incident start to unfold at the Del Rancho? What was the SERT team doing at that time?

A So our day started at 4 o'clock. We served a warrant for Homeland Security Investigations in relation to a robbery investigation. That was on 136 and about Powell area. And then at 9 o'clock, we served a second warrant for the same investigative unit, related to the same investigation at 51st and Killingsworth.

That -- that execution of that warrant started at 9:00 a.m. I believe we finished that. I called up investigators when I received a page on my phone to call Sergeant Nice of East Precinct as he was either responding or on scene of the call-out at the Del Rancho Hotel. So as far as like a specific time,

I can't recall.

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Q And did you take the call from Sergeant Nice or were you still finishing the tasks related to the warrant?

A I was finishing the tasks related to the warrant, so I got on the police radio and asked

Sergeant McConnell to call Sergeant Nice to see what was exactly happening and what we could provide as far as assistance goes.

Sometimes these consults are mainly asking questions. They're reaffirming that what they've set up tactically is correct and meets the standard. And then sometimes it turns into a full-team activation.

Q And after you were finished finalizing the tasks related to the original warrant that you were completing, did you consult with Sergeant McConnell about what was going on with Sergeant Nice's situation at the Del Rancho?

A Yes. I met face to face with Sergeant

McConnell. He had told me that it sounded like there
was a hostage situation down at the Del Rancho Motel
and that we were likely going to be activated.

He had already talked to Lieutenant Dakin and received permission to move the team closer to a staging location. That way, if we were activated, we

would be close and our response time would be minimal.

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So we were getting all the officers loaded back up into the vehicles that we were transported to to serve the warrant and we were going to drive down close to the -- close to the hotel. Specifically, we picked a Fred Meyer parking lot at 82nd and Johnson Creek Avenue, which would give us a straight shot up 82nd to the motel.

Q Now, just as an aside, had the SERT team not been activated for these other warrants, is such a rapid response by SERT typical when these situations are evolving like they were at the Del Rancho?

A No. Typically, we're all over the place, some people at home. So in order to get the whole team there, it could take up to 45 minutes to an hour. It just depends what -- what time of day and what the location is.

Q So based on your training and experience, the response, despite as we've heard earlier, rush-hour traffic or the morning traffic, would you characterize SERT's response to this particular location for this particular incident as quicker than usual?

A Yes. Very -- very much so. Probably the quickest response that I've been to as far as like a

1 call-out situation goes.

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Q And as you were working with the SERT members who were available as resources are being gathered, were you listening over the air or consulting with other police personnel as you were en route?

A Yes. So we were coordinating our efforts on one radio channel, which is called She-2. That's kind of the primary net that we use for our team when we're on an event. The main incident was happening on East Precinct.

There was actually also a call created, which I can read on my phone. And I was talking on the phone with the CNT sergeant who was also responding, Sergeant Troy King.

So between all those things, I was trying to gather as much information as possible about what had happened and what was happening currently during the -- the incident.

Q And from your understanding as you were en route, to the best of your knowledge, what was your understanding of the situation as you were gathering the SERT resources?

A Well, I knew that there was disturbance at a 7-Eleven, which was, from my previous knowledge, was

pretty much right across the street from the Del Rancho Motel.

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I knew it involved a knife and I knew that the disturbance kind of carried over into the Del Rancho Motel parking lot and then a female was forcibly taken into a motel room.

It was my belief based on the conversations that the female was a significant other of the male that had taken her in there. I didn't know exactly what the relationship was, but boyfriend-girlfriend was what the assumption was.

When I got there, I also received information that was probable cause to arrest the male subject for the incident that happened in the 7-Eleven. Specifically, it said there was probable cause to arrest him for Assault II.

I knew that Sergeant Nice was in charge of the event as the incident commander. And at -- as we got off of the freeway at Johnson Creek, we were actually officially activated as a team to respond, so our services were requested.

And we never actually stopped at the staging location. We drove straight to the Del Rancho Motel; stopped so I could get out and contact the incident commander.

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Q And we've heard previously that when there
are SERT call-outs and the critical incident commander
or CIC arrives, they take command. But prior to that
person arriving or all the places are set in place
pieces or set in place, excuse me, there's someone
else in charge at that time. Was that the case in
this situation?

A Yes. The sergeant or the highest ranking individual on scene with the most information is going to be the incident commander. And that at that point was Sergeant anyone Kyle Nice. He was still assuming that role.

And he was pretty busy up there at the scene, directing activity. Myself, Lieutenant Dakin and then Assistant Chief Jaime Resch were all part of the previous incident as the -- as far as the people in charge.

When I got there, I knew Sergeant Nice was too busy to come out and talk to us, so I made an effort to move to where he was to have a face-to-face conversation with him.

Q And did you get permission from Sergeant Nice, when you arrived on scene, to get pieces in place for your SERT team.

A Yes. So, first I asked exactly what room

the suspect was in. He showed me where it was. It was Room 16 and then he also told me that he'd evacuated Room 15 and 17, and they were working on some additional evacuations.

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He had set up a custody team out front and had -- and some containment officers as well. I asked him if I could deploy a hasty team. That would be a team of a minimum of five officers, depending on resources. And I'd like to get them as close to the room as possible.

And the purpose of that team would be to make entry into the room if there was some type of commotion. They needed to provide life-saving aid to the female victim. He approved that -- that mission.

I also asked him if I could start working on some explosive breach capabilities, specifically for the front door, and also for some through wall gun ports and maybe a through wall charge as well.

And that would occur in the room to the right of it if you're facing the door which would have been Room No. 15. He approved both those missions.

And I specifically asked him to continue evacuations.

If you look at the picture there, the Del Rancho Motel kind of had two sides, they parallel each other.

I was concerned about people being inside

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their rooms, potentially in a hazardous situation, so I asked him to evacuate the entire hotel, all rooms.

Q And going to that term "hasty team," it's been your experience and now, Sergeant, describe briefly what -- what a hasty team is designed to do upon arrival at the scene.

A So we train as a group, as a team, quite often. A good way to put it is a quick reaction team so specifically you'll have one or two guys assigned to breach or ram the door open. In this case we need to gain access. You'll have somebody designated to throw a flash-bang. Maybe somebody to break a window and get a rifle through and then make entry into the room itself.

So at bare minimum it's a team of officers that train together, work together on specific tactics that can come up with a quick plan to get inside of a location and provide aid; or end a situation, take somebody into custody.

You're always working to make that plan better and you're always working towards what we refer to as a deliberate plan, which would mean everything's in place, every possible outcome you can consider has been though of and this is your best chance of resolving the situation safely.

So that's your end goal and you start out with a group of five at least officers going up and starting to formulate a plan.

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Q And as already indicated, you set that up at this time. At some point, were you able to get a face-to-face briefing with Sergeant Nice at the scene to kind of get a better understanding of what was going on? Or was all your information from over the air?

A I did have a face-to-face with him. One thing we always do is when the management arrives, the CIC, the lieutenant from SERT and CNT, we have -- kind of have a face-to-face meeting as a group and kind of go through the whole incident, so everybody's on the same page.

This incident was so rapidly developing that when they pulled Sergeant Nice away to do that, I was very busy setting things up, so I was not able to attend that -- that meeting and kind of get the whole comprehensive call. So I had a face-to-face with him. I got a little bit of information, but I was not able to attend that meeting.

So what I did do was ask Lieutenant Dakin over the radio I kind of gave a summary of what I knew, and asked him to fill in any blanks so everybody

on the team would have that information on our radio 1 2. net, which was SU2. 3 And -- and that -- so you conveyed that over 4 the air to your lieutenant and did -- did that 5 actually happen from the command center to that 6 blinking (indiscernible) or that air? 7 Α Yeah. They had -- they had their briefing. 8 I -- I did that for two reasons. Normally, on a call 9 we'll kind of give as much information as we can to 10 kind of -- kind of let an information update, or I 11 would normally do that, but since I did not attend, I 12 specifically got on the radio, gave the information I 13 had and asked Lieutenant Dakin to fill in the blank, 14 so that happened. Everybody received the same information. 15 16 And as that occurred, at that point, did the 17 information change or was it still pretty much the 18 same about what everybody then knew about the 19 circumstances as they found it? 20 It was pretty much the same. 21 So can -- can you summarize, again, then at 2.2 that stage, what was the information known to the team 23 since at that point it was conveyed open -- over the 24 air. That there was an incident at the 7-Eleven

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that involved a knife. And then that incident, disturbance, continued in the parking lot of the Del Rancho. The suspect pulled a female forcefully into a motel room and there was probably cause to arrest him for Assault II.

There was also information put out that he

-- he specifically said when officers were there that,

"If you don't leave, I'm going to kill her." So that

led us to believe it was definitely a hostage

situation.

Q And when all this information was being conveyed over the air, are these summaries or -- or -- or is it, you know, verbatim recordings of what everybody does?

A It is summaries.

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Q Now, in addition to your team setting up the hasty team in the -- in position in the rooms nearby Room 16, was there any other sergeants or officials setting up any other SERT officers?

A Yeah. So there's too much for one person to kind of run everything, so Sergeant McConnell was in charge of the IP and he was setting up containment or sniper observer officers.

So, specifically, as we -- as we look at our -- our room, it's on the bottom of that which would

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have been the south side and towards the right, or the east end of the unit, so we would want officers on the back side of it kind of if you look at that, that grassy field area --

Q Are you talking about right around here?

A Yes. We would want officers back there and so I know specifically he was sending officers back there for sniper observer spots and containment. We also had officers, if you look where that red or reddish color pen is, we had -- we had replace patrol and they were our custody team, yes. Or sniper observer officers on Site 1, or the main door.

So Sergeant McConnell is responsible for setting all those people up. I'd also designated Sergeant Frankus as in charge of the hasty team, which had moved into Room No. 17, which is to -- if you look at that, to the right end of the unit and if you're facing that door it would have been on the left side of our target.

Q Now, you mentioned as you were moving pieces of personnel around, the lieutenant and the acting chief also arrived. So did the command of the scene change at some point after your response to the scene?

A Well, Sergeant Nice went back there. They had a conversation. I could see them huddled up. I

was not a part of it. I was kind of moving around 1 2. talking to different people getting things set up. 3 Once that conversation happens the normal 4 procedure is that the critical incident commander, 5 which would have been Assistant Chief Resch, would take charge of the incident itself as the overall --6 7 person overall in charge. My direct chain never 8 changed. Lieutenant Dakin was always my next step in the chain of command. 9 And, at some point, did acting Chief Resch 10 become the critical incident commander at the scene? 11 12 You know, I can't recall her saying anything 1.3 on the radio that she was in charge of it. 14 conversations always went through Lieutenant Dakin. 15 0 Gotcha. And is it fair to say that during 16 the interactions any orders that come to you from 17 Lieutenant Dakin is going to be coming from either the 18 critical incident commander or whoever's in charge of 19 the scene at the time, through that chain? 20 That is correct. 21

Q And as we've heard from other witnesses, your chain is involved with the SERT team, and there's a separate chain related to the crisis negotiation team; is that accurate?

A That is correct as well.

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1	Q During this process, as orders are being
2	filtered down from the critical incident commander
3	prior to that were there rules of engagement in place
4	that all the officers are operating under?
5	A Yeah, we were, at the time, operating under
6	what we refer to as standard rules of engagement,
7	which means that you are bound by procedure policy,
8	state and federal law. You're acting within the rules
9	and regulations that are set forth every day for
LO	patrol officers, as well as any teams.
L1	Q And as that is going on, nothing, to your
L2	knowledge, changed from those rules of engagement?
L3	A That's correct, they never changed.
L4	Q Now, as this situation evolved, did you
L5	learn of any behavior going on inside Room 16 as your
L6	hasty teams were in place and the inner perimeter team
L7	was in place?
L8	A Yeah. So the front window was the
L9	curtains were drawn, they were closed, it appeared
20	dark inside.
21	At some point, I heard Officer VanBlokland
22	say over the radio that he was placing a mattress up

I could also -- I could never hear it but

behavior that I would refer to as barricading.

against the rear window, so it was consistent with

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officers who were staged in the rooms next door could hear furniture moving around and they broadcast that over the radio, which was also consistent with barricading.

I was concerned he was barricading doors, windows, which would limit our access to the inside of the room if we needed to make an entry in there to provide assistance, life-saving aid to the female.

Q And let's talk about that. Do you, based on your training and experience as a SERT sergeant, but then also addressing your over 20 years of experience as a law enforcement officer, are you familiar with the dangers that could be present when someone is armed with a knife as opposed to a gun?

A Yes. They're both very dangerous. You know, I've responded to scenes where people have died from stab wounds, you know. They're both extremely dangerous, could result in death.

So I was concerned for her safety based on the fact that I knew that he had a -- a knife; that it was seen by people in the 7-Eleven as well as the Del Rancho Motel parking lot. So -- and then threats to -- to kill her on top of that made me highly concerned for her -- her safety.

Q And despite it not being a firearm, in your

training and experience as a law enforcement officer how quickly have you observed or learned about, through other people's cases, are able -- people able to use a knife in an illegal manner out in the public?

A Extremely fast. I think maybe the common person, if they've never seen something like that before would be shocked. And -- and the overall impact that a knife could have on somebody is -- is -- if you've never seen it before, it's shocking I would say.

So definitely barricading doors would prevent us from getting inside her chances of survival go down based on the fact that we can't have access to her.

Q So as you learn about the barricading and the covering of the windows, did you communicate to the hasty team and the teams in and around Room 16 of measures to take to try to expedite responses to help protect the person inside the room?

A Well, I knew the gun port charge was built and hung. I knew Officer Corno was working on a door charge, so he's going to get that place on the front door which would increase our chances of getting through the front door even if it is barricaded.

And I knew that Officer Snitily was also

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going to start working on a through-all charge. So at that point, Sergeant McConnell and I kind of had a meeting. We did have some officers that were in training at Columbia County, which I had requested that they leave training and respond to the scene.

Our partner team is Washington County tactical negotiation team. I had reached out to our lieutenant, Lieutenant Dakin, and asked for them to send eight additional officers to come assist us. Two breachers to assist with the through wall, and four entry guys to support that. And then two additional IP guys to help with containment. So I was getting more resources there to increase our chances of success.

Q And to that point, from your training and experience for these SERT call-outs, one, you -- you identified that sometimes it can take as long as 45 minutes to assemble a SERT Team to arrive on scene.

Despite the rap -- the rapidly evolving facts from this particular case, with the resources you were seeking under other types of SERT responses, do these types of situations take longer to evolve with the persons inside the room and then negotiations with the Crisis Negotiation Team or other officers on scene?

A If I understand your question right, the length of time based on negotiations?

Q Yeah.

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A You know, once we get everything set, it's our hope that negotiators can make contact and have meaningful conversation and relay to us how it's going. In this case, it was relayed over the radio that negotiations were not going well. They were kind of on and off the phone with him several times.

I didn't note specifically what had been said, other than at one point -- and I can't remember in the -- in the chain of this -- it was relayed over the radio that initially he said, "If you don't -- if you try to come in here, I'm going to kill her."

And then later on he said, "If you don't leave, I'm going to kill her." So it did not sound like negotiations were going well. We were continuing with our plan, but nothing had bumped it up to us activating a deliberate plan, at least through the command post.

So we were still kind of waiting for that -that piece, something on the inside, something seen or
something heard, to actually activate us.

Q And compared to other SERT responses that you've had, how -- how fast would you describe this

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situation escalating with the individual compared to other scenes where people are either held hostage or they're just holding themselves up, preventing law enforcement from taking them into custody?

A This was extremely fast. I -- I would guess my time on scene is 30 minutes. Normally, these things take hours. This was, by far, the fastest one I'd been a part of.

Q Did you also work with officers to come up with a break-and-wreck scenario to try to go through the windows, if that was available?

A Yeah, that was part of the hasty team plan.

Sergeant Frankus has actually worked out the personnel responsible for that, so the front door was on the left side as you faced the unit.

There was a window to the right of the front door. Two officers were responsible for breaking that window with a tool. And then the second officer would ideally get on some type of elevated platform to look inside with rifle.

So as it was set up, we had a gun port charged, which would, if activated, would blow a hole under the wall big enough for a person and his shoulders to look through. Usually, you can support that with a handgun to get eyes into the room.

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We had a team that was going to go through the front door. Sergeant -- or Officer Corno was working on an explosive breach, but as it was set up two officers were going to use a ram to try to break the front door down.

And then the third thing that we had going was a break-and-rake plan, which was two officers, one to break the window and a second to get a rifle inside the room. So we were going to get three different looks inside that room to hopefully save her life if needed.

Q Now, we've talked, again, about the barricading and item being moved around. Despite the efforts that you were making to try to get in that room and get in that room quickly, from your training and experience these barricades or obstacles, so to speak, does that create delay for the hasty and rescue teams to get in there to protect the victim?

A Yes. We practice this stuff in training.
We actually get buildings or houses that the City has purchased and we set up scenarios where we actually do explosive breaching and try to get through.

And if there's any barricade, it does limit us and our abilities to get through that. That's why we -- we try so many different options to increase our

likelihood of success.

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Q And going back to the point that everyone was still operating under the standard rules of engagement, within those standard rules of engagement is there a term that you are aware of or know as appropriate initiative?

A Yes. So appropriate initiative means that you, as the individual, still have the authority to evaluate the situation and make use of force or lifesaving decisions based on the totality of the circumstances or the information that you know at the time, just like you would on an open police call.

Just because you're part of a team that's run by a command structure does not limit your ability to do that still. So that's -- that's something that we discuss as a team.

Appropriate initiative is always there.

It's -- if you have time, it's one of those things that you may choose to relay your plan over the radio just so other officers are involved. But there's oftentimes where you don't have that opportunity to do so.

Q So as this, again, plan is constantly evolving and trying to gather resources, what are you physically doing in addition to communicating with

your team at the scene at the Del Rancho?

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A Well, because I was still waiting for a couple officers to come from Columbia County range, they were on their way, and I had requested those eight officers from Washington County CNT, the last two people that were available to actually retrieve any gear or equipment were myself and Sergeant McConnell.

I was still overall in charge of the entire event so I was trying to really limit my involvement in that. But there was a couple pieces of gear that I specifically had to grab for team members that were requested.

And I had -- we have intel officers as well that work as part of our team. We did have three intel officers there at the scene at least, and I reached out to one of them to grab a piece of equipment for me that I took from him at the sidewalk and then walked back to the hasty team.

So I was kind of trying to get stuff done and still have overall vision of what was happening and be available for the responding people when they arrived so I could brief them and place them where I needed them throughout the event.

Q And at what point as this is unfolding did

-- did you hear a gunshot?

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A So as I'd received -- it was a bench. I received a bench from the -- one of our pieces of armor from an -- the intel Officer Mike Jones, I walked it back towards the hasty team, which was, again, in Unit No. 17.

I walked along the north sidewalk, and as I was crossing the parking lot area to get to Unit 17, I heard a gunshot. I was not 100-percent sure if the gunshot came from us or it came from inside of Unit 16. It appeared kind of muffled, but I was in the center of those apartments.

I heard it but I specifically was waiting for radio traffic. If it was one of us, the expectation is after you fire a shot, that you announce that on the radio.

So I did not touch the radio. I heard moments later Officer VanBlokland announce on the SERT net specific command that we use, "Zulu, Zulu, Zulu," which means, "I fired a shot." And he gave specific information, suspect was going to be down right below a window as you walked inside of the -- as you walked inside of the room.

Q And so based on the training and experience of the SERT Team, what is the typical response when

that command goes out?

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A Based on the situation we had and the tools that we had set up that entry into the room could be launched under two situations or three. One would be a deliberate command from the command post.

I could have launched (indiscernible) two situations. Number one, I hear something inside, like I hear a commotion, maybe I hear her screaming for help. That, in the situation, would have cause me to execute the plan.

The third thing would be a sniper shot. So on a "Zulu, Zulu, Zulu," the training for our team is and the standard practice is for us to support that by putting our plan into place, and our plan that we had at the moment.

So immediately I heard the gun port charge go off, and the hasty team exited the Room No. 17 and started moving towards No. 16 and two officers were working the two-person ram on the door.

I could tell it was barricaded. The door was barely moving. I think it was three hits before it kind of got far enough back to gain access inside and the break-and-rake team responded to the window and had smashed the window out.

Q Now, you mentioned three hits to get into

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the door. Is that consistent from your experience of the door being barricaded, given how the ram, the equipment, can be used?

A Yeah. The two-person ram is generally very effective. The doors at the Del Rancho Motel are not significant. Normally, that would have gone when hit, it would have came swinging open. Potentially even like off the hinges. But this was -- they are very slightly pushing.

Even after three hits it was big enough for officer or Detective Todd Gradwahl to toss a flash-bang in there and then we had to physically use muscle to force that door open in order to get people inside.

- Q And just to be clear, that team nor you were actually in the room at that time, so there's still potentially a risk of harm both to the female occupant and/or the law enforcement personnel going in there given those instructions and how difficult it is to get to that door; is that accurate?
 - A That's accurate, yeah.
 - Q So after that occurred, what happened next?
- A So the officer -- the officers that had did the gun port charge and got a view inside the room were now giving us a little bit of information. They

could see the suspect was down.

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We had forced the door wide enough to get -start getting officers in there. I believe I was the
forth officer through the door. Officer Townley
(phonetic) who I think was the second had shielded the
female against the wall and we, the rest of us, had
worked back to the bathroom area where the suspect was
laying on the floor.

Based on my initial observation, it appeared to me he was deceased. I tried to get on the radio several times. We have medics that work with us in a close capacity. They're Portland Fire Bureau medics that are trained and are assigned to our team.

I specifically had requested for one of them to come up so they could either treat him or pronounce him deceased. And then I asked for Officer Townley to get the female out of there. I wanted her -- I know she just went through a traumatic event. I wanted her out of there and also potentially looked at by medical to make sure she was okay.

The medic, Jay Fink (phonetic), from the Portland Fire Bureau made it inside and pronounced the suspect deceased.

Q Once that occurs and knowing your -- based on your training and experience, then what typically

1	happens next in these incidences, what was your next
2	role?
3	A So I started to switch roles into this is
4	now a crime scene. Everybody needs to get out of the
5	the motel room. So I started funneling officers
6	out. We all got outside onto the sidewalk.
7	I I asked for an investigator or a member
8	of the CNT or intel to come up and take control of the
9	female victim, so they could get her back to
10	investigators. They sent two detectives up there to
11	grab her.
12	And then I would just reminded officers that
13	this is an investigation and we cannot talk about it.
14	We're going to get an interview by detectives,
15	potentially issue GAG orders, so I just reminded them
16	that we're not allowed to to speak about this.
17	Q And did you did you segregate your teams
18	into different locations as well when when doing
19	that?
20	A Yeah. So the parking lot itself actually
21	turned into a crime scene. So officers were
22	already
23	Q Do you have a street level, like in front of
24	the area?
25	A Officers were already setting up crime scene

tape. When I -- when I walked out of the apartment, I asked them, kind of -- they were pushing it really close to us. I asked them to push it down further.

So, basically -- do you mind if I stand up?

O Yeah. Go ahead.

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A So, basically, the -- the red crime scene tape ran right here. So this, right -- from here back was all the crime scene of the event. We then put crime scene tape across here. And then this was kind of like a working area where officers could stage.

Initially, we were all standing more back here, outside of the -- the armored vehicle that rolled out or the -- the ambulance that rolled up.

And then we all move down to this area right here, so we weren't interfere with anything that was involved as far as evidence goes.

Q And going back to the original point, of the
-- did you allow the SERT officers to kind of strip
down their gear as they waited for investigators to
arrive?

A Yeah. So our gear weighs 60 pounds. And we've been working since 4:00 a.m. So I specifically asked investigators if we can take our gear off and just relax. And they -- they allowed us to do that.

Q And, to your knowledge, in addition to not

talking to each other, were gag orders in place for the witnesses as well to not discuss the incident?

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A Eventually they were. So the typical process or procedure is you get interviewed. And then you'll get issued the gag order. So knowing that's coming, everybody was not allowed to talk to each other based on my direction until we all had received our gag orders or had been interviewed by detectives.

Q How did the -- did you have a chance to personally observe the victim, the female, inside the residence after you guys were able to pull her out of the room?

A I did. I -- I saw her both inside and then outside of the room as well.

Q And how did she appear to you?

A She appeared in shock, like, she -- she appeared very white, almost like I would refer to as condition black. And -- but not -- not injured, like, she was able to walk out on her own and follow directions.

Q And, finally, just going back to the search call-outs and certain protocols, what are some of the more high-risk lethality or dangerous scenarios by which SERT is often or mandatorily called out to and respond to?

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A So, as a team, the policy for the Portland Police Bureau says we're required to respond -- we're required to activate for hostage situations, active shooter situation or sniper situations.

The other thing that were required to be there for, but it's not, like, an emergency ongoing incident is high risk of search warrant. So we have a procedure where investigator will go through a checklist and if it rates to a certain point, they're required to activate us.

There's also considerations for block searches where armed people are known to be inside. So the main three that are actually ongoing events are hostage, active shooter or sniper events. And the -- the reason is the chance of loss of life is very high.

Q And, again, from your training and experience, you've participated in certain scenarios or incidences. How would you characterize the speed of which this escalated compared to other SERT call-outs and scenarios?

A Even in scenario world, this was an extremely fast incident. You know, normally these things take a while to build up. There is some background, some -- some conversation.

Like I said before, it was about, I would

Examination of Donald Livingston

1	estimate, 30 minutes of me being on scene until it was
2	finished. It was very fast, the fastest one I'd ever
3	been involved in.
4	Q And just, again, as a SERT sergeant, is
5	there any information indicating coming from the CNT
6	side of this operation that the person inside the
7	residence was actively trying to discuss ways to
8	surrender or ways to hand over the female hostage
9	inside the residence or ways to end this peaceably
10	without SERT being involved?
11	A Absolutely not and quite the opposite. The
12	negotiations were not going well. He was making
13	threats to harm the victim.
14	MR. HANNON: Do the grand jurors have any
15	questions?
16	Thank you. May this witness be excused?
17	Thank you.
18	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
19	MR. HANNON: Sure. We'll take a five-minute
20	break. We'll go off the record.
21	(Recess taken, 10:07 a.m 10:22 a.m.)
22	MS. MARRERO: Okay. We are back on the
23	record.
24	This is Sergeant Peter McConnell.
25	PETER McCONNELL

1	Was thereupon called as a witness; and, having been
2	first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
3	A GRAND JUROR: Thank you.
4	DIRECT EXAMINATION
5	BY MS. MARRERO:
6	Q Good morning, Sergeant. Can you please
7	state and spell your first and last name for the
8	record.
9	A My name is Peter McConnell. My first name
LO	is spelled P-e-t-e-r; and my last name is spelled is
L1	M-c-C-o-n-n-e-l-l.
L2	DIRECT EXAMINATION
L3	BY MS. MARRERO:
L4	Q Thank you. Can you please tell us how you
L5	are employed.
L6	A I'm a sergeant with the Portland Police
L7	Bureau. I'm assigned to Central Precinct day shift.
L8	And I'm also a detached sergeant on the Special
L9	Emergency Reaction Team.
20	Q Can you detail for the grand jury your
21	training and experience that qualifies you for those
22	positions?
23	A I've been a police officer here in Oregon
24	for 25 years. I attended the basic Police Academy at
25	Monmouth, Oregon at the time, the Portland Police

Bureau Advance Academy, yearly inservice.

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Approximately 12-and-a-half years ago I was appointed to the Special Emergency Reaction Team as an operator. I worked on what's called the inner perimeter for approximately nine years before transferring over to the entry element.

Approximately a year and a half ago I was promoted to sergeant, assigned to Central Precinct and also given supervisory duties on the Special Emergency Reaction Team or SERT.

As a member of SERT, we train two days every other week and once a year for a week at a time at Camp Rialea. We go through extensive training related to scenarios we would encounter in our jobs as members of SERT and training at the range as well.

- Q Thank you. Were you working on October 10th of this year?
 - A Yes, I was.
 - Q In what capacity were you working that day?
- A I was actively working as a member of SERT, serving a warrant. I was the second sergeant in charge. And on a call-out my duty would be to run in the inner perimeter.
- Q And can you tell the grand jury when you were finish serving the warrant, how did you first

become alerted to the incident that was unfolding in
East Precinct?

- A I'm sorry. How I became aware of it?
- O Yes.

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A Actually, we weren't quite finished serving the warrant yet when my pager went off. We received a request for what's called an a SERT consult page.

In certain tactical situations that regular uniform patrol officers encounter, it common to reach out to special units, such as SERT or the Crisis

Negotiation Team, to talk to those sergeants about other options or other avenues of handling the call.

So towards the end of the warrant, maybe we have five or ten minutes to go, my pager went off. I took the consult page. It was from Sergeant Nice at East Precinct. I called him back on his phone and he had told me over the phone -- he wanted to give me a heads up, but it looked like they had a hostage incident in the East Precinct.

He was not scene yet. He was going to get on scene and call me back. He was not activating the SERT, but I let him know that we were all together a short distance away and we can be there shortly if he needed us.

Once we ended that phone call, I went up to

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the house. It was just finished being cleared. I met with Sergeant Livingston and let him know the content of the conversation I'd had with Sergeant Nice. We had other operators that were aware of it now and were reviewing the call, I believe, on their phones.

We decided it was best, based on the incident and the seriousness of it, the potential danger to life, that we finish the warrant quickly and we started heading closer to the area to a staging point, so if we were activated, we would be able to be on the scene shortly.

Q And, Sergeant McConnell, let me ask you -to clarify or to follow up on that a little bit. You
said, "Based on the incident and the risk to life and
the dangerousness of that situation." What
information did you receive in that first phone call
with?

A Initially, what I believe I received was that there was a hostage situation that -- I think it was a girlfriend had been grabbed at knifepoint and taken into a hotel room. I'm not certain if this was during the consult page or en route to the call.

We further got updated that the suspect had stabbed somebody and I believed that was at the 7-Eleven. I think later when we arrived on scene,

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that information that he stabbed somebody at 7-Eleven, was discounted. And we received new information that he attempted to stab somebody at the hotel prior to taking the woman into the room at knifepoint.

Q And so when you decided to leave the -- to finish up the warrant up quickly and to head towards the hotel, what's the process for getting your team over there?

A In this case, we had left our equipment van at North Precinct, which was only about 40 blocks away. So as soon as I hung up with the consult page, our inner perimeter at the warrant didn't have any responsibility because we were just clearing the attic, so I directed someone that was free to drive to North Precinct to get the equipment van and start bringing it back to where we were.

Don and I discussed briefly. We decided we were going to load everybody up in our two pieces of armor and drive to I-205, start heading Southbound and en route we would find a place to stage.

In looking at the map, we decided we were going to take the Johnson Creek exit and stage at the Home Depot parking lot there until or if we were activated. Then we would respond from there. That would put us about ten blocks away from the hotel.

Q And what did you know at that point about whether or not CNT had been activated and what they were doing?

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A En route, we had a dispatcher come over to our net, which was She-2. They gave us a synopsis of the call. At some point during that, I learned that CNT was activated and I believe it was Sergeant King or Lieutenant Nakamura (phonetic) from CNT was calling the IC, which I believe was Sergeant Nice, to see why SERT wasn't activated.

Just at the time that we're arriving on scene -- actually, we never pulled in to the Home Depot parking lot. We were just pulling on to Johnson Creek Road, Sergent Livingston got on our net and said SERT had been activated and we can proceed to a staging area close to the hotel.

So once I got that information I talked to -- we were in the lead. I talked to the driver of our vehicle and told him to just go northbound on 82nd Avenue and stop just south of the hotel out of sight.

Q And so once you got there what was your role? What was your responsibility?

A My role was to run the inner perimeter. I was in charge of placing people on SERT around the

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perimeter to take appropriate action, whether that be containment, whether that to employ some kind of force option. But make sure that all sides of the problem were covered from the outside.

Sergeant Livingston was in charge of the entry element and the overall team leader. He and I met briefly when we landed to the south. He advised via radio that they had already come up with a plan to come up with a hasty team from their officers in their armored car, which is a group of officers that can respond immediately if for some reason we needed to make entry.

He was going to go forward and talk with the IC. I felt it easiest if I just went with him because we were actually going into what I would call the courtyard of the hotel.

And that way I can see myself exactly where the problem was, where the hotel room was, try and get as much information as I could. And then I would return and deploy people on the IP based on what I saw. So I -- sorry.

Q So -- and I'm -- can -- I want to clarify a couple of the terms you're using. You've said IC and IP. Can you tell the grand jury what those are.

A The IP is the inner perimeter and that is in

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reference to SERT operators. The IC is the incident commander, which, in this case, was Sergeant Nice. So it's the -- typically, it's the highest ranking sergeant or a sergeant that is initially in charge of the call on the uniform side.

It would be possible that the shift lieutenant gets there, get's briefed and takes over the IC role from the sergeant, but I believe Sergeant Nice was still the IC and that is who I had taken the consult from and that is who Sergeant Livingston met with.

Ultimately, command normally will transfer over to SERT in the CIC role or Critical Incident Commander, but in this case at the time we arrived, Sergeant Nice was the IC.

Q Okay. Thank you. And so as you are positioning folks in the inner perimeter, where -- where are you directing folks to go to? Can you describe, sort of, the scene that you were seeing?

A So I'm looking over you to the -- it looks like a Google Earth photo of the motel that's on the wall here -- to the top, which would be to the north, that's the northern building of the motel. And then to the bottom is the southern building of the motel.

Unit 16, which I was directed by officers on

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scene, is where this problem was occurring, is in the southern-most building. Unit 16 is about in the middle of that east, west building, give a little bit left or right.

When I came around the corner, I saw a large number of officers on the northern part of the parking lot, focused their direction to the south towards
Unit 16.

I got information that that's where the problem was, that a male -- and I got a description from Officer Higginbotham which I broadcasted on the radio, had taken the female into that room at knifepoint.

And this is when I think Officer

Higginbotham told me that he'd also attempted to stab

somebody at the hotel, so I put that on the -- that

information out on the radio.

In looking at this, since there was a hotel room on either side of Unit 16, my biggest concerns in containing that and getting observations were having someone on the inner perimeter on the front, which we would call Side 1 and on the back of that unit, which we would call Side 3. Those were the two likely avenues of escape or that the suspect would come out of.

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I found Officer Griffin and I brought him over to the front where the other officers were. I told him where the problem was. I gave him a very brief description of what I had learned and told him his job was the front door and the one window attached to Unit 16. And that I would find him a partner as soon as I could.

There were also other officers there, but I wanted him partnered up with a fellow SERT officer from the inner perimeter. Ultimately, I think that, initially, being Officer Asheim.

And then my next concern was getting security on the back side. I sent two officers there and a K-9. But they got to their position, which I direct them to going through the manager's office, which is the extreme west end of the southern building where that southern building gets a little wider to the left. The one that --

MR. HANNON: Right here?

THE WITNESS: -- Deputy District Attorney Hannon is pointing to. You actually enter from the other side. Right through there is the door.

They went through that office to where his pen is now. There's a little three-foot fence on the backside with maybe a three to four foot alleyway.

So I told them to stay there with their K-9 officer and that they would be responsible for anybody that came out of Unit 16. But I also was aware that they're not able to make observations into Unit 16.

So my next priority was to find two officers on the inner perimeter that I could put further back off of the back side, directly off of Unit 16 that would be able to make observations through any windows that would be there.

BY MS. MARRERO:

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Q And, Sergeant, can you tell us why would those officers have not been able to see into Unit 16 from where you had positioned them?

A So their position was west of Unit 16 and they're right up against the building. They're between the building that Unit 16 is in right -- right there, give or take where your pinky finger is now, and the fence line. So they're -- they're looking directly east.

So they're -- what you need to be is to the south looking north to be able to be able to make observations into the windows if there are any there. This position is what I would call a containment position. They're ready with lethal options, less lethal options, and a K-9.

1	In the event that the suspect were to
2	somehow crawl out one of those windows, they would be
3	able to challenge the suspect and deploy whatever
4	force would be necessary in that circumstance. Or if
5	the victim were able to self-evacuate out one of those
6	windows, they could interceded and take the victim to
7	safety.
8	Q And so knowing that that was their
9	positioning and that would be their role, did you
10	assign officers to try and get a more direct view into
11	that room?
12	A Yes, I did.
13	Q And can you describe for us who you assigned
14	to that?
15	A I made it back out on to 82nd Avenue at some
16	point and I saw that Officer Kelly VanBlokland and
17	Officer Leo Harris were geared up and ready to be
18	deployed.
19	I went to or pointed to the entry way to
20	the parking lot on the north side of the VN Indoor
21	Garden Supply. That's the building. And then to the
22	north of that would you like me to come up there?
23	MR. HANNON: Sure. Sure.
24	MS. MARRERO: That would be great.
25	THE WITNESS: All right. Or do you have a

laser pointer? 1 2. MR. HANNON: We don't. 3 MS. MARRERO: I don't. 4 THE WITNESS: All right. I'll try to speak 5 loud. 6 MR. HANNON: We've got a microphone. You're 7 fine. Okay. So the next business, 8 THE WITNESS: directly south form the motel, is labeled the VN 9 10 Indoor Garden Supply. There's a parking lot on the 11 north and kind of east side of that. There's a fence 12 line right here and right here. 13 Even though this shows a gate right here, I 14 don't remember that, but there is a gate right here. And these items here, I don't think that's realistic 15 16 with how that was that day, but I remember that there 17 were Conexes, like great, big 55-foot Conexes, maybe 18 ten of them right here. 19 I didn't notice at the time, but there was a 20 red pickup with a red wooden -- red work pickup with 21 wooden rails on the side that was parked just north of 2.2 those Conexes. I pointed to this area and I asked 23 Officer VanBlokland and Officer Harris to get into 24 that parking lot. 25 I suggested maybe on top of the Conexes, but

to find a position that they could see into the 1 2 windows of Unit 16. I don't really remember much 3 other conversation than that. 4 I asked them if they enough information and 5 they told me that they did. I think they ended up 6 having to cut the lock off of this fence to gain entry 7 and then they deployed to their position and I went back to the area of the motel to conduct other 8 9 missions. A GRAND JUROR: Was her window into that 10 backroom? 11 12 THE WITNESS: You're saying the bathroom 13 of 16? 14 A GRAND JUROR: 15 THE WITNESS: I believed there was, 16 honestly. And I, ultimately, end up -- you'll hear 17 later -- end up back in this area after the event. 18 But I never really looked back here, but just walking 19 up and knowing that it's a hotel, I saw windows all 20 through here, so I believe that there were windows on 21 the back side of 16. 2.2 But just -- by my positioning, I never 23 really got the time to pause and look and make sure there were windows there. 24 25 A GRAND JUROR: Okay.

BY MS. MARRERO:

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Q So you had directed Officer VanBlokland and Officer Harris to that area. Did you give them direct orders on exactly where you wanted them positioned?

A I wanted them positioned on what called Side 3, the back side, in a position that they can see in any windows to Apartment 16. I didn't specifically tell them where to go.

I pointed out some options, but they're both highly trained officers and do this all the time in training and in real life operations and don't necessarily need me to point exactly to a position than say, "This is where I want you." They understand when I say "Side 3" what their responsibility is.

Q And so once you had given them that instruction and went back to the front, what is your continuing role at that point?

A I'm still the sergeant-in-charge of the inner perimeter trying to make the perimeter better than what it is, managing getting uniform personnel out that aren't necessarily needed, but also establishing containment or thinking of other contingencies.

One thing I remember talking about with Sergeant Derrick Foxworth who's on the inner perimeter

is getting containment to the east if the suspect or victim were to come out and run and go to the right to the eastern part of the parking lot.

By this time, we didn't really have any inner perimeter folks left. And so I think that position I got three uniform officers from Sergeant Nice or any sergeant and put them with a K-9 and told them to stay out of sight, but listen to our radio in case this suspect came out and ran to the east.

Q So you indicated that at that point you didn't have any inner perimeter officers left. Were you seeking or was anybody still seeking assistance from additional officers that were being called to the scene?

A Sergeant Livingston and I had met briefly in the courtyard. He informed me that we had officers that were coming into the scene from training, but they were the Columbia County Range. And so there's a -- a distance to drive.

We talked about getting additional resources from another SWAT team. We talked about getting six more operators, four of which would be inner perimeter operators from Washington County, TNT or SWAT team.

And it's my belief that that request had

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been made to the command post and they would be coming this way. But, again, that is probably 45 minutes to an hour away before they get there.

- Q Did you also discuss with

 Sergeant Livingston that the team is still operating
 under standard rules of engagement at that point?
 - A Yes.

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Q Can you talk a bit about that?

A Standard rules are how the team deploys. In refers our force rules. We have a directive,

Directive 10.10. It covers police officer's use of force. It covers a wide range of, you know, uses of force to include deadly force.

Standard rules, essentially, means that officers are acting under Directive 10.10 and making force decisions on their own based on the directives of the Bureau.

Occasionally, based on the situation of the incident, there may be a modification to those rules, meaning that the command post which typically has the most information in an event, they have the direct line to any negotiations that are going on, any information that's being provided by the negotiators about an event that an operator may not have.

A commander or a Critical Incident commander

1	may modify the rules and say, "You have a shot of
2	opportunity, " meaning the next time you see somebody,
۷	opportunity, meaning the next time you see somebody,
3	you know, you need to employ deadly force, even if in
4	that moment you don't think that it would I don't
5	say necessarily be appropriate, but you don't
6	understand why that is because the command post has
7	the most information.
8	And that is just an example. In this case,
9	however, the rules were never modified. We deploy
LO	under standard rules and we stayed under standard
L1	rules throughout the event.
L2	Q And under the standard rules, if an officer
L3	felt like they needed to employ deadly force in order
L4	to protect life or serious physical injury, would they
L5	be allowed to take that initiative?
L6	A Yes.
L7	Q Okay. As this is happening and as you're
L8	deploying folks to their respective positions, did
L9	are there still is there still information coming
20	out over the radio?
21	A Yes.
22	Q And what sort of information is, to your
23	recollection, being sent out over the radio?

A There's information about negotiations

through phone calls. I don't remember the specifics

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1 of that.

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I recall hearing that we had been on the phone with the suspect; that that phone call was ended. I believe that I heard that he had threatened to kill the victim inside, but I don't remember the specific transmission or where that was in the call.

I do remember someone broadcasting that we have probable cause for the suspect for Assault II, which is a serious Measure 11 crime. I'm not positive if I heard that officers were hearing sounds thinking that the suspect was barricading the room.

I know, ultimately, that was the case, but
I'm not sure if I heard that on the radio. I was
moving around and doing a bunch of other jobs. There
was a lot of radio transmission that day.

Q Okay. And what were you doing as all of this was happening? Once you're at the front, once everybody's deployed and you're waiting for additional units, what are you doing?

A So I talked about kind of deploying the inner perimeter. Other things that I was doing in it amongst that was getting hotel room keys made by the manager who was there, so officers would be able to get into these rooms whether it be right next to Unit 16 or if they wanted to get into a room just to

see the lay of the land, so they can see, "Oh. This is Room 11. It's just like Room 16. This is where the bathroom is." Things like that.

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One of the big concerns I had is establishing negotiations with the suspect. I didn't specifically know it, but I believed that uniform had already tried with ECIT trained officers and also through phone negotiations or had the suspect's phone number available to -- to CNT negotiators. But sometimes people hang up the phone or sometimes they just don't answer their phone.

So I saw Sergeant Max Holbrook (phonetic), who's a negotiator with the Crisis Negotiation Team.

I asked him to get a face-to-face negotiation team ready and stage it by the manager's office. So if it became necessary to use them, we could bring them forward and start a face-to-face negotiation.

The other thing we have SERT medics, which are EMTs with the Portland Fire Bureau that are assigned and detached to the CERT team. We had two of the medics with us that day, so I made sure they understood where the problem was.

I asked them to stage, be ready in the Bearcat because they also sometimes double as drivers. But if we had a -- a need for medical for the victim

1	or the suspect, I wanted them to know that where
2	the problem was and be able to get there quickly so
3	they could render aid to either one if need be.
4	Q Are you also at that time assisting and
5	getting equipment to various members of your team?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And can were you able to get everything
8	where it needed to be before you heard the shot fired?
9	A No.
10	Q And at what point did you actually hear the
11	shot fired?
12	A I was just returning from Room 15 to right
13	next to room 16. I had dropped some equipment off
14	with Officer Tom Snitily, and Detective Billy Winters
15	accompanied me and assisted me in doing that.
16	We were going back to retrieve additional
17	equipment and I was either in the courtyard or had
18	just rounded the west end of the building when I heard
19	one gunshot, which I believe to be from the back side
20	of the hotel. I believe that it was a police officer
21	that had shot.
22	I don't necessarily remember hearing the
23	transmission that it was an inner perimeter officer
24	that fired, but it was by belief that that is what had

happened. I turned around, and I could see the entry

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element from Room 17 starting to move to the front door. So, at that point, I turned and ran to assist them in any way that I could.

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Q And how were you able to assist the entry team?

A When I got there, I saw Officer Aaron

Sparling (phonetic) doing what we would call a

break-and-rake at the window of Unit 16, which is

taking a long, six-foot pole, breaking out the window,

trying to use it to capture any curtains or window

hangings that would prevent you from seeing in and

then getting a view into that room and covering the

people trying to make it through the front door.

I ended up to the right of him. I briefly looked into that window. I really couldn't see anything. I -- I think there was a -- a mattress covering most of the window or at least the left side of the window.

My perception was that the entry team had been able to get through the front door. I thought I had seen the line of officers starting to move in, so I moved over to trail in with them. But then I realized that they were having more trouble getting through the door because the door appeared to be barricaded.

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After a short delay, officers were able to get through the door. By the time I got close to the door, they had located the victim. They had secured the room.

There was no need for me to go into the room so I never actually made entry. I saw the victim being escorted out. I called for a medical -- or the two SERT medics to come right up to Room 16 with a plan on having them there, staging them there until the room was called clear and then we'd bring them in to render aid to the suspect.

Ultimately, they drove up to the entryway and ran to the front door. They were escorted into the room. So, at that point, I talked briefly with Sergeant Livingston.

There was really nothing for me to do there, so then I went to Side 3, to the back side of the hotel where I thought the shot had been fired by the police to determine who the involved officers were -- or involved officer was and any witness officers, and make sure the scene was secured.

Q And before we talk about what you saw on Side 3, at the time that you heard the gunshot, was everybody still operating under standard rules?

A Yes.

1	Q Okay. Had any commands been give, to your
2	knowledge, to modify those?
3	A No.
4	Q So when you got to Side 3, can you describe
5	for the grand jury what you observed?
6	A Yes. I went through the fence the gated
7	fence that VM Indoor Garden Supply. I walked to
8	the east and was looking for Officer VanBlokland and
9	Officer Harris' position.
10	Ultimately, I found them standing in the bed
11	of this red work pickup a larger pickup with wooden
12	rails on either side. They were so that is the
13	back end of the pickup that I'm describing. It's
14	facing westbound, so the end that we're looking at is
15	actually the eastern end, if that makes sense.
16	When I came around the side that you can
17	see, I found Officer VanBlokland and Officer Harris
18	standing in that bed. I'm thinking, which is labeled
19	G there, is Officer what I believe to be Office
20	VanBlokland's drag bag, which is a fancy name for an
21	equipment bag that you carry a larger rifle in.
22	Sitting on top of it was an AR-15 style
23	rifle. I asked them, essentially, who shot, and

Officer VanBlokland indicated that he had shot. I

asked Officer Harris, "Had you shot?" And he said no.

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So I determined, in my mind, that

Officer VanBlokland was the involved officer.

Officer Harris was a witness officer. I told them to stand fast, not to discuss the incident.

I started getting uniform resources there to secure the crime scene. One of them, I think it was Officer Harris, indicated probably a little bit further east in the grass would be a shell casing.

Presumably Officer VanBlokland's shell casing.

I briefly looked for it, but it was, you know, 12 inches of grass and that really was not my priority. So I -- I stopped doing that. I got two East Precinct officers. I brought Officer VanBlokland and Officer Harris down off the truck.

Officer Harris was not involved. He was wearing his rifle, so I told him to bring it. I told Officer VanBlokland just to leave his rifle sitting on top of his drag bag.

I brought one of the East officers back there where exactly I was standing. I told him not to trample the grass because there should be a shell casing there; that that rifle -- presumably the other rifle -- were loaded and not to touch it, but also to maintain security on it because we are in a public area.

And then I brought the two officers to the 1 2. front of the truck while I briefed the other officer from East about where to put up the red crime scene 3 4 tape, to start a crime scene log. 5 I started coordinating officers to place, 6 with Officer VanBlokland and Officer Harris. 7 you know, so they have someone with them after this traumatic event and also to make sure that no one is 8 9 coming up and talking to them about the event. 10 I found two cars that we could put them in, 11 once we had all that in place. Each of -- each -- you know, the involved officer and the witness officer 12 13 were placed in the cars with another SERT member that 14 wasn't directly involved in the incident, and they 15 stayed there until they were authorized to leave the 16 scene. 17 Okay. And, at what point -- well, what do 18 -- what do you do at that point, once they're 19 separated? 20 That they're separated? I continued 21 managing the crime scene. 2.2 And then --23 -- I kind of did various administrative

jobs along 82nd Avenue. I had the crime scene

I made sure there was a crime scene log

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secured.

1 happening.

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I'm sure I touched base with

Sergeant Livingston. You know, the next time I really
became aware of the hotel, most of the SERT team was
segregated behind some tape, kind of in a holding
area.

I coordinated with Detective Kammerer, who is one of our SERT intel officers, but he's also a homicide detective. We also had Detective Brad Clifton there, who is a SERT intel officer and a homicide detective.

We had Detective Billy Winters there, who is a SERT intel officer and a robbery detective. But, specifically, Detective Kammerer and Detective Clifton, who regularly investigate these things.

If I had a question about is an officer involved or -- not involved -- but a witness officer, not -- specifically, like the officers on Side 3 that could only look down Side 3, I asked them, do you -- do you consider them witness officers? Do they need to be segregated? Questions like that to make sure al our policies were followed.

Q And so, at this point, it's really turned into an investigation because the threat is gone; is that correct?

1	A Yes.
2	BY MR. HANNON:
3	Q A couple things to clarify real quick. We
4	heard a couple different things on staging areas.
5	When SERT was in route to the location when it was
б	called initially as a consult, was is it your
7	understanding the staging area was going to be the
8	Fred Meyer Johnson Creek parking lot, or was it or
9	Home Depot parking lot, or do you recall?
LO	A I believed it was going to be the Home Depot
L1	parking lot, but this is an event where we were kind
L2	of, you know, making these decisions en route.
L3	And because I'm thinking Home Depot parking
L4	lot and there was someone else in the other like
L5	Don, who was in the other piece of armor as we're
L6	separated, might have said the Fred Meyer parking lot.
L7	My belief is that we were going to 82nd and
L8	Johnson Creek, and we were going to find the business
L9	that best afforded the large package that we bring to
20	stage there until we were officially activated.
21	Q And, ultimately, it all became moot because
22	you never really staged in either parking lot?
23	A Before we had come to a stop on Johnson
24	Creek or would've been turning into either of those

businesses, Sergeant Livingston advised us that we'd

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1 been activated.

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And so then the next question was: How do we get close enough to where we need to be without just running right into the scene?

Q One other question I had, you were talking about you couldn't recall what you actually heard or when you heard it because of radio traffic.

Is it fair to say that it was radio traffic coming in throughout this process, but as this is ongoing, you're also working on other aspects of the — of the scene so that you may hear some of it but not all of it, but other officers may hear some of it and not all of it? It just depends on each particular person?

A Yes. So I wear a radio with an earpiece.

I'm operating on the same radio net as all the other

SERT operators. But as radio broadcasts come out, I

may be talking to Tom Snitily about securing chainsaws

or, "What equipment do you need?" Or deploying

Sergeant Foxworth or briefing Officer VanBlokland and

Officer Harris.

So there are occasions where I'm aware of a transmission, but I'm doing multiple things and don't necessarily process the entire transmission.

MS. MARRERO: Any questions from the grand

1	jurors?
2	May this witness be excused?
3	MR. HANNON: Mm-hmm. Thank you.
4	All right. Thank you. We're ready to call
5	our next witness, is it sergeant or officer?
6	THE WITNESS: Officer.
7	MR. HANNON: Officer Joshua Howery.
8	JOSH HOWERY
9	Was thereupon called as a witness; and, having been
10	first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
11	<u>EXAMINATION</u>
12	BY MR. HANNON:
13	Q All right. Could you start by please
14	stating and spelling your name for the record?
15	A Yes. My name is Josh Howery, H-o-w-e-r-y.
16	Q And Officer Howery, how are you currently
17	employed?
18	A I'm a Portland Police officer. Have been so
19	since January of 2001. And I am currently assigned to
20	the Special Emergency Reaction Team.
21	Q And how long have you been assigned to the
22	SERT team?
23	A I've been assigned there for nine years.
24	Q And is that your specific assignment, or is
25	that you are you part of the SERT team, but you

have other duties with the Portland Police Bureau? 1 2. At this time right now, that is my -- that 3 is my primary assignment. Up until two months ago, 4 the previous six years, I was the lead control tactics 5 instructor and the use-of-force instructor for the 6 training division. 7 And just briefly, what is the control tactics instructor? 8 Control tactics is our discipline of 9 10 hand-to-hand defense stuff. It used to be called 11 defensive tactics. So we would -- we would teach all 12 the arrest techniques, take-downs, hand-to-hand 13 defense moves and then go over our use of force 14 policy, that sort of thing. 15 You mentioned you were an instructor in 16 another field. What was that? 17 I'm also -- I -- right now, I'm also a 18 firearms instructor. I'm also a patrol procedures 19 instructor; but my main, full-time job at the training 20 division was the control tactics and use of force. 21 Okay. And before joining the Portland 2.2 Police Bureau, could you describe for the ladies and 23 gentlemen of the grand jury your educational 24 background? 25 I received a Bachelor of Arts degree

1	from George Fox University. I attended a campus
2	Public Safety Academy while I was shortly
3	thereafter, as I was employed there. And then I was
4	I attended Basic Police Academy and Advanced
5	Academy.
6	Q And how long is police Basic Police
7	Academy?
8	A Basic Police Academy was, I believe,
9	14 weeks at that time.
L O	Q Mm-hmm. Yeah?
L1	A And
L2	Q Advanced?
L3	A Advanced Academy was another 14 to 16 weeks,
L4	I believe.
L5	Q And how does that work in the timeline of
Lб	one's career at the Portland Police Bureau going
L7	through Basic and then Advanced Academy?
L8	A At the time of hire, a police officer would
L9	go through, get hired, spend a little bit of time just
20	getting their equipment together of a couple days,
21	getting orientated [sic] to the Bureau, itself. And
22	then sent to it's now Salem, at the time for us it
23	was Monmouth to go to the basic academy.
24	So you would spend that time after being
25	hired to go get your initial training. Then an

officer would go to the street with a coach and they would work with their coach for several months going through the field training process.

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And then after a certain time when the next academy was ready to go, the advanced academy would start. And that's put on by Portland Police. And so then they would -- the -- the officers would go through that.

Once they finished that, they would finish out the rest of their probationary time, which is 18 months, and they would finish that on the field training aspect again.

- Q And so as you've just indicated, the

 Advanced Academy with the Portland Police Bureau is an

 additional training provided to the uniformed officers

 from the Portland Police Bureau?
 - A Yes, that's correct.
- Q Now, in your capacity as train -- training in these various fields including control tactics, what are some of the things you do as a trainer in that regard?
- A We would teach all levels of force, beginning with, you know, mere presence, for instance. How to even -- and then moving on verbal. You know, how do we give commands? How do we try to get people

1	to comply with us? How do we put ourselves in a safe
2	position to deal with a situation, right?
3	And then when an officer was forced to act,
4	they would be they would be taught what's
5	appropriate level of force to act with in certain
6	circumstances? What's a reasonable amount of force?
7	And so would it be merely handcuffing somebody and not
8	using any physical force, all the way up to, you know,
9	deadly force situations.
10	Q And in discussing that, are you familiar
11	with or able to discuss the differences between normal
12	use of force and deadly force?
13	A Yes. Deadly force, we would we would
14	have defined as force that is likely to cause serious
15	physical injury or death.
16	Q And why is it or why do police officers get
17	trained in that capacity or scenarios that would
18	require that type of use of force?
19	A We we train the officers to be able to
20	use that type of force because of the levels of
21	resistance that they may encounter from a suspect that
22	they are dealing with.
23	And that person, based on the on the

level of threat that they provide to either the

officer or somebody else. And so when we teach force,

force, typically, is taught proportionately.

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And so as the level of threat rises, the level of amount -- or the amount of force that an officer should, in some cases, use to effectively stop that behavior, many times will arise as well, all the way up to and including deadly force.

So if a person is using deadly force against somebody else, the amount of force to stop them, based on distance, time, other factors, it might -- it very well and very often rises to a level where the officer needs to use deadly force themselves to stop that behavior.

Q And in that context, we're not just talking about a police officer and the police officer's interaction with an individual, are there scenarios in which officers observe an individual presenting a threat of -- that requires a use of force or lethal use of force because of a danger presented to another individual, not just the police officer.

A Yes. And that -- that goes along with our police, too, when we talk about deadly force. That an officer can use deadly force if they reasonably believe that a person poses a -- poses an immediate threat of death or serious physical injury to them or another person.

1	Q And and and now are you familiar with
2	the concept of a duty to act?
3	A Yes.
4	Q And and what is duty to act?
5	A That you know, if the officer's observing
6	somebody who's in dire need of help, right, they
7	there there's a person who is in danger of being
8	seriously injured or death you know, or death, that
9	the officer is that's why they're there is to try
10	to protect those those folks from being harmed.
11	Now, it's not always that that officer has
12	to run into a situation that is hopeless and that they
13	have no chance of success, but if they have a chance
14	of success and they can do so safely, they should, in
15	fact, intervene in those situations, including using
16	deadly force to stop that deadly threat from
17	happening.
18	Q And so is my understanding correct that in
19	addition to defensive tactics and use of force, that
20	there is also components or education related to kind
21	of the sanctity of human life or protection of life?
22	A Yes. The our our entire force policy
23	starts by talking about the sanctity of human life and
24	that we recognize that. And that part of our job is

to preserve life whenever possible.

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1	Q So and in your training, are you familiar
2	with kind of the legal minimum incidences required
3	that allows based under State and federal law
4	that allows officers nationwide to use deadly or
5	dangerous force against someone in those situations?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And does the Portland Police Bureau follow
8	the standards that is the bare minimum as required by
9	State and federal law to use lethal force?
10	A Yes. We we take that, and then we
11	actually add a layer above that. And so our policy,
12	when it talks about deadly force, is more restrictive
13	than what the State and federal law actually leave as
14	a minimum
15	Q Okay.
16	A if that makes any sense.
17	Q And let me and let me ask: Why is that?
18	A Part of that is because the Police Bureau
19	or, you know, City of Portland, the Police Bureau,
20	we we want to make sure that there's an extra level
21	of protection there. That we're not just shooting
22	everybody that we can shoot, but that or, you know,
23	we're using deadly force against everybody that we can

But that there's some thought going into it.

use deadly force against.

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And that if there's other ways, that we should try to go -- we should try to resolve those conflicts with less. We understand that that's not always possible; many times it's not.

But that -- if an officer is following policy and they use deadly force and they are still within our policy, then what it lets us know is that we are still a long ways from the very bare minimum, when they could use force legally as defined by federal and State law.

Q And in -- in -- from your experience, we've heard testimony with the critical incident commander and SERT call-outs that has a dual component, both the CNT, or Crisis Negotiation Team, along with the SERT team.

Is the purpose of the Crisis Negotiation

Team consistent with that in trying to de-escalate situations without the need of using any sort of deadly or dangerous force in that -- in that regard?

- A Yes, absolutely.
- Q And from your training and experience as part of the SERT team, how -- how critical is the CNT component of -- the Crisis Negotiation Team component -- of those call-outs?
- 25 A It's very -- it's very critical. In fact,

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we don't do -- we don't go to any call-outs without CNT also typically joining in on that. They -- they're the ones that usually get communication with our suspects.

They -- they're usually the ones that get a lot of the intel. They -- they get a lot more information for us. And then as -- as we work together, you know, our primary mission is to resolve this confrontation peacefully in some -- you know, in -- obviously, in some cases that's not possible because the event is driven by the suspect.

But they -- they're such a part of what we do, that our teams work together so we can bring enough resources. We can bring more options to the table. Where, in some cases, if you didn't have all those resources, deadly force might be used a lot faster and a lot more often.

But because we have the resources, in many cases, we're able to diffuse those situations before they rise to that -- that level of immediacy. And then again, in some cases, it doesn't work because of what the suspect does.

Q So can you -- you made a statement there that I want to expand upon a little bit. You said the incident is driven by the suspect.

1	A Yes.
2	Q Based on that and are you aware of the
3	issues related to action and reaction in your training
4	with use of force and deadly use of force with
5	officers?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And and describe what you mean by the
8	incident is driven by the suspect and how that factors
9	into action and reaction in these discussions and use
10	of force.
11	A Okay. The principle action/reaction is
12	something that we teach in our defensive tactics
13	program the control tactics program and the
14	patrol procedures program as well. At we start
15	that from the very beginning of the police officer's
16	career, as far as the basic and advanced academy.
17	When we talk about action/reaction, it's a
18	principle that we we define as any contest of time,
19	the initiator of an action has an advantage over the
20	reactor the person that has to react.
21	There's all sorts of games that people play.
22	You know, there's the slapping the hands game.
23	There's the drop the dollar bill in between somebody's
24	fingers and, you know, lots of different illustrations

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for that.

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When it comes to the -- me saying that the suspect drives what happens with the -- with the situation, it's the same thing. The suspect makes decisions. We have -- we don't have control over what they're going to do in many cases.

Especially with their -- you know, for instance, they're in a building. They're walled off by doors, windows and walls, and we don't have physical control over somebody there, right? They are going to be able to do what they want to do, and then we are going to have to react to that.

In the -- when we are reacting, it always means that we are slower. We -- we do a -- we do demonstrations in the advanced academy. And I can have somebody with a -- a blank firing gun, one of our Sem munition pistols, pointed at me with their finger on the trigger.

And if I have the same type of gun down by my side, when -- and the -- the game is when I move my hand to come up and actually shoot at them, they can pull the trigger and shoot me. And what happens is because they're waiting for my motion first, and then they're trying to react to it, I will win that almost every time.

I'll be able to take the gun all the way

form pointed at the ground with my finger off the trigger, point it at them, pull the trigger -- sometimes two to three times before they're able to simply pull the trigger.

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Just because the brain takes some time to actually process what's happening and send the signal down to the finger to actually pull the trigger and then the time that it actually takes to take -- pull the trigger. It puts them back at lest a quarter of a second of reaction time.

Now, we take that into a bigger scenario, a bigger deal, that person's able to do a lot more things before physically we can actually react to them. But, again, the -- the concept is -- the principle is still there. If the person makes an action and then the -- the -- the person who has to react to that is going to be slower.

Q You mentioned in that example kind of devices used to give firearm scenarios. Let's talk about knives. In -- in your -- as a trainer in the teaching both the officers and the advanced academy, what -- what lessons are to be learned from how lethal knives can be as -- in these kind of scenarios -- both in the action/reaction and how deadly they can be?

A Okay. Knives can be just as deadly. You

know, the way the bullets typically produce death is usually by blood loss. Same thing with knives. The difference is, typically, range, right? You have to be a little closer to a person with a knife to -- to do that same type of damage.

However, the amount -- the type of damage is still immediate. It happens just as fast. In some cases, it can -- multiple knife wounds can be delivered faster than multiple gunshots in some cases. And then the -- the damage is just as devastating.

Q No, that's okay. Was there something else you were going to add to that? I didn't mean to interrupt your thought, sorry.

A Oh, no.

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Q So go and again, expanding upon that further, as you mentioned the scenarios broaden. When you have a situation involving a knife, and then you expand upon the scenarios as opposed to an open area with just an officer or another person and the assailant, if you throw in obstructions and things that obscure the view of officers or people trying to save lives --

A Mm-hmm.

Q -- what does -- what -- who has the advantage when factoring in knives and those

obstructions and not being able to observe what's going on?

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A The suspect has the advantage, certainly.

Many times -- you know, there -- there are some cases

when knife wounds, gunshot wounds, can be, you know -
treatment can be given to help save lives from those

type of injuries.

However, most of the time, time is very critical on those. If you have a gunshot wound -- if -- if somebody shoots somebody inside if a building -- and we may not be able to see that -- but we still have the indication that a gunshot went off because you can hear it, even outside the building.

A knife is silent. And so you may get a muffled scream or grunt or something like that from the person being stabbed. However, that's not always the case either and they may not be able to. You know, we had a -- a situation about a year and a half ago, where the guy stabbed three people, and it was a matter of a second.

Three people, and two of them died and one of them was able to be saved. But, you know, that's because the officers were there very, very quickly and were able to render medical aid right away. But that's not always possible either.

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Again, it it happens so fast, and then
with a knife, again, it could be so silent that if you
if this happens inside a building, we may not even
know that it actually occurred and there was
nothing giving us an indication that it did and
then now the immediacy even jumped up even more 'cause
we just don't know.
Q So let's take you to your experience with

- SERT. One, while you are an instructor, and you instruct on use of force and -- and Central tactics instruction and you are part of Portland Police Bureau's SERT team, were you actually on the call-out with the Portland Police Bureau on the SERT incident that occurred at the Del Rancho on October 10, 2018?
 - A I was not. I was on vacation out of state.
- Q And so turning to this type of scenario or situation, how critical is CNT, or Critical

 Negotiation Team, in trying to resolve this kind of hostage scenario where someone is -- is locked into a building with their assailant?
- A They are critical for us to be able to get information if we're going to be able to resolve this peacefully.
 - O And how is that?
 - A For us to resolve that peacefully, we have

to be able to negotiate with the suspect. We have to be able to communicate. We have to be able to get information on what's going to be going on inside.

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Without them, we're left with just what happens and what we know of how violent this situation was already. Without the communication, it's very, very hard to start a diffusion process. We can't diffuse that situation very well.

Q Even if negotiations are not going well, but it's a two-way conversation, is there still value for that for both the CNT negotiators and the SERT team who are trying to set up?

A Yes. If -- if we have some kind of communication, at least there's some information that gets -- that's able to be passed on with us. Even if that information is only: Negotiations are not going well.

Because that gives our -- that gives our team on the outside that's trying to do a tactical plan, the information that, you know what? We may actually have to do a tactical resolution on this because negotiations are not going well.

And they start -- you -- you -- you may start making plans to initiate that or changing our plans on how we're -- something that will give us the

best chance of success.

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Q And is it fair to say that whether -- even if the person is not talking positively about surrendering or releasing a hostage or hostages, but the fact that they are talking with the crisis negotiating -- negotiation team members, that -- that additional time just has value in potentially diffusing the situation?

A Yes. Typically, the longer a situation goes on, you know, the -- the less energy it -- it -- it continues to hold. And so if things are moving very, very quickly, it -- it's a little bit more dangerous.

If we can lengthen that out, I were -- and we're pretty positive we're lengthening things out, then that energy tends to ebb and flow a little bit more. And we're able to gain some time. Plus it gives us more time to actually make our tactical plan if we need to go that direction.

Q And when those communications are ongoing, even if they are not in a positive direction, but still at least if a two-way communication, does that give the crisis negotiation team of negotiators other avenues to explore or stratagems to use to keep the person talking and keep that delay occurring so that the search deployments don't need to occur and more

time can be bought?

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- A That definitely can be the case, yes.
- Q From what you understand, having not been at this scenario, if the SERT team got activated and the ultimate hostage scenario resolved in about 30 to 35 minutes, how quickly or not so quickly is that for a resolution in a hostage situation that occurred here?
- A That's -- to me, that sounds very, very fast.
- Q In your experience with the SERT team, both directly or in your training and experience watching other people's experiences and scenarios, the hostage situation or, in the alternative, the stand-off situation, how long do those typically last when deployed and set up in surrounding a person?
- A It varies. However, it -- the -- part of it is it takes time to just set up, right? To get our pieces in place. To get the -- the armor; to get the other resources that we want; to get containment on an area. It takes some time to do that.

It takes other time for CNT to get set up and get their negotiators in position where they need to -- you know, they have all the equipment ready and now they're starting to actually put out feelers for

more intelligence and more information that they can start to pass -- pass on.

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And then when you think about all those pieces that have to get in place and all the information gathering that's happening, and then it starts to get passed out on the radio to -- back and forth between the negotiation team and SERT, where it's, like, "Okay. They're ready for this. Now, we're ready for this. And, okay, we're going to move some folks over here," just the whole -- the whole planning time takes time.

It can be that 30 minutes before we're even ready, in some cases, to get a phone call in. Just try it -- you know, try -- try to start. In other cases, we may be close enough that we got set up a lot faster and that phone call goes in, and now we're starting to go, you know, try those avenues. And then if we're not able to get communication or the communication is going bad, that can tend to speed things up.

- Q And when you talk about communication going bad, that's one aspect.
 - A Mm-hmm.
- Q But are there -- are there things that officers on scene may observe themselves, first hand,

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that they will relay to the other SERT members or the crisis negotiation team to -- to determine whether the scenario's getting worse or better?

A Yes. One of -- one of the things that we try to do is get containment on a -- on a structure if we have a structure that's involved, and get intelligence from that, eyes-on.

The negotiation team will do that, usually by phone in that sort of thing. SERT will do that by actual putting members in certain places so they can actually get realtime information that they can actually see themselves.

Q And in talking about that personnel, did the inner perimeter officers and sniper -- or officers with the rifles -- what component can they contribute to in fact gathering and intelligence gathering in those scenarios?

A Our inner-perimeter folks are the ones with the rifles and they typically have optics available to them, both binoculars and scopes on the rifle.

They're able to, if we can, get into positions where maybe seeing inside windows, seeing what kind of movements the suspect is doing.

In some cases, they're able to see facial expressions and start to look at, you know, "Hey, this

person looks really, really scared" or maybe they're not. And then other information, sometimes just on doors and windows.

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Sometimes whether the suspect is doing something inside that might make it harder for a tactical resolution to actually work, right? I -- I spoke before is we try and give ourselves the best chance of success.

And if the suspect is inside and they're starting to do something that starts to take away some of those options, or slow down those options, if we were able -- if we were half -- if we were forced to launch, that's good information for the rest of the team to know, too, because we may start using other options.

Q And as in this scenario, while the SERT officers are able to communicate to the critical incident commander and team, what they're hearing, seeing and observing firsthand, is that in conjunction with the information or lack thereof that's being communicated by the Crisis Negotiation Team and the team of negotiators on the communication or lack thereof coming from the suspect or person inside the residence in this scenario?

A Yes. All that information is coming

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together and so that the CIC -- the commander -- the incident commander -- should have a more complete picture, in most cases, than any one side or one person?

Q So we've discussed with other witnesses regarding criminal incident commanders and additional orders versus the standard rules of engagement.

Regarding the standard rules of engagement, what are those?

A Standard rules of engagement let the officers -- the tactical officers on the outside -- know that the commander's intent as far as use of force, that it would be guided by normal policy, by what the officers observed for themselves.

And so the -- the officers would be under the deadly force policy, that an officer may be -- may use deadly force if they reasonably believe the person to pose an immediate of death or serious physical injury.

Q And the term "appropriate initiative," how does that factor into standard rules of engagement?

A That lets the officers know that they are authorized to do what they have to do if -- in case of a life-threatening emergency, and that they are free to act as they -- as they need to without a specific

Examination of Josh Howery command from the CIC or from the command post that 1 2 yes, you may use whatever force or technique you need 3 That if you -- if there's an urgency to 4 doing this to -- to protect life, that -- that you 5 may do that. 6 And, again, going back to your instruction and teaching newer officers in ongoing training and --7 8 and tactics, that appropriate initiative exists for 9 uniformed officers in any normal type situation every 10 day they get up and go to work; is that accurate? 11 Α Yes, that's correct. So if -- if a uniformed officer sees someone 12 1.3 in -- in danger of -- lethal danger or danger of 14 serious bodily injury from a person on the street and

Q So if -- if a uniformed officer sees someone in -- in danger of -- lethal danger or danger of serious bodily injury from a person on the street and there's no other scenario that they could do to protect the life, as they see it, they're allowed to use reasonable steps as necessary?

A Yes, that's correct.

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Q Now, in this -- I mentioned an incident on the street; and, obviously, that's different. How does all of this factor in to someone who's working with a rifle and a scope and working in that kind of inner-perimeter capacity in a search response?

How do the -- do the circumstances or rules of -- standard rule -- rules of engagement or

(indiscernible) initiative change in any way?

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A They don't change as far as what -- what's reasonable, what is allowed under the policy. The officers on the out -- on the outside, on the inner perimeter there, they -- they do take into consideration the other resources that are available.

They do take into consideration the two teams that are working and how negotiations are working because of the amount of training that they go through.

So because of -- the situation has changed now, it is rarely just -- it all happens at once.

Typically, we understand that we are trying to get different pieces in place. We're trying to get more information in some cases.

And then as those things evolve as far as the situation itself as a whole, they're looking at a bigger picture than we sometimes end up looking at for them, I guess, than a patrol officer looks at while they're on the street and things juts happen in a -- in a split second.

So because of that, they may, in some cases, be a little bit more patient. And in some cases understand that now things have changed to the point where they have to use deadly force. And then they do

it because of the -- the situation as a whole.

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Q In this particular incident, if I were to tell you that the initial call to regarding this incident or disturbance at 7-Eleven with all the information that was available to the officers as the situation escalated to when the ultimate shot was fired by the -- one of the SERT officers was less than 65 minutes.

Based on your training and experience, would you characterize that length of time for this scenario as normal, fast or slow, given how everything unfolded and escalated?

A It seems rather fast. It seems -- I would say that the suspect was continuing to do things that -- that -- that kept feeding the situation energy.

And that they weren't allowing some -- any of the resources to effectively start to defuse that situation.

Q And presuming -- when you talk about at -not being able to defuse energy from the situation,
would you consider it more high risk or less high risk
in the fact that when SERT was finally involved as
well as the Crisis Negotiation Team, that they were
not able to establish really any positive or any
direct contact with the suspect other than threats

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coming from the suspect as well as direct observations of barricading, going on in the room and -- and obstructions covering the windows, did that create a higher risk situation for the responding officers and -- and their concern for the victim inside or pretty normal, given the time frame of that scenario?

A That increases the risk greatly because it's -- what it does, it makes it harder for us to have more -- it -- it takes -- I'm sorry. It takes away some of the options to try to resolve it peacefully.

And then what it does, it shows -- it gives us a glimpse of the suspect's mindset a little bit of how -- they're not trying to use a hostage as a bargaining chip so where we can actually maybe negotiate with them, but they're using them as just a true victim.

And then this person is, you know, we would categorize that person as a little bit more dangerous or a lot more dangerous because they're not trying to -- to negotiate. They're not trying to get away.

They're just trying to commit their crime.

Q And the information that is going out, are each -- when it's under the standard rules of engagement and this idea of appropriate initiative, is

each individual officer left for their own personal 1 2. decision making skill set based on what they're 3 observing directly and observing secondhand through 4 the radio and information being shared, having to make 5 their own decisions in these critical points? 6 Α Yes. 7 MR. HANNON: Okay. Do any of the grand 8 jurors have questions for Officer Howery? 9 A GRAND JUROR: 10 MR. HANNON: There was I believe earlier one 11 question related to uniform officers watching Mr. Rice 12 pull Ms. Ochoa into -- or grabbing her, potentially, 13 going into the hotel room. Do you want to ask that 14 question? 15 A GRAND JUROR: Yeah. Yeah. Just as you 16 were describing, in the beginning you were explaining 17 to us the duty to act. 18 THE WITNESS: Yes. 19 A GRAND JUROR: And I was just -- I was 20 thinking about -- I was thinking about as -- as I 2.1 think there maybe two patrol officers. They be coming 2.2 in for coming across the street and find him and engage him, you know, stop and --23 24 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 25 A GRAND JUROR: He's pacing back and forth.

And I was thinking, isn't there some action that they 1 2. can take at that moment to try to prevent him to going 3 into the hotel? 4 THE WITNESS: I see. 5 MR. HANNON: And -- and let me elaborate. 6 So -- and the question regards that more if -- not to 7 put words in your mouth, but would you characterize 8 more aggressive actions to take him down before he 9 gets into that room? 10 A GRAND JUROR: Yes. A Taser or -- or --MR. HANNON: Or take him down? 11 12 A GRAND JUROR: Or if necessary. 13 THE WITNESS: Sure. You know, part of that 14 is -- that's still left up to the officer's discretion 15 on what do they think that they can do that will work. 16 But at the same time, there will also be a -- you 17 know, there's -- always the thought of, I don't want 18 to make it worse, right? 19 And so if what I decide to do has a great 20 chance of working and it's within policy and I can --2.1 I can do that, then great. If the officers don't 2.2 think that it's going to work or if they had think 23 it's a low chance or working or they think that they 24 can make it worse. 25 What happens if I miss? What happens if,

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you know, certainly, if they decide to deploy deadly force with their pistol from a significant range, what if they, you know, missed completely? What if they hit some bystander? What if they hit the hostage? Those things would certainly make it worse.

And so they -- they're trying to avoid that at the same time as trying to resolve this. If there's too much distance and the person gets in and barricades themselves in and then now they're trying to break down the door, maybe not without -- with -- maybe not with the right tools to do that.

And now we're -- the person's, you know, maybe that let's the suspect go to a point where they're -- they end up using lethal force against the -- the hostage because they feel that they're right on -- it's right on the heels and we don't have a chance to intervene, that might be a consideration for the uniform officers as well.

And so based on what they, you know, the distance, the time involved, the researches they have at hand, they may decide to back off and call in the rest of the resources that, you know, have SERT and CNT and everybody else come in and start to try to resolve this.

A GRAND JUROR: So -- so if we go through

the incident happening, there's a moment where they
have their -- instantly think, okay, I got to back off
and let other -- other things come to play here?

THE WITNESS: Right. They have -- they -- they are the only ones that have that decision-making process, right? They're -- the -- that ability. And they have to make it in that split -- split second decision.

Do I go for it and try something that could potentially solve this? Or they have to consider, can I pull it off? Will this make it worse? Is it better for me to back off and get more resources here; and, you know, different tools even in some cases.

BY MR. HANNON:

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Q In some of those situations where they're confronting somebody who's acting in a certain aggressive manner, is the personal knowledge of either the officers or maybe other officers who had experience with that individual, can that factor into their decision-making process in the belief that maybe deescalation and backing off might actually improve the situation versus going forward and -- and worsening the situation with aggressive behavior?

- A Yes, absolutely.
- Q And from a -- from a tactic standpoint

1	from from the Portland Police Bureau, again,
2	understanding that the scantity of human life is the
3	the life of the accused or the person who's acting
4	aggressively, is that also another life that the
5	Portland Police Bureau wants to try to save or protect
6	and and avoid having to use that lethal force if
7	if possible?
8	A Yes. That's and that's, essentially, why
9	we have all of the resources we have. You know, in
10	most cases when the negotiation team and SERT gets
11	called, we usually are able to resolve those
12	situations using to little or no or not force.
13	And that's that's the goal is to use
14	little or no no force. There are other situations
15	where we may be we may have the tools and the
16	training and the ability to resolve a confrontation
17	where we do have to use force as well.
18	But, generally, with all of our call-outs
19	and all the things that we do, we use force very
20	very little a small amount of the time.
21	MR. HANNON: Any other questions from the
22	Grand Jury?
23	May this witness be excused?
24	A GRAND JUROR: Yes.
25	THE WITNESS: Thank you.

1	(Pause in proceedings, 11:36 a.m
2	11:37 a.m.)
3	MR. HANNON: Yep.
4	MS. MARRERO: Okay. The State's next
5	State's next witness is Leo Harris.
6	MR. HANNON: Over here. Stand and please
7	raise your right hand.
8	<u>LEO HARRIS</u>
9	Was thereupon called as a witness; and, having been
LO	first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
L1	<u>EXAMINATION</u>
L2	BY MS. MARRERO:
L3	Q Take a seat, please.
L4	Can you please state and spell your first
L5	and last name for the grand jury?
L6	A Yes. Leo Harris, L-e-o, H-a-r-r-i-s.
L7	Q Thank you, Officer Harris. Can you please
L8	tell the grand jury how you are employed?
L9	A I work for the City of Portland for the
20	Police Bureau.
21	Q How long have you've been in law
22	enforcement?
23	A 17 years.
24	Q Can you detail for the grand jury for your
25	background and your training?

1	A When I got hired, I went to a program called
2	the Police Corps. Ended up going through basic
3	training there and came to Portland, obviously, and
4	went to the Advanced Academy.
5	Then I've had ongoing training throughout,
6	obviously, inservice year to year. I'm currently in
7	our Training Division, running the Patrol Tactics
8	Program or Patrol Procedures Program, which teaches
9	some of the tactics that police officers do
LO	day-to-day. And I'm also on SERT and I have been for
L1	ten years.
L2	Q Thank you. And were you working on
L3	October 10th of this year?
L4	A Yes.
L5	Q And then what capacity were you working
L6	that day?
L7	A As a SERT member on the IP.
L8	Q IP being the inner perimeter?
L9	A Inner perimeter, yep.
20	Q And can you tell the grand jury what you
21	were doing as you were finishing up the warrants that
22	you've been executed that morning?
23	A Officer VanBlokland and I were in a
24	containment position and we moved back to a vehicle
25	that had the radio on and was scanning and started

1	hearing a call coming out in East Precinct. And
2	A GRAND JUROR: Can you talk just a little
3	louder?
4	THE WITNESS: A little louder?
5	A GRAND JUROR: Yeah.
6	THE WITNESS: Sorry.
7	We were just finishing up one warrant. And
8	as we're heading back to our vehicle from our
9	containment position, we started hearing a call on
10	East Precinct that we're all talking about.
11	BY MS. MARRERO:
12	Q Okay. And what, specifically, were you
13	hearing in this call?
14	A That a man had dragged a lady inside and was
15	saying that he was going to slit her throat or kill
16	her. And that they were in a motel room at the
17	Del Rancho.
18	Q Thank you. As you're hearing this, what is
19	your thought process in terms of what your next steps
20	were going to be?
21	A I was thinking about policy and how that
22	looks and what patrol would probably do. It'd
23	probably be to eventually active SERT and have CNT
24	come and try to negotiate and SERT come and try to do
25	the tactical piece.

1	So I was trying to transition into how we
2	would get there or how we would set it all up.
3	Officer VanBlokland and I had taken somebody else's
4	vehicle for some other reasons to the first warrant,
5	so we had to actually had to go back to North
6	Precinct, get our vehicles.
7	I think the majority of people went from the
8	warrant straight down there, so we were delayed a
9	little bit, going to North Precinct and then down to
LO	the call-out.
L1	Q And then when you eventually got to the
L2	call-out, did you make contact with Sergeant
L3	McConnell?
L4	A Yes.
L5	Q And at that point had you received further
L6	updates on either the radio or from Sergeant
L7	McConnell?
L8	A Yes. I mean, just trying to keep up to
L9	speed on everything that's happened. There was a lot
20	of information coming in. I'm sure we missed some of
21	it, but we're, you know, keeping up on it. He, I
22	think, was in Room 16.
23	They had officers out front. They were
24	trying to talk with him. They had the backside, which
25	we called Side 3, I think facing the south was

contained. They needed somebody back there with a view into the room, if possible.

Q Okay.

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A So that's where officer -Sergeant McConnell sent us, trying to get a elevated
position looking maybe down into the room, so we can
see what was going on in there.

Q And so can you talk a little bit about what your duties were with regard to that assignment?

A Find an elevated position and be able to get a view down inside. Hard to know what's going on in there. Don't -- I wasn't hearing that they were seeing him out front. So if it's at all possible, our job is to try to get some intelligence.

At that point, maybe our whole understanding of the call is different. Maybe what's going on inside there, they're just in there talking calmly or something, like, a lot of times what we're hearing may or may not be accurate with what we're seeing.

But if we don't have an ability to view into that space, then we don't really know. So there was a fence on the back side with some blackberry bushes blocking the view. So the only way to really -- if we were going to have an ability to look inside, there was to get a little bit higher than that fence.

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The property to the south had several Conex boxes that we're full of -- I don't know what they're full of actually. And we ended up finding a truck that was in front of those. There's no good way for us to get in top of those Conex boxes to have a view down in, but that was goal when we left.

Q And can you talk about, sort of, the gear that you had on you just in terms of the stuff that you had?

A We always have a standard kit. We have a load-bearing vest that's bulletproof on it. You have, you know, all of our normal gear for doing different kinds of missions. I brought with me a spotter scope that's not attached to a rifle. It's a 40-power scope that you just look through.

So my hope was to find a spot where we can look deep into a room through a window and gain more intelligence. We both had -- I have one rifle.

Officer VanBlokland I think had two rifles. Normal helmets, all that stuff that we normally wear.

Q And as you got there and you were looking for a location to set up, were you completely set up as the situation was escalating?

A No, not even close. Events kind of happen on their own and, obviously, we tried to be, you know,

set up and ready when they happen.

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If this was a standard barricade where maybe somebody was inside refusing to communicate and wasn't coming out, a lot of times those have more time to develop where if we don't take any action and maybe try to force him out using gas or something, then nothing happens.

Here, it seemed like things were happening the whole time. It never really slowed down. We never did get into our final spot. We would've both -- I don't want to speak for Kelly. We were looking for an elevated position where we could look down into the room.

I would've rather had been prone. I would've rather had been hidden and none of those things were really an option. Things were moving so fast, so we ended up standing up in the back of a truck where we were, at some point, going to -- that's it right there.

That's funny, I haven't seen it since that day. I thought there was a hot tub in the back that was on its side. And there's my spotter scope sitting there. So as you can see, there's not a lot of room in there, so we were both standing to the back.

Once we went around the front of the Conex

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boxes and could see the back of the motel, my biggest concern was to just trying to figure out which window or windows or room was where the incident was going on. So that took a while and I don't remember if we were both in the back of the truck.

I vaguely remember I think

Officer VanBlokland being in the truck and I might've

been on the ground using our radios to try to talk to

other SERT members and figure out which room the whole

incident was happening in 'cause we were looking at a

whole bunch of windows.

Q And how did you, ultimately, determine which room the incident was occurring in?

A I asked. I heard that there were SERT members in the rooms on both sides, east and west of his and I asked them to come to the windows and point us in the right direction.

So, at some point, they came to the window at the same time and were both pointing this way, which made it nice and clear. The only confusing thing was there was two windows and a door.

And so the door I was worried that -- and the SERT members were on the outside of that door. I think we asked if they had a door in their room. And they said, "No."

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So then I was concerned that that would a door that the man in 16 could exit from. And, basically, we figured out that that was a boiler room maybe that had no other access into or out of any of the rooms, at least that's what we're told.

I still don't know if that's true or not.

So we were just mainly, at that point, concerned with the two windows that we could see.

Q And what did you see as you were focusing on that window?

A The window to the left, which I would think more to the west, at some point by then we had figured out that was the room. Kelly and I were both standing -- Officer VanBlokland and I were both standing in the back of that truck.

He was closer to the wood, to the right side, which would be to the north. I was to the left. We were going to climb up on to the sidewall there and get up on to a Conex box.

And a man looked out of the window and we recognized -- we had already looked at our work phones that had a picture of what we were considering the suspect on there. The person that came to look out of the window looked like the person in that picture.

I think it took a minute for me to kind of

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realize what was going on. It seemed like the window was kind of blocked and my recollection is that there were curtains that he had either pulled out of the way and then there's also a mattress in front of the window.

And I think what he had done, I think the mattress was taller than where he can see. So he had pulled the mattress down and was, like, had his arm over it, he was looking.

I think he flipped us off and was yelling.

I can see that he was yelling. I can kind of hear it.

I assumed the window was shut, 'cause it didn't

sound -- it wasn't loud. I couldn't tell what he -he was saying.

Q And -- and you said that you think he flipped you off. Did you -- what did you observe? Did you actually see him making a gesture with his finger or --

A Yes, like that. And it wasn't -- we were close. It probably felt 20 to 30 yards away, maybe 30 yards away, but it wasn't so close that I could make eye contact with him and see he was looking directly at us. I felt like he probably saw us, but he was looking out the back. And I assume at some point that he saw us. I don't know.

1	Q Okay. You couldn't hear what he was saying,
2	but did you have a perception of of, sort of, his
3	demeanor towards you based on what you did see through
4	the window?
5	A He seemed angry. He seemed loud. He was
6	yelling. He seemed like he was saying something at
7	the top of his voice.
8	Q Were you able to see the female victim at
9	all?
10	A No. I could not see anything other than
11	just, I think it might've been his right arm, but
12	I'm not sure shoulder, and then face.
13	Q And what was going through your head as you
14	were observing this?
15	A Whether or not we should use deadly force to
16	protect the lady inside at that point. It seemed very
17	early. We tried to coordinate as a team. We really
18	want these things to get resolved peacefully.
19	We know the most hostage-type incidents get
20	resolve through negotiations. That's how we always
21	want them to go, but I was also thinking about all of
22	the other things that it kind of led up to this.
23	Him out on the community, having stabbed
24	somebody or had reported to have stabbed somebody, and
25	dragging her back inside, making threats to her and

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specific threats, you know, "I'm going to slit her throat," or, "I'm going to kill her," I believe were the terms.

It wasn't just, you know, "She's going to die," or something. It was more specific. He -- I can't remember if it happened before this or after this, but, at some point, he leaves and I think pulls the curtains shut, something that make me think, oh, we're not going to see him again.

Okay. I thought, okay, he's gone and he's not going to come back. That was my thinking. And I know that I was feeling, like, maybe we made a mistake. Maybe we should've used deadly force right then to protect her.

We already heard about him barricading the doors and making it harder for officers to get in. I was feeling very scared for the lady inside. I was thinking, you know, if he takes an action against her, even if we try to respond quickly, it might be really slow and delayed. It may not be in time to save her.

I was also thinking that for us it was safer that he was reported to have a knife because for us going in there, that would be safer. But I actually thought that might make the situation worse for her because he might stab her or hurt her and we might not

1 hear it.

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It's not like a gunshot that you can hide, but if he covers her mouth and stabs her, we may not even know something bad happened to her, so that we should go in there and rescue her.

So it was hard. It felt like a lot of pressure to be looking at him and trying to figure out whether or not to use deadly force or not.

It was obviously a lot of stuff going on on the radio. Normally, at that point, we would get on the radio and say, "We're thinking about using deadly force. We're really worried about this lady's welfare and that he might slit her throat."

And allow anybody else to chime in and say, "Well, we have this information or that information that would not lead you to believe that that'd be a good thing to do."

Right after he disappeared from that window,

I believe that CNT was on the phone with him again and

it wasn't a very long conversation. And he basically

just said, "Get the police out of here or I'm going to

slit her throat."

Sergeant Livingston then said, "If we hear her screaming, that we're going to make a crisis entry." Obviously, for her and for the SERT members,

that is a more dangerous action than us using deadly force on him if we had to protect her 'cause there's no guarantee that they're going to get in.

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Even with all of our plans in place and all of our efforts, it's still is going to be -- we don't know what has happened in there. I can hear if we put a couple of desks and chairs against the door, it'd be really challenging to get in, even with all of the other things you put in place.

Q And so as this is going on in your head and you -- you've heard all of these things over the radio, and in terms of it being more dangerous for -- to do a -- a crisis entry as opposed to you using deadly force or Officer VanBlokland using deadly force, can you expand on that just a little it?

A The potential is there for it to just be more successful and immediate. If we saw him and use deadly force, it's just us and him versus them trying to get in through a door and maybe he is able to do something to her.

Maybe he's able to do something to them as they're climbing over desks and chairs and tables or a bed, whatever is in a motel room there.

Q Given the amount of time it would take to -- for them to get in?

A	Correct,	veah
Δ	COLLECC,	y Carr

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Q And so the information that you had received about possibly barricading the door, was that playing into your thought process at that point?

A Very heavily because if we can't get in there and help her, then he has more ability to either set up some kind of ambush, do something to her and we're not able to go take an immediate effort, you know. It's, like, we'll take on all that risk and we'll do the best we can to get in very quickly.

And I think that, you know, we train a lot we have a lot of people who are very committed to it, but it still could be 10, 15, 20 seconds and that is a long time for somebody to hurt other people or move to a different location and make our job harder. So it was --

Q And so what was the next thing that you've observed or that drew your attention?

A At some point right in that also, we heard an update over the radio that we had probable cause for Assault II. So that factor into it also. I don't know -- I didn't know anything about the victim at 7-Eleven, but, at some point, there was still an external victim out there.

Q Okay. What had you heard about that

incident?

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A That he had been at 7-Eleven and tried to stab somebody. I thought I heard, initially, that he had tried to stab somebody and was unsuccessful.

But then later, right at that point, we heard -- and it was right in that time period where we had seen him in the first window and then he disappeared, I thought that we got the update that there was PC for Assault II, which made me feel, like, okay, there is some kind of concrete action that happened out in the public, which also plays into this not being a type of situation where we would disengage from it because if he is willing to hurt other people out in the community, it's not something where we can just say, "Okay. This is going to resolve itself."

So even if he was by himself, where a lot of times if somebody's in crisis or they are even a cornered criminal and we think that the risk is going to be really high. But if we don't think they're going to go hurt other community members, an option on the table is disengaging, like, could we come back tomorrow?

Is that going to be something that's an option? In here, partially because of that information from 7-Eleven, that absolutely felt like

the wrong thing to do for the community.

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So we get to that point. We're worried about the barricading, which would delay us getting in if he were to hurt her. You know, Sergeant Livingston had already said if we hear her screaming inside, we're going to make a crisis entry, knowing that might take a little bit of time even with all of these other things in place.

He, at some point, then comes back to that second window. I think I was still trying to figure out a place to up my spotter scope, still thinking about whether or not I was going to climb on to the Conex box. So I think I was facing the same direction as the truck. Officer VanBlokland was over by the wood side rail.

And then I don't know how I knew. I don't know if Kelly said he's back on the window or something, but I looked up and he was in the window and out to the left. What I remember and I don't know if this is true, but what I remember was a piece of wood diagonally across the windows.

And I thought I remember seeing him open the window. At that point, Officer VanBlokland shot one time and the man went down out of view. I heard -- I thought I heard somebody call an execute.

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And so I knew that if we shot, I knew that the entry was going to go in and try to rescue her.

There, you know, from our training, we know that it's possible taking moving shots, potentially, through barriers like if there had been glass we have to shoot through, it's going to be a lot less effective.

It deflects the bullets, so there may or may not be a devastating round that actually stops the threat, so they are always going to follow up with an entry, so I knew that was going to happen.

I don't know how long it took. Several seconds, obviously. They were working through breach issues and stuff like that that other people will talk about, but, at some point, I heard them say that the suspect was down and to bring medical in.

I did not hear over the radio, or at least I don't remember hearing it, that the victim was fine and I was really hoping to hear that. At some point, I don't know how I figured out that she was okay.

I do remember later, sitting in a car after they separated all of us, I see her walk out and talking to detectives. That made me feel better that at least, physically, she looked like she was okay.

Q Okay. And once the shot went off, you said eventually you all were separated, but once

1	Officer VanBlokland actually fired the shot, what did
2	you at that point?
3	A I don't even remember exactly. I set my
4	spotter scope down.
5	Q Did you remain at that location?
6	A Yeah. We just stayed at the back of the
7	truck. Sergeant McConnell walked up pretty quickly,
8	told us not to talk to each other about it, asking
9	where the round might've gone, the shell casing from
10	the rifle. We figured it went into this patch of
11	leaves where we couldn't see it. He told us not to
12	talk to anybody, call anybody, not to talk to him.
13	I had Sergeant McConnell make a bunch of
14	phone calls from me because I had a bunch of classes I
15	was suppose to teach that day and throughout the
16	night, that we started letting people know they were
17	going to finding replacements for us.
18	Q And aside from that, though, you didn't
19	you didn't take any further actions part of the the
20	scene that day?
21	A No.
22	Q So I want to go back a little bit and talk a
23	little bit more about some of the things that you had
24	heard or things that you knew.

Had you heard anything over the air about

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any sort of mental health symptoms or any sort of drug use for the suspect?

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A Not mental health. There could've been, but I didn't hear it. It is somewhat of a challenge. I always feel bad later. People think, oh, you should know all of this information. And I think we probably 80 percent of it, if not more.

But we're climbing fences sometimes, cutting locks, driving there. You actually having to pay attention to traffic. You're driving there quickly but safely, trying not to get, you know, us or somebody else injured, listening to all of the stuff that's going on. It's easy to miss stuff.

I have heard quite a bit about reported meth use. So they had said that he was high on meth, he'd taken a lot of meth and some of the information from CNT was that he wasn't making a whole lot of sense.

I remember some of the stuff he was talking about, prostitution and stacking. And I don't know what that is. I remember I think saying something to Kelly. We're like, "What did they just say?" Like, it didn't make sense talking about stacking and prostitution.

And that made me more concerned for her safety also. I've been on several real life hostage

situations and also, you know, multiple scenarios and when there's somebody inside saying, "I don't want to hurt anybody. I just want you all to leave."

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A lot of times, that's going to work out in some kind of good, you know? It may take a lot longer, but he didn't talk to them very much. It seemed like he was hanging up the phone with them and we knew he was high on meth.

It was much more concerning for her safety that maybe he's not making rational decisions. This isn't him saying, you know, "I just want to leave and, you know, I won't hurt her." He was saying, "I'll slit her throat."

And then there wasn't a lot of dialogue.

They, I think, said he was agitated, none of which helped us feel like this is going to work itself out.

Q So did you feel like the situation was becoming more agitated as time went on?

A Yeah. It definitely felt like it was building as we were -- from the time we listened to it until the time it ended, it felt like it just kind of built and built. It felt very fast. I don't know how long it took me to get there and then get into that yard.

I know I was more delayed with Kelly getting

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there than some of the other people that were right out front; but from our standpoint, never really a time where we knew all of the information and then we're trying to make strategic moves. It was, like, we just still building our plan and reacting to stuff because of all that was happening so quickly.

Q And what was your thought process after he had stepped away from the window the first time before he reappeared?

A I was feeling a little bit nervous that he would kill her or do something. And then we would feel guilty for not having shot him the first time, which was a lot of pressure. It felt very -- it felt a little bit -- we joke sometimes about on IP about feeling like you're on an island, like, you're all by yourself.

There's really nobody else there to help you make decisions. You're not, like, asking bosses.

You're not -- there's no way you're weighing all of this information kind of by yourself. And then, in some senses, you know, Kelly and I don't even have time to talk about everything that's happening.

And so it's, like, okay, you know, and, you know, very cognizant of, you know, police officer-involved shootings and how they're going to

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get looked at and how they're going to get reviewed.

And he and I are both in the Training Division and we have lots and lots of experience looking at it, reviewing tactics.

We're constantly trying to do the best job we can. Obviously, everybody wants it to be resolved peacefully and this weighs on all of us, even in the moment. And it was definitely a few seconds of, "Oh, crap. Did we just let her get killed?"

But then it's weird, you know? It's not like we're watching him standing over her with a knife stabbing her right then. We're trying to make a decision based on everything we're hearing, our ability to effect a rescue, how much danger she's in, what kind of decision making he's going to be making down the road.

All of that is very challenging and we felt like her life was in danger, but we also wanted CNT to be able to talk to him, try to have more of an effect, all of this stuff. But if we never seen him again, I don't know how this would have resolved itself.

It could've gone really well or it might not have of. It's just so hard to know. It's certainly, in that moment, did not feel like it was going to resolve itself well.

1	Q And, in that moment, you felt that her life
2	was in danger?
3	A Very much so.
4	(Pause in proceedings, 12:01 p.m.)
5	BY MR. HANNON:
6	Q You just mentioned that there's a lot of
7	information coming into the radio traffic and you're
8	have a lot of thought processes going on in a very
9	short period of time and that you're on an island,
10	kind of making these decisions, both you and
11	Officer VanBlokland personally.
12	Was there any conversations going on between
13	the two of you as you're observing what you're
14	observing, either statements kind of in passing or
15	casual conversations as to what you're seeing or what
16	you're hearing?
17	A They were very choppy 'cause something would
18	happen. And then we would maybe talk about something
19	just for a second. I don't remember very many. There
20	were no full conversations. There wasn't any, like,
21	"Hey, you do this and I'll do that."
22	We were both trying to figure out, you know,
23	where our spot was going to be. And then we just kind
24	of ended up at the truck. There was no other way to
25	get on top of those Conex boxes. The yard was

actually very clean.

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I was hoping to find a ladder, you know?

The closest thing we could find to that truck was a barbecue and I was thinking about trying to climb up on to this barbecue. And then it would've been a hard climb with all of our gear.

So we get to the truck and then all of a sudden we're in the view of the back. So he and I didn't have much time to talk. We're both feeling pressured to figure out which window the room is.

Then we get up in the truck and we're still trying to decide whether or not to move higher; and, all of a sudden, we see him the first time.

I think that we may -- I can't remember whether it was, you know, internally. I was thinking this or he and I talked about maybe we should've shot him. That's when he left the first time. We were, like, that might have been a mistake, like, we might have just let something terrible happen. I can't remember if that was outside or inside.

We did talk about -- after he left the first time, there was a couple of different things that happened. Like I said, the PC for Assault II; him saying he was going to slit her throat if we didn't get the cops back.

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Don Livingston saying that if we heard her screaming or crying, they were going to do a crisis entry. At some point in there, Kelly and I did have a really quick conversation about, "I would like to get on the radio and say if we see him again we're going to use deadly force," just so that everybody else knows.

And also if command post has more info, then they can tell us, "No, don't do it, you know, we are back on the phone with him and things are going well," or something. I can't remember if we tried or not. I feel like we did.

There were so many times where we did try to ask a question and I would push my radio button and it would honk at me because somebody else is already talking, doing something.

So that happened frequently throughout the call, even just trying to figure out which position we're going to go to, which window is which. We go to talk and the radio would be already busy.

Q And in that -- and does that fit with your kind of experience of this entire scenario as a whole that based on that radio activity, there was just a lot of rapidly escalating activity requiring everybody to respond as to what they're observing and seeing

at once?

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A Yes. And then also just the coordination for some of the breach issues and things like that where we're trying to put together a plan. We have to go rescue her right now 'cause this felt like this was moving very quickly.

At no point did I hear any radio traffic that wasn't important. Each time I wanted to say something and somebody else was saying something I recognized that was either equally or more important.

But, yeah, that was definitely a challenge, but it happens like that on every fast paced event like this, whether it's some of our trainings that we do that are fast paced, quickly evolving or whether it's a real life one that communication is always a challenge.

There's no way to divvy up, oh, half of you are going to go talk on a different radio net 'cause then you don't know what each other knows. So you have to stay on the same net, but at some point there is a max capacity.

And on those events, they're usually -- it's at max capacity for it at some point. Once you get all of your plans built, if nothing's happened, then there starts being some radio space where there are

long gaps where people aren't talking. 1 2. And --3 A lot of times on a barricade it might get 4 like that, but not on a --5 And in your training scenarios and actual 6 live scenarios, whether it's a hostage situation or a 7 stand off, is it -- is it more typical that those periods last longer which allows for a little more 8 9 information to come in or Crisis Negotiation Team has 10 had better success with the -- engaging in a two-way conversation with the person inside the location? 11 12 Can you say that again? 13 Sure. So in other -- you -- you describe this as fast. 14 15 That's correct. 16 Have you -- have you had a faster SERT 17 call-out hostage scenario or -- I -- J -- put the 18 hostage scenario in with the stand-off scenario 19 because sometimes they're by themselves. 20 Mm-hmm. Yeah. 21 Have you had one that occurred faster than 2.2 this one in your experience? 23 I don't remember one that's happened faster. 24 I would say that the majority or the most critical 25 ones feel like they can't go any faster.

O Mm-hmm.

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A And this was definitely in that category.

So I don't know if it's faster, slower than another one of those. But there's only, you know, maybe in my -- I've been on the SERT team for ten years and there's maybe five or six call-outs that all feel like they couldn't have gone any faster.

The hostage piece makes it so much more challenging because if this was a standard barricade, if he was in there if he committed a crime or if he was in crisis and we were just trying to get him to get out, we wouldn't be worried as much about all of the breaching issues.

We wouldn't be making a plan to go in. We'd be waiting for him to come out to us. We'd be much more patient. So because of the hostage piece and us trying to figure out an entry to go rescue her if we needed to, that probably added a whole nother 25 percent of communication that has to happen on the front end, so that really fills it up quickly.

Q And then, initially, one last question. I think and maybe I'm wrong, but, initially, after the shot was fired, obviously, Sergeant McConnell hadn't come yet and turned it into a crime scene and separated everybody and put down, don't -- don't talk

1	about this incident.
2	But was there any conversation or any
3	statements that you recall made by Officer VanBlokland
4	immediately after the shot was fired, but before
5	Sergeant McConnell came?
6	A He did say something, like he set his gun
7	down and he said something, like, "I was hoping to
8	never have to do that," or something like that.
9	MR. HANNON: Okay. Do the grand jurors have
10	any other questions for Officer Harris?
11	Okay. Why don't we take a brief recess as
12	we get situated for our next witness as well as I
13	believe lunch?
14	A GRAND JUROR: Can we take 10? A break
15	and
16	MR. HANNON: Yes, absolutely.
17	A GRAND JUROR: and get it set up?
18	MR. HANNON: Yes.
19	* * *
20	(Noon Recess taken at 12:07 p.m.)
21	
22	AFTERNOON SESSION
23	(Whereupon, the following proceedings were
24	held before Grand Jury No. 1, 12:33 p.m.:)
25	MR. HANNON: We are back on the record and

1	call our next witness, Officer VanBlokland.
2	Please stand right there, raise your right
3	hand and then we'll swear you in.
4	KELLY VanBLOKLAND
5	Was thereupon called as a witness; and, having been
6	first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
7	THE CLERK: Thank you.
8	EXAMINATION
9	BY MR. HANNON:
10	Q Go on and have a seat.
11	A Can I get a glass of water?
12	Q You absolutely can.
13	A Thank you very much. Thank you, sir.
14	THE CLERK: Absolutely.
15	BY MR. HANNON:
16	Q So first, thank you for being here and could
17	you please state and spell your name for the record.
18	A My name is Kelly VanBlokland, K-e-l-l-y,
19	V-a-n-B-l-o-k-l-a-n-d.
20	Q Officer VanBlokland, you you are here
21	voluntarily; is that correct?
22	A That is correct.
23	Q And you have an attorney outside, so if you
24	have any questions or concerns, you can take a break
25	at any time. You just let us know.

A Thank you.

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Q First, why don't you tell us how you're currently employed.

A I'm currently employed with the City of

Portland Police Bureau. I've been a Portland police

officer since December 30th, 1993. I'm approaching my

25th year next month. I'm currently assigned to the

Training Division, where I've been there since 2010.

I was the lead firearms instructor for approximately six years. And then I took position as our lead armor, so I'm responsible for maintaining all the weapon systems the Police Bureau operates for repairs and purchases.

I also purchase all the ammo for the Police Bureau for duty use and for practice. And I'm also a detached member of our Special Emergency Reaction

Team, which is our version of -- of a SWAT team.

Q And before we get into more of your training and experience, why don't you tell us a little bit about yourself personally. Are you from Oregon?

A Yes, born and raised in Oregon. Moved over to this side of the state to go to college. Went to Western Oregon State University. During my last roughly two years at Western Oregon State, I was a reserve police officer with the City of Keizer.

1	Started to seek employment with law
2	enforcement agencies when I was still in college. And
3	upon graduating, the City of Keizer employed me as
4	their community service officer, where I worked for
5	maybe two or three months before I was hired by
6	Portland that December.
7	Q And when you went to Western Oregon
8	University, what was your major?
9	A Criminal justice was my major and I minored
10	in Spanish.
11	Q Do you actually speak Spanish?
12	A Used to. I haven't had the chance to use it
13	enough to maintain it.
14	Q Okay. Now, you indicated you were assigned
15	to the Training Division. What exactly do you do
16	within the Training Division?
17	A I'm currently one of the lead armors, so as
18	I had mentioned, we're responsible for all the weapon
19	systems that are deployed within the city, just for
20	purchasing or repairs, make sure they are properly
21	functioning.
22	If someone calls us and says there's an
23	issue, we will take it in and repair it. So that
24	covered the Glock handguns, the Remington X70
25	shotains the less-lethal launchers

1	Q And when you were the firearms instructor,
2	what did that entail? What were you doing then?
3	A I was teaching the advanced academy, so I
4	was the lead firearms instructor responsible for
5	training all the new recruits when they came back from
6	the basic academy down in Salem.
7	Q And when you were teaching at the advanced
8	academy as a firearms instructor, did that include use
9	of force or threatened use of force in an officer's
10	capacity?
11	A Use of force was covered in different
12	classes.
13	Q Mm-hmm.
14	A We're basically main are basically
15	focused on the shooting skill itself, which is a very
16	perishable skill. So we did a lot with marksmanship
17	and just being able to protect themselves and others
18	with the weapons they're issued.
19	Q Gotcha. And, of course, as a Portland
20	police officer, you, yourself, have been trained in
21	regards to you attended basic academy; is that right?
22	A Yes, I did.
23	Q And did you attend the advanced academy?
24	A Yes, sir.
25	Q And just in your own words, could you

summarize for the ladies and gentlemen of the grand jury basic academy and advanced academy?

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A The basic academy is -- when I went, it was hosted in Monmouth. Since then, it's been moved to Salem. When I went through, I want to say it was a 12-week process going through the basic academy. Upon graduation, returned to Portland where you're assigned with a field training officer.

You work the street for a period of time until an advanced academy slot opens up and then you go back to the academy that Portland hosts to get more specific training on Portland techniques, city codes; and, again, kind of criminal law, use of force, decision making.

And then once you were finished with the advanced academy, then you return back to the street with your field training officer to complete your phrases until you're off probation.

Q And then just in your capacity as a Portland Police Bureau officer, is there ongoing training throughout your career?

A Yes. We have yearly in-services that may range from a 40-hour in-service to two different blocks of 20-hour in-services. They run the spectrum of hard skills, driving, shooting, defensive tactics,

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coupled with legal updates, use-of-force classes, just
whatever the topic may be. It varies as far as the
classroom work from in-service to in-service so they
can cover a broad spectrum to keep us up to date on
different policies.

- Q And you probably already said this, but going back to SERT, how long have you been with SERT?
- A I was assigned to SERT June of 2007, so I've been an active member for 11 years.
- Q And as a member of SERT for 11 years, have you had a consistent role or has the role evolved over time with SERT?
- A So my first year, we do a rotation between our entry element and our inner-perimeter team, so it's about a six-month rotation on each, after which I was assigned to our inner-perimeter team, which I've been on ever since. So I've done the last 10 years of my time with SERT as an inner-perimeter officer.
- Q And before going more into the details of what an inner-perimeter officer is, as a member of SERT going back to 2007, in addition to all the other in-service and ongoing trainings that you've had with the Portland Police Bureau, is there any ongoing training or updates that you work in as a member of SERT?

A As a member of SERT, as a specially unit that does respond to the most critical incidents requested in the City of Portland, we do receive a tremendous amount of additional training above and beyond what your average patrol officer receives.

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We train two days every week, so that averages out to about 520 additional hours plus a year that we receive. It's shooting skills on one day and basically the other day is some type of, like, scenario-based training, iteration training, just depends on what topic we're covering.

We cover a broad spectrum of types of critical incidents we may have a respond to, and so we take time to hit on every one of those topics generally at least twice throughout the year.

Q And run us through, what is scenario-based training? What would that entail as a member of SERT?

A Scenario-based training is when the person running the training basically sets up a realistic event that the team has to deal with. It could be a hostage crisis. It could be a lone barricade in the house.

It depends on the hard skill they want us to work on for the day. So we'll have actual role players come in. They'll have assigned tasks as how

they want this to potentially resolve. It's kind of fluid depending on how we choose to deal with the event, so you can only anticipate so many things.

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When you have 27 guys that all are coming up with ideas and you have one guy that's setting up the training, it's hard to cover the spectrum of what a very critical thinking person may come up with.

So they kind of know how they want the scenario resolve, and so they'll work us through that. And we'll actually deploy in our positions. The entry team will come up with their hasty plan, their delivery plan for the event.

And then we'll basically just start putting all of our pieces in place, the negotiations, the information that we're seeing from the inner perimeter, so we're kind of information gatherers.

We disseminate back to the team as far as our role on a outer or inner perimeter and then the scenario just kind of plays out and we get to resolve it.

Q And when you have that scenario training, is it just doing the training or is there any sort of debriefing periods afterwards where you analyze kind of what the team did, how they did it and ways to improve and ways to anticipate future scenarios or

unknowns?

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A Yes. So at the end of every scenario, we'll pull the role players out of the house that we used and we get all of the members of the team together that were involved and we'll basically talk start to finish as far as how we resolved it, our thought process at the time, things we could have done better, things that we did that didn't go well, how we could improve upon that.

And we always are very critical of ourselves as far as figuring out did we have best choice at the time and what could have been better. So in actual real events, we have a broad knowledge, a base of things we've done in realistic-based training to pull, to use.

Q So in going back specifically to what's been your role for the majority if not almost entire time on the SERT team, describe for the grand jury what inner perimeter is. What is that role?

A So inner-perimeter team member's role is once we respond, basically the uniform officers have set up containment around whatever problem we're dealing with. And so our role is to, as an inner-perimeter officer is to basically -- we don't just take their positions, but we'll kind of work in,

talk to them, debrief the officers.

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If it's a good position that hasn't been compromised or seen, we may actually stay in that position. But our role is to watch our designated area of the house. We -- we generally number a house one through four, where generally the front door will be Side One and we work clockwise around the house.

It will be Side Two, the back is generally Side Three and then Side Four. And that just takes the confusion out of directions. You put me in Southwest Portland and tell me north, I'm going to mess it up probably every time.

So this takes the guesswork out. So if I tell someone I'm seeing something off of Side Three, the rest of the team's aware of what I'm looking at and where that problem might be.

And so as an inner-perimeter officer, my role is to contain. We want to contain and isolate these incidents as best we can. Uniform generally has done that for us, so we're augmented and relieving that. And then we're really information gatherers at that point. We're seeing real time what's going on.

We can broadcast what we see and what we hear to the other officers on seen, so we can give them a better picture of what is actually occurring

now as opposed to getting relayed from somebody else.

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They're getting real time information from the inner perimeter officers as far as what's occurring with the event if we're able to glean any information from what we can see.

Q And are you doing that just with the naked eye? Is there technology or enhanced technology that allows you to get perspectives or vantage points that other officers, whether they be uniform officers, SERT officers or even crisis negotiation team officers, just a better perspective that you might be able to inform them on?

A Yes. So we carry 10 power binoculars with us as well so we have magnified optics that we can look through, binoculars.

I have a 50 power spotting scope that I could deploy. I usually don't for most of them, as it's too big and cumbersome and we're so close anyway to most problems. And then we also have magnified optics on our weapons system.

Q And inner perimeter, SERT activations or the use of the SERT team, is that usually by itself or is there another component when there are -- when SERT is utilized in any given scenario?

A Yes. When we serve search warrants or we

have a call-out, our Crisis Negotiation Team is also a part of those events. We have a smaller number for a planned search warrant, but we'll get the entire Crisis Negotiation Team for an actual call-out.

Q And setting aside warrants, are there certain policies or procedures or protocols in place with the Portland Police Bureau that requires mandatory SERT call-out that deploys both the SERT team and the crisis negotiation team to respond in concert to those scenes?

A Yes, there are. Hostage event is one.

Armed barricaded persons would be another. Our realm is really starting to broaden. We're starting to respond more to like high-rise suicidal events. We have a rope (indiscernible) system of that. Another one would be an armed person in the blocks.

And an example is maybe a traffic stop that goes bad or a pursuit happens. Say the suspect runs from the car, an officer sees a gun in his hand. He runs into a neighborhood. They get good containment and nobody's in there, they'll activate us for that as well.

Q What about live active shooter situations? Are those another one?

A Yes.

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Q And as working in a perimeter and doing it
so long, taking some of the bigger ones, such as
hostage, armed barricade, live active shooter and
armed persons in the blocks or kind of locking down
city blocks for community safety, going back to your
years and experience in 2007, could you give us an
estimate as to how many SERT call-outs you've been a
part of as an inner perimeter team member?

A Between search warrants and call-outs, we probably average a hundred a year, so from 2007 to now, I'm probably just short of a thousand different missions that I've performed in my job with the SERT team.

Q And okay. And in addition to providing intelligence, one, do you keep yourself in a position that is standing upright and open or do you try to find a prone position under concealment as you're setting up in a position in the inner perimeter of a SERT call-out?

A Ideally, we want to find kind of a clandestine position that we can get into. It may be a seated position. It may be in a house looking through someone's front window.

Ideally, we want to be away from the problem and we want to be somewhat out of view or seen, A, to

protect ourselves, and especially if there's an armed person in the house with the rifle or handgun, we don't want to be visible so they could potentially take shots at us.

But we also want to become out of sight if we can because of -- generally, if a person knows the police are there, they're not going to act normally, so we're going to get less intel.

If they identify where we're at, we may never see them again, so why would -- 'cause why would they want to be seen if they know we can observe and report on what they're doing. So, generally, we do want to be in a clandestine position.

Q And then do you bring any -- I mean, as a uniformed officer, I presume you have a sidearm or handgun with you as part of your day-to-day operations?

A Yes.

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Q And when you work in a capacity as inner perimeter in a SERT call-out, do you bring any other firearms with you in those scenarios?

A Yes, I do. So as a inner-perimeter officer, we deal with a lot of the problems at a distance, so I always deploy my AR15 rifle with a magnified optic on it. I also have access to a Remington 308 precision

rifle, which is more for distance through heavier 1 2. barricades, like thicker glass, two-pane residential 3 glass and the downtown business glass, it has a better 4 chance of penetrating if I did have to fire a round to 5 save someone's life downtown. 6 So we have different tools. We also have a 7 40-millimeter less lethal launcher we have access to. 8 So, yes, there are a broad spectrum of tools that I can choose from based on the incident as far as what I 9 10 think I will need.

> Turning your attention to this particular day and incident, were you part of a SERT mission prior to all of the incidents that unfolded at the Del Rancho on October 10th, 2018?

Yes, I was. I was part of two search warrants that we performed that morning. Started at -- the first service as at 4:00 a.m. and the second service was 7:30 a.m., I believe.

And in those missions, was that similar to what we've described before? There was a CNT component, a SERT component and including you and others for an inner-perimeter assignments?

Α Yes.

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- And did those warrants go as planned? Q
- They went flawlessly. Α Yes.

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Q At what point when you're involved in those
missions did you personally learn of or know that
something may or may not be unfolding in East Precinct
at the location of Del Rancho Motel?
A la the conclusion of the gogord gearsh

A As the conclusion of the second search warrant, it would have been sometime after 9:00 a.m. The inner perimeter had been cleared from that search warrant because everyone had been taken into custody and they were waiting for investigators to come up and take possession of the house.

So Officer Leo Harris and myself went back to the truck that we had arrived in and we were basically waiting for the search warrant scene to basically disintegrate so we could go back to northeast -- or North Precinct.

And at that point, I had heard someone say that our SERT sergeants had received a consultation page from East Precinct regarding an incident that was occurring there.

Q And did you learn more information about what that was entailing at this warrant scene or did you and Officer Harris head back to North Precinct before learning more?

A So the scene wasn't secured yet.

Investigators hadn't taken for -- for us for the

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search warrant. So as we were sitting in the truck, I was in the passenger seat. Leo's in the driver's seat, Leo Harris, Officer Harris, excuse me.

And once we heard the -- learned of the consultation, I basically pulled my phone. I have access to CAD, so I can pull up CAD calls and read basic descriptions.

And so we turned the truck radio on East net so we could start monitoring what was occurring over there a little bit. I still had a SERT net in my ear, in my ear piece, and I, basically, started scrolling through the call that was occurring at the Del Rancho, so I read that initial piece of it there.

Q And -- and a CAD, is that a printout of kind of what's being relayed through BOEC, or the Portland Police Bureau communications on the open net?

A Yeah. It's our computer-aided dispatch system that BOEC uses to dispatch officers to incidents. And so you can pull it up on a computer. We can pull it up on our phones.

And it's basically kind of a description of what's going on on the call. They put updates to the initial call and just keep it kind of a running update as far as what's occurring.

Q And from your recollection, what did you

recall seeing either in the CAD or heard over the air as this was unfolding?

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A I had it pulled up, so I was reading it to Officer Harris and it said that there had been a fight, I want to say, in or near the Del Rancho Motel. There had been an attempted stabbing.

The suspect had retreated back to the

Del Rancho where a witness had seen him armed with a

knife. They saw him grab a female, make threats to

her and then drag her into Room 16.

Q And as you learned of that information, what were you thinking at the time as to whether or not you were likely or not likely to be activated or were you thinking about that?

A Another piece in that initial part that I read was also that they believed he was possibly high on meth. So I'm reading through this. I read the fact that he had already attempted to stab somebody.

He's now taken a female hostage, in my mind, the way he grabbed her at knifepoint, made threats to her, high on meth, drug her into the room, I immediately recognized that East was dealing with a pretty -- pretty significant event and I was already starting to label this as a hostage event.

Q And from your perspective in your training

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and experience, were you anticipating then that a SERT call-out was probably likely at that point unless you had more information later?

A Yes. Based on what I had read and my understanding of what had initially occurred, unless something significant changed in the next few minutes, I felt highly likely that East would activate the entire team.

Q What, if anything, happened next that you were monitoring that? Did you drive back to North or did someone else drive back to North?

A So they -- they cleared the search warrant. It was secured by investigators. Sergeant Livingston got on the air, kind of apprised us that he had a SERT consult for this event that was occurring at East. Told everybody on scene that he wanted us to start kind of rolling that way so we'd be closer to the event in case they did activate the entire team.

I went and contacted the owner of the truck I was sitting in 'cause it wasn't Leo's or my truck. So he drove us back to North, 'cause I had to have my first responder vehicle, 'cause I -- I needed access to additional tools in that truck that I figured I might need for this event if we did get activated.

And so we started heading back towards North

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Precinct from the area of like 16th and Killingsworth, so we weren't that far away, which was nice. And the rest of the team, both piece of armor and I think CNT just started to head towards 82 and Johnson Creek, which was going to be our initial staging location prior to the activation.

Q Now, from your -- from your experience as a SERT member, given that there were some previous warrants executed by SERT and given the fact that you were part of that, how quickly would you describe this deployment of SERT to this potential location compared to scenarios where you were paged to a call-out?

A It probably cut our response time in half, to be honest with you, 'cause we were already geared up and we already had everything we needed uniform and equipment-wise, other than me having to go get my truck. Pieces of armor already had drivers. They were ready to go straight away. So, yeah, I'd say probably cut our response time almost in half.

Q And were you at North Precinct long or were you able to get your equipment along with Officer Harris relatively quickly?

A It was quick. We rolled in. I jumped out of the rig, used the bathroom real quick, jumped in and then myself, Officer Harris and another third

responder vehicle jumped in and we started running code towards our first staging location.

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- Q When you say "running code," what does that mean?
- A Code 3, so I activated my lights, my siren.

 And so we just make sure we have everything lit up on our rig and audible as much as we can to basically protect ourselves and everybody else to give them notice that we're coming through as quickly as we can safely.
- Q And as -- so -- and were you the person driving to the location or was anybody -- or was someone else driving to the location?
- A I was by myself in my truck. I was driving. I was the lead vehicle. Leo Harris was behind me in his first responder vehicle. Then a third first responder that, to this day I don't know who that was, jumped in behind us.

So I was the first of three, which always causes me concern when you're running in a -- in a group of more than one vehicle. Everyone generally sees the first, so I always feel good about that, but then they tend to want to fall back in right behind you, so that raised my level of concern for the guys that were following me, so I was extra cautious as far

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as really changing my siren tone, getting my -getting the -- not the PA, but honking my air horn a
little bit, really putting people on notice to pay
attention.

It was a pretty busy morning still, later that morning. It was like 9:00 -- I don't know, probably 9:20, 9:30 by then, I'll bet, but traffic was -- it was packed on Killingsworth.

Q And as you're doing that, were you able to monitor what was going on on the radio or the CAD as you responded to the scene or was your attention more focused on getting to the scene as quick as possible?

A Both. I turned my truck radio on East net.

I still had my SERT net in my ear, so I'm trying to
monitor both radios, trying to run code, play with my
siren, my air horn, keep people out of the way. So my
attention was really mainly focused on being that lead
vehicle to protect the guys behind me and get us
there.

So I picked up a few bits and pieces. I was able to glean from, I think, the East radio that they were currently doing evacuations on the motel, trying to isolate Room 16, which was giving me a major comfort they were getting things contained as much as they could. So I knew they had a good contingent

there that was dealing with the problem as best they could.

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Q But in your -- in driving there from the vehicle to the location, is that an example of while everything is out in the open air, sometimes different officers from their own individual perspectives may have other things going on that doesn't necessarily allow all the information to come in at once, given that there's other tasks and duties occurring simultaneously?

- A Yeah, that would be correct.
- Q Okay. So did anything else of note occur as you were driving towards the location or did you ultimately arrive at the location?

A Finally made it down Killingsworth, which was, like I said, very -- very high pedestrian vehicle traffic that day. Once we got into I205 southbound, for being 9:30 in the morning, it looked like rush hour. It was basically at a standstill. All three lanes were crawling, very, very slow pace.

And so I hate to do it, but there was always that big wide left emergency lane, so I opted to put all three of us in that emergency lane, which always has its own type of issues, 'cause people want to tend to take that lane when they hear a siren coming, so

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again, that slowed me down and was really putting me on notice to pay attention to what people were doing more than what I could hear on the radio.

So I -- I didn't glean a ton of information other than the evacuations were occurring en route.

On 205, the full team activation happened, so again, my phone started blowing up. My pager started going off, so I'm dealing with those as well, trying to silence those.

And, basically, the -- the page read very similar with the initial call from the motel as far as male took a female hostage to Room 16 and they believe the subject was high on meth is I think roughly the way the page read. And then I just continued to guide the three of us down I205.

We took Johnson Creek and then we basically were told we could respond straight to the problem.

So I hit northbound 82nd and parked just south of the motel in the middle turn lane on 82nd.

Q When you were driving -- going back to the point of driving down 205 on that emergency lane, did you choose that despite some of the concerns mainly because you wanted to arrive at the scene quicker given how the situation was unfolding?

A Yes. If we hadn't taken that left emergency

1	lane, we would not have got there. It would have
2	taken hours, the way traffic was traveling at that
3	point.
4	Q When you arrived at the scene, what was the
5	next thing that occurred?
6	A Once I arrived, I finish finished basically
7	collecting some gear I thought I would need for that.
8	I already had my AR15. I grabbed my gear bag that I
9	could put my 308 precision rifle in.
10	I contacted Officer Harris, asked him I
11	assume since we arrived together I didn't see any
12	other inner-perimeter officers there that he and I
13	would be deployed together.
14	So I contacted him and asked him if he had
15	his 40-millimeter launcher with him, which is our less
16	lethal system. He said he did, so I didn't bother
17	grabbing mine. Then we contacted Sergeant Pete
18	McConnell basically to see what he needed as far as us
19	deploying, what missions needed to be done.
20	Q And, to your knowledge, when you arrived,
21	had the hasty team already been deployed or was it in
22	the process of being deployed?
23	A Yeah. Sergeant McConnell told me that he
24	already had one inner perimeter team off of side one,

which would have been the front door side with the

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hasty team, so I knew we already had a hasty team in place, which gave me a measure of comfort. I already knew we had at least the front door covered by an inner-perimeter team.

Q And so where did Sergeant McConnell then --well, let me ask this: Did you have some input as to where you and Officer Harris might be deployed or was that given at the direction of Sergeant McConnell?

A I was confident (indiscernible) the Side One team, so he said the next position we needed to fill would have been the Side Three position. So he mentioned that there was a lot to the south.

It was -- it was a motel, so there really was not a two and a four side that would need inner-perimeter officers for, so that -- that helps on our deployment as well as far as giving us additional resources.

Rather than having four teams out, we now can have two teams out and we're starting doubling those teams, which is always nice on an event like this, to have more people looking at the same problem.

Q Let me interrupt you real quick right there.

So when you say two, four, just refresh our memory.

Two, four meaning the east and west sides of the

location where this is occurring, but the front door

1	is covered and all we need now is the rear covered by
2	the inner-perimeter team?
3	A Yes, which would be the south side of the
4	motel, so Side Three.
5	Q And so did you ultimately go to that
6	location with Officer Harris?
7	A Yes. Sergeant McConnell pointed out that
8	the lot in the back had some Conex boxes, which is the
9	large shipping containers that you often see in the
10	back of semis or on trains. He said that might give
11	us an actual decent spot as far as looking down on the
12	room a little bit.
13	I looked at the lot he was talking about and
14	there was like an agricultural business there that
15	owns that lot, I believe. And it was surrounded by a
16	tall chain-link fence with razor wire on it. So I
17	start scouting around.
18	The business is closed. I can't get in that
19	way. The chain-link fence goes all the way around.
20	There's a gate north of the business on the west side
21	of the lot that's padlocked, but we can gain access to
22	that.
23	So I told Leo I was going to go back Leo
24	Harris that I was going to go back and grab a set of

bolt cutters. Came back, passed those off to him and

we basically worked on cutting that lock so we could gain access to the lot.

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While we were working with that lot -- or the lock, Officer Harris gets a cut on his finger, so we have to deal with that real quick with our medics, get him bandaged and then we deploy in the lot.

Q And as this is unfolding, are you receiving any new or aware of any updates that are occurred on the open net or as we learned before, the search She-2 frequency?

A So I know they already have a hasty team in place. There's more SERT officers arriving, so they're going to start augmenting that hasty team in front with more of a deliberate team.

That's the next step is once you're there and you have enough people and it turns into -- and you have a good plan for -- for the mission, they start calling a deliberate team.

I knew they were working on what they call gun port charges. We have several breachers that deal with explosives, so they were putting gun ports up on both sides in the adjacent rooms that would gain us a visual access into that room if we did have to make some type of entry. So I knew that was in the works.

Q And was there any information yet coming out

in the open net as to whether or not -- well, let me ask -- let me take a step back.

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In your training and experience as both in scenarios as well as working inner perimeter, how critical a role does the crisis negotiation team or CNT play in either, A, fact gathering; or, B, defusing the situation to require less aggressive measures by the SERT team?

A The fact gathering and the deescalation is CNT's primary role. That's what they do. They're very good at what they do. I knew they were already on scene because we had the contingent of CNT who were with us. And I think I remember seeing their big gear van as well when I -- when I showed up initially.

So I knew they had probably not got their whole team there yet, but a small contingent who could start working on trying to figure out who the people are inside, relationships, to start gathering intel and at some point to start trying to make contact to deescalate, defuse and help resolve the crisis.

Q What happened next?

A Once we got into the lot, I was scouting for a position for us to set up. I looked at the Conex boxes and there was just no great way to get up there. There was no ladder system. There were no ladders

1 around.

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So I started looking for an alternative position to set up. So I walked around to the north side of the Conex boxes. They were basically at maybe a 30-yard gap or 40-yard gap between the -- the closest Conex to the motel and the motel itself.

And there was a flat bed pickup truck that was actually in a decent position. It had wooden rails on the side of it, so I'd have some support.

And so I told Officer Harris, I said, "Hey, let's just set up here initially so I can get eyes on."

I had a rough idea of where Room 16 was in the bank of motel windows. I look at the back side of the motel. I'm looking at the windows and they're kind of set up in twos. So my initial assessment was that probably each room has two windows that allow visibility in and out of the -- the motel rooms.

Q And you said you're trying to get eyes on. Explain that. What were you hoping to accomplish in getting into your position? You mentioned you were trying to get eyes on to the hotel.

As inner perimeter, what was your primary focus in trying to get into position in this particular scenario or incident?

A At that point, I wanted to identify where

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the problem was and see if I could start gathering information for the team and for both teams, CNT and SERT at that point, to start relaying what I'm seeing, give the most real time updates, as I said, a big part of our role as inner-perimeter officers.

Q Were you able to get set up into the truck at the rear of the hotel?

A Yes. The flat bed truck, it was easy to step right into. I set my gear up, stepped up and -- this event was very high energy from the get-go. I mean, it never slowed down.

And so I, based upon my training and experience and my understanding of my weapon systems and ammunition, I chose to stay with my AR15 and had a significant -- enough optic on. It's got a one to six power scope on it.

And I was close enough to the problem and I knew six power would be more than I'd ever need for this. And I also knew dealing with this motel, the odds were was probably single-pane residential glass.

And ammunition choice that I chose, I knew if I had to take a shot through glass, it would penetrate, stay together and not deviate from my point -- point of impact much. So I just chose to stay with my AR15 and not set up my 308 precision

1 rifle.

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Q Go into that sequence of thought processes that you had. You've been in SERT since 2007. You're a firearms instructor. You've gone through 520 plus hours of training per year in addition to whatever actual live incidents you've responded to.

That calculation that you made in your head as to keeping your rifle, keeping that particular scope and keeping a particular set of ammunition, how quickly of a decision-making process is occurring as you make that decision, given how much experience you have in this particular field?

A It was pretty immediate, to be honest with you. It just occurred. I didn't have to really put any thought into that. I -- I know the ballistics of my ammunition. I know what they're capable of and their limitations.

I know that the 308 precision rifle has some limitations as well. And I just knew as close as we were to this problem, that that was going to be the best selection, so I just stayed with it. It was instant.

Q So in addition to providing intelligence and fact gathering, is it fair to say that the dynamics that you observed either through the net or

information that you were receiving from She-2, was factoring into the decision making process for you as to exploring all options in protecting the person inside?

A Absolutely.

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Q And so let's talk about that. At this stage as you're setting up, what were some of your concerns about the person inside? What did you know and what were you worried about?

A Well, at this point, what I knew about the male subject inside was that he's already shown his willingness to do violence. He'd been in an altercation with a subject.

I think it eventually turned out to be at the 7-Eleven I think across the street, but I initially thought it was at the Del Rancho or around the Del Rancho Motel. But he attempted to stab an individual, so I knew he was absolutely willing to do violence.

He'd been seen with a knife. He was armed with a knife. Knives are incredibly dangerous tools. Anybody that has any kind of skill, really not even a skill. I mean, he can cut you and poke holes in you as fast as they can move their hand.

And knife wounds could be very traumatic.

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If you hit an artery, you bleed out in a matter of less than a minute depending on what artery's severed. So I was very concerned for her. At this point, I didn't know the relationship between she and he.

I knew that he was using her basically to keep everybody at bay, put her in harm's way. I was afraid that -- they hadn't said if she'd been injured yet, but I was afraid if he was injuring her, no one would know.

That's another fear about a knife is they can be utilized with no one ever knowing it's happening. And so there's a lot of fears in my mind as far as what was going on in that room.

Q So as you're setting up, you have your rifle in place, you have your scope, you're getting into position. And is Officer Leo Harris with you at this point in -- in that area of the truck?

A Yes, he is. He's still down on the ground. He's setting up some gear. He's getting his spotting scope out, which is the higher magnification scope that I was talking about, the 60 power.

And he was also just kind of looking. We always scout for better positions. You want to look always to better our position if we can, so he was still looking around to see if we could gain access to

the Conex, I believe, and just seeing if there was somewhere better than where we were currently at to set up.
set up.
Q And as this is, again, continuing, is there
any more information filtering in to you from either
the crisis negotiation team or fellow SERT officers,
part of the hasty team?
A I knew they were working and they talked
about working on the gun port charges, so I knew that
was in place, which is a big piece of our deliberate
plan for a hostage rescue if we do have to execute
one.
So I knew that was occurring, which was
giving me a measure of comfort, that they're
solidifying their plan. They're really working on
getting their deliberate plan in place.
I I had a conversation Leo Harris and
I had a conversation about just wanting to narrow down
which bank of windows we were looking at. Information
had come out I don't remember exactly what point
that we had SERT members in both adjacent rooms on

So Officer Harris got on the air and asked the SERT members inside to come to their windows closest to the Room 16 and basically just open them up

both sides of 16.

and look at us. 1 2 Prior to that as I was looking through, I'd 3 seen movement through the clear glass window that I 4 suspected belonged to Room 16. It looked like I saw 5 somebody kind of -- almost looked like they were 6 facing back and forth. 7 And I could see light-colored skin, so I 8 knew all of our guys were wearing helmets. And so I 9 was relatively confident that I was looking through 10 the clear pane glass window of Room 16. 11 And once the SERT members came and 12 identified which rooms they were in, then that locked 1.3 it down. I absolutely knew that I had seen a subject walk back and forth in Room 16 in front of the window. 14 15 Do you recognize this vantage point or 0 16 this -- a picture of this location? 17 Α Yes, I do. 18 And when you were trying to get eyes on the 19 correct room, were you able to get SERT members from 20 each area to direct you to the appropriate room and 21 confirm whether you were correct? 2.2 Α Yes. And were you correct in which room you 23 24 suspected was that Room 16? 25 Yes, I was. Α

Q Okay. So after they were able to confirm that room, what happened next?

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A I continued to watch my two windows, trying to gain information. Like I said, I'd seen the person kind of pacing back and forth and, in fact, they were deeper in the room. It was a bright, sunny day, dark in the room, so I really -- my vision couldn't penetrate very deep in the room.

My eyes were adjusted to daylight and I'm trying to look into a dark room, so I didn't have the ability to see very deep in that room. From my training, scenario-based training, I know that on a day like this, the room's dark.

For me to really get a good facial recognition on somebody, they're going to have to be within probably a foot and a half, maybe two feet of that window for the ambient light from outside to shine on them enough so I can get some type of facial recognition to recognize somebody.

So I knew in order for me to get information, anybody inside would have to get awfully close to that window anyway. So I'm running through that in my mind as well, just trying to understand that if I see anything, it's not going to be very --very far from that window.

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At some point after I see him in the window, there's information broadcast that I think CNT had finally identified who the subject was inside as Samuel Rice.

And our intel officer said that they were going to be sending out a photograph of him to us.

And they usually do that via e-mail or a text. It also came out at that point that I think that also had potentially identified the female inside.

And I -- I think eventually came out that that was a girlfriend. I thought I heard wife at the time. I can't remember exactly which I heard, which also and -- and they stated there was a history of domestic violence between the two.

And so that also raised my level of concern for her safety. With a -- with a stranger-to-stranger hostage event, there's no -- there's no connection to the hostage. There's no passion. There's no emotion there.

The hostage is potentially just to tool for them to safely resolve a problem. But with a history of domestic violence, he's already shown his willingness to do harm to her, so that starts to escalate that he's already been willing to try to stab somebody at the 7-Eleven.

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He's grabbed now I know his wife or girlfriend and drug her in this room at knifepoint and threatened to do her harm as he did so.

And now there's this relationship piece there that make makes, in my mind, him even more unpredictable as far as what he's going to do to her or how he may use her in this event. So my level of concern for her is ever increasing.

Q And given your training and experience either as a Portland police officer or as a SERT responding officer, have you seen the unfortunate tragedies of domestic violence situations where males have used lethal force against their significant others with a knife that were both legal or at least caused serious bodily injury?

A I've seen domestic violence with knives. We were on a call-out where the significant other actually beat her to death with his fists. We responded to that. Unfortunately, she was already dead before we ever arrived.

But, yeah, it runs it gamut of anyone willing to do harm against somebody will use whatever means necessary to achieve that.

Q As that information filtered in, did you, in this entire process -- let me -- let me take a step

1 back.

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When there's other scenarios with SERT call-outs and the crisis negotiation team is involved and trying or actually engaged with the occupant of the location, did you have any information indicating that CNT was having success in having conversation that would potentially deescalate or slow the energy in this particular incident?

A Not up to this point in the call-out, no.

I'd heard no information that CNT had any -- any
success up to right now where I'm talking with
communications with Mr. Rice.

Q What was the next thing to occur or bit of information that you received?

A Several of the entry officers inside broadcast that they could hear the sound of heavy furniture being moved inside and they believed that he was barricading the front door, which, again, is starting to raise my level of concern.

This isn't -- this isn't normal behavior.

It's someone who's trying to fortify their position and prevent us from helping anybody. And so now I know that those gun ports are incredibly important.

It's a mechanical device. They're relying on the ability for everything to detonate properly and

for people to be in the right rooms if they have to make an entry to be there to intervene and protect somebody.

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So I've seen many successes with them and I've also seen failures with gun ports. Depends on where they hang them on a wall. Did they properly span the two by fours. Is it efficient enough to tap the water through and push away enough sheetrock to be able to see.

So there's a lot of variables in there that I have great confidence in but I'm also concerned about. Things go wrong. I heard them start talking about starting to build through-wall charges. Now that they know the front door's barricaded, they're starting to think how else are we going to gain access to this.

This room only has really one main way of getting in, which is the front door. He just took that away from us and made it incredibly challenging now for us to get in quickly, efficiently and save somebody if need be.

So that's raising my level of concern as well. If she does start screaming or if we do decide we have to make an entry to save her life, it's going to take a lot more time for our entry team to get in,

locate them, assess and do what they need to to protect her.

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And so, yes, this event is -- again, the energy was just -- kept climbing and climbing and my level of concern for her, it just continued to grow throughout the course of this.

Q And in that context, when there's barriers or as the information is being relayed to you and the barricades and barriers are being put in place, one, how does that impact from your training and experience and your thought process the reaction time in trying to intervene on any violence between him and her?

Does it create more time or less time for you or other SERT officers to intervene if she's in danger?

A Any barricade that we have to negotiate will -- will add time to what we have to do. If you -- if you fortify and block the front door, the tools we normally use to breach that to gain entry are now diminished.

A heavy dresser or bed frame, now our standard two-person key hitting that is against more resistance and so they're going to have to find different ways and potentially use explosives now to take that door away so it folds in half as opposed to being trying to push in, so all that takes more time

to build. And so it lengthens our ability to get in to the event.

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Q And in that context as well, based on your training and experience, either scenario-based on in actual incidents, when those barriers or obstructions are put in place, is anybody else potentially in danger when there's a breach besides the victim who you have the SERT officers are trying to rescue?

A Yes. It changes our tactics a little bit as far as how we have to enter. We have certain ways that we can enter safely to cover angles and make sure we're -- we're protected as we enter as well.

And now, having to negotiate a barricade, even with an edge weapon, it now affords someone the opportunity to do the victim additional harm, us more harm. Our ballistic vests aren't knife-proof.

It'll stop handgun bullets, but you can stab right through them. So, again, that's raising concern that if someone gets hung up through the barricade and he's there to ambush them, they have really no protection against that.

Q And even with the armor or Kevlar protection, are their joints or arterial areas that are not necessarily going to be as protected as other centralized areas for the SERT officers trying to make

entry into this breach?

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A Well, your arms aren't protected, so they have access to underneath your arms where your major arteries are. Your neck's not protected. Your groin area's not protected. So all your major arteries other than your heart and organs really don't have a ton of coverage.

Q And, again, I know you're striking a lot of information in a short period of time, but given the hundreds of hours of experience over many years, are all of these things instinctively going through your mind as you're observing this room and other information is filtered in?

A Yes. And that's -- these are things that I've encountered enough with 25 years as a police officer just to know as far as the dangers of certain types of weapons against civilians and law enforcement.

So to be honest with you, it's -- it's one of those things that naturally occurs for me at this point, which is a luxury for me on a call-out like this because I can focus on the task at hand and not put a ton of thought process into the things I already know.

The information is just there. And so I

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just use that from my prior training and experience to start basing my actions and judgment based on the totality of the circumstances as far as what's already occurred, what they're armed with and what they're capable of doing.

Q And, at this stage, even though you've heard now information from the SERT officers about barricades and furniture potentially being moved, have you yet received any information from CNT or the Crisis Negotiation Team indicating that all of the energy in this incident is defusing or diminishing?

A No. There's been no information from CNT that they've had any luck yet with contacts and the energy level was still rising.

Q What's the next -- what happened next and -- as it's unfolding?

A So shortly after the information came out from the entry team that they heard him moving furniture and barricading that front door, I'm watching my windows responsibility. As I mentioned before, there were two banks of windows, a clear pane glass window on the left; an opaque glass window on the right.

The clear pane glass window was partially obscured with a blind or a drape was partially across.

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And so I'm obviously focusing more on that window 'cause I can still see into it. The opaque glass window is frosted. I can't see in, so I've got really one window to focus most of my attention.

And, at this point, I'm roughly 20 yards from the windows, so I'm mostly looking over the top of my optic, because you get eye fatigue if you look through it too long. So I'm just watching, gleaning information. I can watch both windows easier.

And as I'm watching the clear pane glass window, I start to see movement, so I focus my attention more on it. And what I'm -- what I see is Mr. Rice. I already had a picture pushed out to me, so I know who I'm looking for at this point to identify Mr. Rice.

And I see him push a bed mattress up against the -- the Side Three, the south side wall of this motel room. And he starts to obscure this clear pane glass window. He's pushing the mattress up against this window, which is the only one we can see through.

And that immediately confirms what I had heard the entry team say where he fortified that front door. He's now taking me as to fortify the back entry point which would be the windows for whatever we can see in or do with.

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As I'm watching Mr. Rice push -- push this mattress against the window, I'm looking at his hands. And I've got -- already identified him. He pushes the mattress up and his left hand's open, which would be consistent with moving an object.

You're using the most surface area that you can so you have the best footage on it as he's pushing this mattress up. The left hand's open. I can see the fingers over the top.

But his right hand is curled up in a fist.

That immediately caught my attention. It's odd.

It's, like, you don't move objects that way unless you're holding onto something. And so I already know it's him, so I -- I start focusing my attention on that right hand. I'm trying to figure out what he has.

We know he's already been seen armed with a knife, but I'm really trying to figure out, does he have access to other weapons in this room. If I see him with a gun in his hand, that changes the whole dynamics of this for our guys on both sides of that room, 'cause they're -- they're going off the information he's armed with an edged weapon, not something that can fire bullets and penetrate sheetrock, which changes the dynamics of where they

1 might need to be in the room.

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They may have to bring up shields to fortify their position. So I'm visually interrogating his hand, trying to figure out what he has. And I just can't figure out the shape of it.

And he gets the mattress in place and he just stops. And I'm in plain view at this point to take into consideration what he had as a weapon. I wasn't concerned as much with my position of safety. I felt safe being 20 yards away from the window.

But, again, if it's a firearm, that's going to change where Officer Harris and I need to be and what we need to do to protect ourselves as well. So I'm looking at that hand and I just can't figure out what it is and I'm staring and he's staring directly at me.

And he's just got this stone-cold face look and he's just glaring at me. It's like -- it's almost like we could sit here and make eye contact from two feet away. It was that type of intensity as he's looking at me.

But I go back to his hand and eventually I see him almost point at me, like he rolls his hand like he's got a stick or something in his hand that he's pointing at me. I can see -- I can his fist. I

can see his thumb. But I'm just looking at a rectangle-shape object.

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And I'm looking at this rectangle shape, and immediately, I thought firearm. But then I could see right away that there wasn't a barrel. It wasn't -- it wasn't -- it wasn't a firearm that I was familiar with of any kind.

And I'm looking at it and I see a little glint. And, again, laser pointer came to mind. I said, no, it's the wrong color. It was just a flash of light. And I'm trying to figure out what this is and he's still staring at me and I'm looking at his hand and he's pointing this object at me.

And then he disappears and he pulled his hand down and he takes that drape and drapes it across. And I think I had a brief conversation with Officer Harris as far as what I had seen; that I couldn't immediately identify it and then I went back to watching the windows.

And I -- and now the window's taken away from me. I can't see in. I'm looking at two panes of glass, the opaque and the clear, but now I have no visibility in. And my --

Q Let me interrupt you real quick if you don't mind.

A Sure.

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Q You mentioned you had a brief conversation with Officer Harris. Do you recall what, if any, of that substance of that conversation was?

A I can't remember details, other than I think I told him that he had barricaded the window as well and that he was holding something in his hand. I'm trying to still work through what I had seen with that.

Q Okay. And what happened next?

A And so we've got time. I'm now watching these two windows. I -- my heart kind of sinks, because now I have -- I have no ability to get intel on what's going on. He's taken away my only view into this.

I have really no way of intervening now if something -- if something happens in the room. I can't see anything. He's taken away my vision. And as I'm working through that thought process, it clicks in my head what I had seen him holding.

And I had -- and I don't know how I came to it, but I realized he was pointing a knife at me. He was sitting in that window, pointing this knife at me, staring at me. And what -- what I couldn't see was the blade, because it was pointed straight at me.

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I'm seeing the, basically, the hilt of this knife, this rectangle shape. And the glint I saw was he had changed angles on it just enough to catch the sunlight.

And luckily I was in the right spot to catch that visually so I was able to put that all together at that point and realize that, yes. So we had witness information that he was armed with a knife and now I have my own personal knowledge that, yes, he's in that room, she's in that room, and he absolutely is armed with a knife.

Q Was there any thought now that you've lost visual and the energy or how much the incident's escalated as to kind of what you did, what you were doing, what you should have done, what you could do at that point?

A I was thinking I may have lost an opportunity to resolve this incident the first time I saw him. At that point, we had witnesses information that said he was armed or potentially armed with a knife; but the nice thing about our team is we bring an incredible amount of patience and tolerance to these events.

We absolutely want to resolve them in the safest way possible for the person inside, the suspect

or the subject inside that took her hostage and for the members involved.

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And so that's the nice thing about receiving all the additional training is we can run through all these past scenarios, whether they be real or scenario-based training to have this decision-making process of bringing more time and tolerance and understanding the tools we bring to these events as well gives us all more options.

But I was second guessing myself once that -- once my vision went away, that I would never see him again. He was going to injure or kill her and my opportunity to prevent that was gone.

Q After he was able to obscure and barricade that window, did you receive any other updated information from either the Crisis Negotiation Team or SERT officers on scene?

A I remember catching some information that they had made a priority out of the through wall charges 'cause they knew the front door was barricaded.

I never was able to get on the air nor

Officer Harris I'm aware of to say that he had

barricaded that Side Three window as well and that

vision was gone. The energy from Room 16 was so great

that we just had to keep dealing with problems. And so the air saturation was incredible.

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We couldn't get on to even tell them updates that we were seeing him or any of his actions. And at that point, I would have loved to have got that information out, but they already were basing their deliberate plan on the fact that he had barricaded the front door and they would have to find a different way into that room, utilizing the front door and potentially a through-wall charge to gain access if they needed to.

So the information at that point was I think more crucial, at least for Officer Harris and I to have than -- than the entry team inside. So I didn't try to get on the air to get that out because what they were doing, in my mind, was more important than what I had seen, for them.

Q And was there any information coming out regarding any additional threats by the person later identified as Mr. Rice in regards to his reaction or threats regarding law enforcement and the victim inside?

A So I'm continuing to watch the closed windows. There is information broadcast a short time later from I believe our intelligence-gathering

officers that we also have assigned to the team.

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Their -- their main role is they'll be embedded with the Crisis Negotiation Team, so they're giving us as much realtime feedback as they can as far as what negotiations are occurring and -- and what those -- the flavor of those negotiations, are they being successful, are they not being successful, that type of thing.

And information was broadcast that CNT was on the line with Mr. Rice; that he had basically made some rambling comments; and that he had made the statement that the police need to leave or better leave -- I can't remember the exact quote -- or I'm going to cut her throat and then hung up on CNT.

And, again, it just went into the totality of circumstances for me that he's already done harm.

He's made a threat to her before when he drug her in the room and now he's making an unrealistic demand with us having to leave or -- or he's going to slit her throat or cut her throat and kill her. And we can't leave. We know that. He knows we can't leave.

We're there because of the crisis and a hostage event.

And so, again, the energy just keeps continuing to build. He's putting an unrealistic demand on us that's not going to happen with no

request as far as how to defuse this, so the energy's just continuing to climb.

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Q So, at this stage, before anything else happens, in summary, what had you learned then both from the initial call, which still, by my understanding is less than an hour or about an hour, from the initial call from the 7-Eleven where do you find yourself in the next portion of the incident chronologically, what did you know for yourself in totality about this now scenario?

A Well, I know the initial part of it was he tried to stab someone at the 7-Eleven, a felony
Assault II or Attempt Assault II. He then retreated back to Room 16.

He has effectively taken a hostage at knifepoint, kidnapped her, which is again another felony, and drug her in the room against her will.

And now he is fortifying his location inside to prevent us from having easy access to potentially save her life if we need to.

The energy's continued to build. He's now got on the phone, made an additional unrealistic request for us to leave or he's going to cut her throat. Energy's continuing to build.

He's already shown his propensity of

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violence with attempting to stab a person at the 7-Eleven and the domestic assaults before, potentially high of methamphetamine, which is a stimulant, makes people unreasonable, irrational and nervous.

So there's just a lot of pieces of this that is bringing this to, in my mind, it's going to have to be some type of a tactical resolution. CNT is not having the ability to defuse or deescalate this event.

He's not making requests of how he wants to peaceably leave this event and helping CNT with that piece. We can only negotiate with those that want to be negotiated with.

Q So what happened next?

A They -- again, intel got on and said that we did have a good victim at the 7-Eleven. They did want to go through with charges for an Assault II, so I knew we had a good -- good crime to follow through on that, so that crime did occur.

Sergeant Livingston then gets on the air and says that, hey, if we hear yelling from inside, they're going to execute their deliberate plan and make entry into the room to save her life.

And I know he's got an edged weapon. He can -- he can -- he could kill her or injure her and it wouldn't make a noise. And, in my mind, we need to

intervene and do something about this. He is going to kill her.

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And I try to get on the air. Again, the air -- the radio is just saturated. I'm pushing my communication button and all I'm getting a honk 'cause it won't go through 'cause other people are talking.

I'm trying to get on the air and basically put my entry guys on notice, my sergeants on notice, the lieutenant, the entire command staff on notice that base on what I know, the totality of the circumstances, based on this event, what I have right now, if I see him again, I'm willing to use lethal force to end this event.

And I could not get on the air to put them on notice. And so I think I voiced that to

Officer Harris that I can't get on the air. Here's what -- here's what I'm thinking. I went right back to watching these windows in just hopes of some fleeting chance to intervene and save her life.

Q And what in addition to -- in addition to giving just command overall notice on what you're thinking just for your team members, what would be the benefit of letting them know what you're -- what you're hoping to accomplish if -- if the situation presents itself?

A The entry team needs to know that where my thought process is because they have to, A, be prepared that if I do have to fire from outside to intervene in this, they need to be follow up with their deliberate plan.

So it puts them on notice, that hey, let's get our ducks dialed in, finish what we're doing, continue to work on through wall charges, but it puts them on notice that we need to tighten this up and be ready to -- to initiate and execute this deliberate plan if something happens.

Q So what happened next?

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A I continued to watch both these windows.

Again, my focus is on that clear pane glass, because that's where I've seen all the activity.

And all of a sudden, the opaque glass window comes open and I'm fairly surprised, to be honest with you, that it opened up. I -- it just seemed unnatural for someone that has done all this to expose himself to the police.

They already know they've committed an Attempt or Assault II. They've taken a person hostage. And I see this window come open and he's just sitting there staring at me. I can see him, full face from, you know, mid-neck probably up.

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And he's got just that stare again. He's looking at me and just staring at me in my location. And, literally, I'm looking. I feel like I'm having eye-to-eye contact with him.

At this point, I'm looking through my optic. And, in my mind, I knew he was doing one thing. He's made the demand that the police better leave or I'm going to go cut this girl's throat. He knew he had quick access to find me to see if we were complying with that demand.

And I'm having this -- I was just looking at him and he's staring at me and I'm staring at him.

And I know that if I allow him to walk away from that window, he's going to go cut her throat.

And I quickly run through my mind as far as where my guys are in the hotel. And I know they're in positions of safety. They're on both sides of the rooms. I -- I don't think anybody's on Side One of that room with the front door, which I know is my back stop if I fire a round.

And it seemed like it took forever for me to roll through these thought processes. And I said the other one seemed instantaneous and I'm sure this was a whole lot quicker than it felt like. But I was just concerned as I'm rolling through this that he's going

to disappear and I'm going to lose this chance to 2. save her.

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And I -- I figure out in my mind that everyone's going to be safe and I fire one round. Mr. Rice disappears from the window and I, by the grace of God, the air opened up and I was able --

It's okay. Take your time.

I was able to get on the air and tell the entry team that I'd fired a round, that the suspect had gone down and that was from Side Three. basically at that point I continued to watch my window.

I basically started hearing. I heard some loud booms, which would have been consistent with the gun ports going off. Then I heard a bunch of wider banging noises, which, all right, I know they're -they're keying the door and it's not going.

And I know he's barricaded it. And, eventually, I hear flash-bangs go off, so I know they've cleared the entry point and they're getting into the room and it felt like it took ten minutes, but eventually get on the air and said that he was down and the hostage was safe.

And, at that point, I relaxed. I quit watching the window and grabbed my rifle at that point

and knew that she was okay.

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Q Officer VanBlokland, when you wake up in the morning and do certain activities of working inner perimeter, did you ever envision or hope or plan that you would ever have to find yourself in this position to do what you did that day?

A I've been doing law enforcement work for over 25 years and I've never had to use lethal force in my life. And coming up on the end of my career, I felt very fortunate that I hadn't and thought maybe I'd make the last two years of my career without ever having to shoot somebody.

And I've prepared for it. I've trained for the last 11 years or the last 27 years with the idea that at some point I'm going to have probably defend my life or somebody else's, but with the hope that I never would have to.

I knew that in that moment if I didn't take that opportunity, I wouldn't be able to sleep at night. I knew that if he went back from that window and went and cut her throat like he said he was going to, I wouldn't be able to sleep. I wouldn't be able to live with myself for not being able to do my job.

Q And we're obviously being audio recorded and may or may not be clear, but obviously the -- as you

describe it, the emotions are getting to you and 1 2. that's understandable. 3 What's going through your mind right now as 4 you are trying to relive and recollect about this 5 (indiscernible) that's taken place as you communicate 6 to the grand jury? 7 I'm just -- I feel super fortunate that I was there in the right place at the right time and had 8 9 the ability to save her life. 10 It's very unfortunate that I had to do what I did, but knowing that she's okay and knowing that 11 12 all of my team members are okay and I was able to get on the air and tell them what had occurred and what 13 14 they needed to do was huge. 15 And did you believe both at that time and as 16 you recollect, do you believe at this time did you 17 have any other option other than the action that you 18 took that day? 19 No, there was no other option at that point. 20 There was no communication. There was no 21 deescalation. The only option I had at that point was 2.2 to fire that round. 23 Now, when that was completed, do you recall

telling anything to Officer Harris as you watched the

scene process -- it may have seemed like taking

24

25

1	forever and and as you were getting prepared for
2	the scene to turn from a SERT scenario into a crime
3	scene?
4	A I I don't recall what I said to him, if I
5	said anything.
6	Q Okay. And what's the next thing you recall
7	after hearing the breach, hearing the flash-bang and
8	getting word over the air that the female was safe and
9	the the suspect was down?
LO	A They immediately called for our team medics
L1	to come in to try to render aid if they could. At
L2	that point, the air had kind of mellowed or calmed
L3	down at that point and they were getting their ducks
L4	in a row as far as getting care to him as quickly as
L5	they could.
L6	Sergeant McConnell got on the air and said
L7	they he would come back to my position and Leo Harris'
L8	position, which he did shortly thereafter and we just
L9	maintained our positions there we would leave.
20	Q And when he arrived, was there any
21	instructions or anything else that he told you to do
22	when Sergeant McConnell arrived at that location?
23	A No. He asked if we were okay. There was no
24	communication for as far as the event at all. I told

him I was fine. I had him call my wife. I grounded

25

my rifle at that point. 1 I've been involved in enough critical 2. 3 incidents to know that it was an active crime scene 4 and they would need to process everything, so I left 5 my rifle in the condition that it was, grounded on my 6 drag bag and maintained that position until I was 7 relieved. And then I was able to go back to my SERT truck and wait in the SERT truck. 8 9 And were there also instructions throughout 10 this process to not have any conversation with 11 Officer Harris who was present with you when this 12 occurred? 13 Yes, there was. 14 And per Portland Police Bureau protocol, at 15 some point, were you also issued a gag order not to 16 discuss the case with others? 17 Yes. I was issued one that day before I was 18 allowed to go home. 19 And just from a human aspect, you work 20 closely with these SERT officers and other law 21 enforcement officers day in and day out through this 2.2 -- through your career; is that right? 23 Can you repeat that? I'm sorry. Α 24 Yeah. You work closely with officers, both

in SERT and local police officers day in and day out?

25

1	A Yes.
2	Q Are you close to some of them or many
3	of them?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Understanding it's protocol and procedure,
6	but given what you had been through and obviously the
7	impact it still has on you today, is that difficult to
8	not be able to discuss with others and people around
9	you what occurred?
10	A It's been incredibly challenging not to have
11	a chance to talk about the event.
12	MR. HANNON: Okay. Do the grand jurors have
13	any other questions for Officer VanBlokland? Seeing
14	no questions from the grand jurors, is it okay for
15	this witness to be excused?
16	Well, why don't we go off the record and
17	take a break. We'll finish up with our next witness,
18	but as we have a prior court commitment, so we'll come
19	back to that. Why don't we go off the record. Thank
20	you.
21	(Recess taken, 1:45 p.m 2:57 p.m.)
22	MR. HANNON: We are back on the record in
23	this matter and we are ready to call our next witness.
24	Detective Scott Broughton will be recalled.
25	THE CLERK: Detective Broughton.

1	MR. HANNON: You're still under oath, so go
2	ahead and have a seat.
3	EXAMINATION
4	BY MR. HANNON:
5	Q So just to segue where we are at, Detective
6	Broughton, the grand jury has heard testimony from
7	witnesses that led to a critical incident. And where
8	the scene turned in from a SERT response into then a
9	criminal investigation and crime scene, you mentioned
L0	this in your earlier testimony, but what was the first
L1	thing that occurred for you in response to this
L2	incident at the Del Rancho Motel?
L3	A I after being notified or with, like, the
L4	notification?
L5	Q Getting the page, yeah.
L6	A So I was I was notified by my sergeant,
L7	Michelle Hughes, that this incident had occurred and
L8	that I was going to be the primary investigator.
L9	Q And did you did you respond to the actual
20	location?
21	A Yes, I did.
22	Q And when you responded to the location, did
23	you, unlike other homicide investigations, did you
24	already find a large police presence and crime scene
25	clearly established when you arrived there?

1	A Yes, I did.
2	Q And, again, we've talked about this before,
3	but when you arrived, did you already were you
4	already able to identify certain people involved in
5	this incident?
6	A I was aware that Officer VanBlokland was the
7	involved officer and Officer Harris was the witness
8	officer.
9	Q And were you was there an identity of the
LO	decedent who was shot by Officer VanBlokland in this
L1	scenario?
L2	A Yes, there was. I believe I learned that
L3	after my arrival, but
L4	Q Okay.
L5	A he was identified.
L6	Q And it was Sam Rice; is that right?
L7	A Yes, it was.
L8	Q And during your investigation, were you able
L9	to identify the female victim who was held against her
20	will, so to speak, inside the hotel room?
21	A Yes, I was.
22	Q And who was that?
23	A Talon Ochoa.
24	Q And that is is that a picture of
25	Officer VanBlokland as you saw him that day?

1	A Yes, it was. Or yes, it is, rather.
2	Q And did you know about his training and
3	experience and his how long he had been on the SERT
4	and all of that or did you learn about that through
5	this process?
6	A I knew an approximated amount of time, but
7	then I later learned, you know, more specifically when
8	Officer VanBlokland was hired and how long he's been
9	on the SERT team.
10	Q Okay. Now, as part of this process or
11	investigation, is it fair to say that there's certain
12	information that was locked in or recorded as part of
13	your investigation that you would gather?
14	A Yes.
15	Q Such as the BOEC recordings, the CAD
16	printouts, the CNT call recordings and the 9-1-1 call
17	recordings?
18	A That's correct, yes.
19	Q And did you obtain all those things in
20	conjunction with your investigation?
21	A Yes, I did.
22	Q And just to get this out of the way first
23	and foremost, was, except for minor inconsistencies
24	that occur commonly between witnesses who who give
25	accounts from their own individual perspectives, was

there any glaring inconsistencies or material facts 1 2. that were inconsistent with the witness statements 3 that you found on the recordings? 4 Α No. 5 Okay. So, in other words, all the 6 recordings, the CAD printouts, the BOECs, the CNTs and 7 the 9-1-1 calls were consistent with the various 8 accounts provided by local law enforcement at the 9 scene? 10 Yes, they were. So real quickly, I'm going to do -- well, 11 12 and let me ask you this, 'cause this hadn't come up 13 yet. When you conducted your investigation, did you 14 obtain screen captures of the text messages that were 15 communicated between CNT and -- and the occupants of 16 the hotel room from Talon's phone? 17 Yes. I don't recall who those -- which --18 which officer exchanged those text messages, but I did 19 get a copy of them, yes. 20 But was there any witnesses able to 21 definitively say who actually typed in those responses 2.2 from Talon Ochoa's phone to the CNT operators? 23 Α Not to my knowledge. 24 So it's entirely possible while Talon may 25 have texted that either on her own or under duress,

it's also entirely possible that Sam Rice may have 1 2 texted those messages on his own from her phone? 3 Α It is possible. 4 So real quick, why don't we go through some of the recordings that were seized as part of this 5 6 incident. I'm going to start with the 9-1-1 calls, if 7 that's okay. You submitted -- obviously, you have a thick binder there. 8 9 Yes. Ms. Marrero and I are working off our 10 0 11 binders as well. Those are the investigative binders; 12 is that right? 13 Yes. Α 14 That includes not just the paper reports and 0 15 transcripts, but also photographs, video surveillance, 16 as well as digital media related to this 17 investigation? 18 That's correct. 19 And you submitted, it appears -- it lists 20 three 9-1-1 files or recordings; is that -- is that 21 accurate? 2.2 Α Yes. 23 Now, well, when we play these, it's entirely 24 possible not all of them actually have anybody talking 25 on the 9-1-1 calls. These are simply downloads from

```
1
       this particular incident 9-1-1 calls. Is that fair to
 2
       say?
 3
            Α
                 Yes.
 4
                 All right. So I'm going to just play them
 5
       in order.
 6
                 And would you be able to move the bar, the
 7
       date modified bar over so I could see the -- the
 8
       full -- there you go. That's enough. Thank you.
 9
                 And are these time stamps?
10
                 It is.
11
                 Okay. So when it says 9-1-1 call, 9:10,
12
       that's one call at 09:10, 9:10 in the morning?
1.3
                 That's 9:10 a.m., yes.
                 And so this one at 9:57 and this one,
14
       9:59 a.m.?
15
16
                 That's correct.
17
                 Okay. And do we have our volume -- well,
18
       we'll find out, I guess.
19
                 (TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Audio recording played
20
       in open court, 3:03 p.m., as follows:)
21
                 9-1-1 OPERATOR: 9-1-1.
2.2
                 CALLER: So, yeah, I have a customer out
23
       there. They're fighting at the 7-Eleven. And I saw
24
       them and (indiscernible).
25
                 9-1-1 OPERATOR: Okay. Are they inside or
```

1	outside?
2	CALLER: Yeah, inside.
3	9-1-1 OPERATOR: Two people?
4	CALLER: Yeah.
5	9-1-1 OPERATOR: Okay. I've got officers on
6	the way. Are there any weapons involved?
7	CALLER: No, not that I know of. They're
8	talking about knives and stuff.
9	9-1-1 OPERATOR: Can you take them one at a
LO	time. Tell me what is the race, age and color of
L1	clothing.
L2	CALLER: Yeah. They're white guys, two of
L3	them.
L4	9-1-1 OPERATOR: How old are they?
L5	CALLER: One was 22, 25 and the other one's
L6	about 45 plus.
L7	9-1-1 OPERATOR: The guy in his 20s, what
L8	color clothing?
L9	CALLER: He's wearing some kind of jacket
20	(indiscernible).
21	9-1-1 OPERATOR: And what color clothing of
22	the 40-year-old?
23	CALLER: He's wearing black, and black
24	jacket and black (indiscernible).
25	9-1-1 OPERATOR: What's your first name?

1	CALLER: (Indiscernible).
2	9-1-1 OPERATOR: What's the phone number
3	there?
4	CALLER: The phone is not working over there
5	(indiscernible. (503) 775-8911.
6	9-1-1 OPERATOR: 775-8911?
7	CALLER: Yeah.
8	9-1-1 OPERATOR: All right. They should be
9	there shortly.
LO	CALLER: Thank you.
L1	9-1-1 OPERATOR: Bye-bye.
L2	(TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Audio recording
L3	stopped, 3:05 p.m.)
L4	BY MR. HANNON:
L5	Q Detective Broughton, which call in the
L6	sequence of events in this incident, which call is
L7	that?
L8	A That was the initial 9-1-1 call made from
L9	the 7-Eleven store.
20	Q Now, these two subsequent calls, were these
21	calls that dispatch or Crisis Negotiation Team
22	officials or Portland Police officials were able to
23	tie to the Room 16 at the Del Rancho Motel?
24	A Yes, they were.
25	MR. HANNON: Okay.

```
1
                 (TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Audio recording played
 2
       in open court, 3:06 p.m., as follows:)
 3
                 9-1-1 OPERATOR: 9-1-1. 9-1-1.
       9-1-1.
 4
 5
                 CALLER: (Indiscernible).
 6
                 Hello, this is 9-1-1.
 7
                 CALLER: (Indiscernible).
 8
                 (TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Audio recording
 9
       stopped, 3:07 p.m.)
10
       BY MR. HANNON:
11
                 And this is the other call that came from
            0
12
       Del Rancho at 9:59 a.m; is that accurate?
13
           Α
                 Correct.
14
                 MR. HANNON: I'll play that now.
15
                 (TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Audio recording played
16
       in open court, 3:07 p.m., as follows:)
17
                 9-1-1 OPERATOR: 9-1-1.
18
                 SAM RICE: What's in my wallet?
                 9-1-1 OPERATOR: 9-1-1, anyone there?
19
20
                 SAM RICE: They're in out in front of
21
      Del Rancho going after 610 threatened to kill me and
2.2
       rape Talon Ochoa again.
23
                 9-1-1 OPERATOR: Okay. What unit number are
24
       you in?
25
                 SAM RICE:
                            16. My name is Aaron Les Deisel.
```

I'm stuck on a song. I've got the best and hottest 1 2. boy voice in the world. But I am dead fucking pissed 3 about this. I have my nuts cut open. I had my ball 4 sack cut open and I have a scar on my penis to prove 5 it. And so I --6 9-1-1 OPERATOR: Do you need -- do you need 7 an ambulance? 8 SAM RICE: (Indiscernible). No. 9 an ambulance if you don't fucking (indiscernible). 10 Bring in the fucking wallet in there. 11 9-1-1 OPERATOR: (Indiscernible). 12 SAM RICE: (Indiscernible). 13 9-1-1 OPERATOR: Do you want to be transferred to an officer? 14 15 SAM RICE: No, I don't. You are stupid for 16 letting this happen to people, especially women. You 17 shouldn't -- no. You shouldn't sell yourselves for 18 food and money and freedom. You shouldn't sell your 19 body parts for that. I told you what could happen. 20 What kind of (indiscernible) right now. 2.1 9-1-1 OPERATOR: Inside of the what? 2.2 SAM RICE: Why is that guy limping on the 23 People leave and go somewhere else later. I 24 gave her a wallet, my new ID, my proper ID with my 25 proper birth date that I remember on a screen on the

1	window.
2	9-1-1 OPERATOR: Where did you leave your
3	wallet?
4	SAM RICE: Her wallet was in my back right
5	pocket.
6	9-1-1 OPERATOR: And what is your name
7	again?
8	SAM RICE: (Indiscernible). No, shut up.
9	She doesn't trust anybody. I don't mean I don't
10	mean to be rude, but you shouldn't sell people
11	fucking, you know, body parts. She shouldn't have
12	sold it.
13	9-1-1 OPERATOR: Okay. And what was your
14	name again?
15	SAM RICE: No, no, no. I'm done with it.
16	Aaron Johnson stuck his dick in her before I came
17	back. Well, I came back to have sex with my wife, it
18	was (indiscernible) and loose and it's not loose.
19	Leave it on. Leave it there.
20	Okay. She was loose and fucked. I got
21	something that should have been a virgin. But still
22	had two pieces of glass in her vagina, one in the
23	center and one on the right, which is supposed to be
24	the left. And what else?
25	Oh, two razor blades come out. That's your

```
1
               I'm suing you for Attempted Murder of my
 2.
       fiancee, Dawn Talon Ochoa. No (indiscernible) because
 3
       I can't walk through terrain. If I got to find
 4
       someone (indiscernible) I'm going to fight back and
 5
       it's going to kill me.
 6
                 9-1-1 OPERATOR: So Talon is there with you,
 7
       right?
 8
                 SAM RICE: (Indiscernible).
 9
                 9-1-1 OPERATOR: Aaron --
10
                 SAM RICE: Shut your fucking mouth.
11
                 9-1-1 OPERATOR: So Talon is there with you,
12
       right?
13
                 SAM RICE: Shut up. She don't even want to
14
       talk to me or you.
                 9-1-1 OPERATOR: Well, that's too bad.
15
16
                 SAM RICE: Listen and nobody talks. You're
17
       a female.
18
                 A VOICE: Get off the phone.
19
                 (TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Audio recording
20
       stopped, 3:10 p.m.)
2.1
       BY MR. HANNON:
2.2
            0
                 When you were able to analyze that call,
23
       coupled with what you understood the facts to be based
24
       on the briefings when you arrived, what were some
25
       things of note in that 9-1-1 call that jumped out
```

1	at you?
2	A Just the tenor and pitch of the caller's
3	voice.
4	Q Was there statements in those calls that
5	were nonsensical, indicating either that the caller
6	was either under the influence of something or going
7	through some sort of mental health crisis?
8	A Yes, there was.
9	Q And that kind of behavior and aggression,
LO	was there any reports of that in the briefings with
L1	the witnesses that you had when the scene was frozen
L2	and witnesses interviewed?
L3	A Yes.
L4	Q Was and were there was the CNT call or
L5	attempted calls with well, going back to that 9-1-1
L6	call as well, the 9-1-1 caller identified him coming
L7	from Room 16 and also made reference to Talon, but he
L8	identified himself by a name different than Samuel
L9	Rice; is that right?
20	A That's correct.
21	Q Do you recall or could you hear what name he
22	identified himself as?
23	A I believe it was Aaron something. I'd have
24	to listen to it again to say for certain the
25	last name.

```
1
                 And was there information that came out
 2
       after the SERT and CNT response incident that the
 3
       person in the room, in addition to acting aggressive,
 4
       was referring to himself by the name of Aaron as
 5
       opposed to Sam Rice?
 6
            Α
                 Yes.
 7
                 Turning our attention to the CNT call, looks
 8
       like there are two audio files. These are the backup
 9
       files obtained by the CNT. Excuse me, I'll let you
10
       see it. Sorry.
11
                 Yes, that's correct.
12
                 And looks like the time stamps on those are
1.3
       10:12 a.m. apiece?
14
            Α
                 Yes.
15
                 (Pause in proceedings, 3:12 p.m. -
16
       3:13 p.m.)
17
                 (TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Audio recording played
18
       in open court, 3:13 p.m., as follows:)
19
                 (Phone ringing.)
20
                 AUTOMATED VOICE: Please leave your message
21
       for 971 --
2.2
                 (Phone beeping, dialing.)
23
                 UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: I'm here to help.
24
                 OFFICER WEINBERGER: Thanks.
25
                 (Phone ringing.)
```

1	OFFICER WEINBERGER: Hello.
2	SAM RICE: (Indiscernible).
3	OFFICER WEINBERGER: Who am I speaking with?
4	This is Officer Weinberger, Portland Police.
5	SAM RICE: (Indiscernible).
6	OFFICER WEINBERGER: What what was that?
7	SAM RICE: You all (indiscernible) go home.
8	This is over. You're out of your formation. Look at
9	where you're standing. I'll tell you what, I'll give
10	you updates. The formation is four, right?
11	OFFICER WEINBERGER: Formation's four?
12	SAM RICE: No, no, no. Building movements,
13	right? What do you do? (Indiscernible) leave you and
14	me alone, her.
15	OFFICER WEINBERGER: All right. So
16	SAM RICE: So (indiscernible).
17	OFFICER WEINBERGER: What stacked up? I'm
18	going to
19	SAM RICE: (Indiscernible) let me do this.
20	They want (indiscernible). So I'm going to stop the
21	situation. No, no, no, no. But could it, right?
22	So why? The entire world in position, so what
23	buildings would you use to form up and make a stack
24	for the squad or a platoon, so to say.
25	(Indiscernible). You stack up on a building

1	and move through the layers based off the surrounding
2	covers and then move at one (indiscernible).
3	OFFICER WEINBERGER: Okay. So
4	SAM RICE: But go away. (Indiscernible) the
5	formation you got there, are you assuming are you
6	assuming that what you establish that, keep it moving
7	real quick. You shouldn't stop.
8	OFFICER WEINBERGER: Are you are you
9	seeing some
LO	SAM RICE: (Indiscernible) don't stop going
L1	down a road.
L2	OFFICER WEINBERGER: Okay. And what's
L3	what's going on in there?
L4	SAM RICE: (Indiscernible). You're killing
L5	me. Stop it. It's Attempted Murder. Just just
L6	stop.
L7	OFFICER WEINBERGER: So tell me tell me
L8	what's going on in there.
L9	SAM RICE: (Indiscernible).
20	OFFICER WEINBERGER: What do you want me to
21	stop happen happening? Did did you put the
22	phone down? Hey, will you pick up the phone for me?
23	Pick pick up the phone so we can talk. You need
24	to you need to pick up the phone. Aaron?
25	Aaron? Aaron, pick up the phone.

```
SAM RICE: Don't -- don't (indiscernible).
 1
 2
                 OFFICER WEINBERGER: Aaron, what -- what do
 3
       you want me to stop having happen? Aaron --
 4
                 (Busy signal.)
 5
                 (Dialing.)
 6
                 AUTOMATED VOICE: Please leave your message
 7
       for 971 --
 8
                 (Busy signal. Dialing.)
 9
                 AUTOMATED VOICE: Please leave your message
10
       for 971 --
11
                 (Busy signal. Dialing.)
12
                 AUTOMATED VOICE: Please leave your message
       for 97 --
1.3
14
                 (Busy signal. Dialing.)
15
                 UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: And, again, you know,
16
      he's rambling fairly incoherently at times about crop
       formations and that.
17
18
                 OFFICER WEINBERGER: Yeah.
19
                 UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: Again, we're just
20
       trying to keep him on the line (indiscernible) --
21
                AUTOMATED VOICE: Please leave your message
       for 9 --
2.2
23
                 (Busy signal. Dialing.)
24
                 OFFICER WEINBERGER: This feels bad. Hey.
25
       Okay. Okay. Good-bye.
```

```
AUTOMATED VOICE: Please leave your message
 1
       for 9 --
 2.
 3
                 (Busy signal. Dialing.)
 4
                 AUTOMATED VOICE: Please leave your message
       for 9 --
 5
 6
                 (Busy signal. Dialing.)
                 (Phone ringing.)
 7
 8
                 OFFICER WEINBERGER: I'm about to call
 9
               That's the last name he had (indiscernible).
10
       The closest we have. (Indiscernible).
11
                 (TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Audio recording
       stopped, 3:20 p.m.)
12
       BY MR. HANNON:
1.3
14
                 So did you have a chance to listen to that
15
       CNT recording?
16
                 I did.
17
                 Did you receive reports or briefings about
       difficulties with the Crisis Negotiation Team
18
19
       establishing any sort of toe-hold or contact or
20
       rapport with Mr. Rice inside that room?
2.1
                 Yes.
            Α
2.2
                 And did that -- your recollection and your
23
       observations of that call corroborate that while there
24
       was effort, that difficulty to maintain contact
25
       with him?
```

1	A Yes.
2	Q Go ahead and turn it off.
3	And was there anything in the CNT recording
4	that corroborated the kind of escalation or
5	aggravation that the SERT officers reported hearing or
6	seeing or observing as this situation escalated?
7	A Yes.
8	Q And what was that?
9	A At one point, he Mr. Rice is heard, I
LO	believe, saying, "Fuck off or I'll cut her throat."
L1	Or words to that effect.
L2	Q And and was there also mention or
L3	obviously when the recording on CNT is going, it's
L4	almost live recording the background for the CNT
L5	negotiator; is that accurate?
L6	A Yes.
L7	Q So you can almost is it fair to say you
L8	can hear in the background kind of intel being relayed
L9	between observations from the call or conversations or
20	lack thereof to the other intel officers to share in
21	the field?
22	A Yes.
23	Q And, in fact, Officer Weinberger is recorded
24	as saying. "This feels bad" as he's trying to
25	establish contact with Mr. Rice; is that fair?

1	A Yes.
2	Q Were you able to establish a timeline of
3	events based on both the BOEC, CAD recordings as well
4	as the 9-1-1 calls and everything else?
5	A Yes.
6	Q Why don't you walk through with us real
7	quickly the timeline of the event starting from the
8	incident at 7-Eleven to the ultimate final shot fired
9	by Officer VanBlokland.
10	A Certainly. So at 9:11, call is made to
11	dispatch saying that there are two people fighting
12	inside of 7-Eleven at 7501 Southeast 82nd Avenue.
13	Q And we have it characterized as 9:11, so
14	that's within seconds or a minute after that first
15	9-1-1 call that's recorded at 9:10; is that right?
16	A That's correct.
17	Q After that, what happened next?
18	A Officers Higginbotham and Dale are
19	dispatched to that call.
20	Q And you know that time because it's recorded
21	that they're indicating to BOEC or dispatch that
22	they're going to go to that call?
23	A Yes. These are this timeline is taken
24	from the from the CAD, the CAD call printout.
25	Q Okay. After they dispatched to that

1	location, what happened next?
2	A They the dispatch broadcast at
3	7-Eleven. Oh, sorry, suspect in the 7-Eleven call is
4	now at the Del Rancho Motel across the street from the
5	7-Eleven armed with the knife and may have tried to
6	stab someone.
7	Q And then next?
8	A Officer Higginbotham broadcasts a
9	description of a white male, 30, camel hoodie, blue
LO	jeans or gray pants and bald.
L1	Q And what time did he broadcast that?
L2	A 09:16.
L3	Q What was the next bit of information?
L4	A At 09:17, information is broadcast that the
L5	suspect took a female inside the room with him, that
L6	the suspect has a knife and threatened her.
L7	Q Next?
L8	A Again at 09:17, radio broadcast that the
L9	suspect may be high on meth.
20	Q Just as an aside, from your training and
21	experience, have you ever encountered situations where
22	someone may be in displaying signs of being in a
23	mental health crisis and those symptoms being confused
24	with being high on methamphetamine or some other form

25

of controlled substance?

1	A Yes.
2	Q And vice versa, have some people confused
3	someone who is believes someone is in a mental
4	health crisis; but, in fact, they're under the
5	influence of methamphetamine?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And based on your observations from both the
8	surveillance videos as well as the 9-1-1 call and the
9	CNT call, was that description of the suspect
LO	potentially being high on methamphetamine consistent
L1	with the behavior that you observed both visibly and
L2	audibly?
L3	A Yes.
L4	Q What was the next portion of the timeline
L5	that you were able to establish from the record?
L6	A At 09:18, acting Lieutenant Nice request
L7	requested a call from a SERT sergeant.
L8	Q And then what happened?
L9	A 09:18, a request is made through dispatch to
20	have the Crisis Negotiation Team respond to the
21	location.
22	Q And then what happened? Let me help you.
23	A 09:21, uniformed personnel broadcast they're
24	watching the back of Room 16.
25	Q Next.

1	A 09:22, a request is made through dispatch to
2	find a K9 to respond.
3	Q And then?
4	A 09:22, acting Lieutenant Nice paged out CNT,
5	which is the Crisis Negotiation Team, to the scene.
6	Q And what happened after that?
7	A 09:22, a radio broadcast is made stating a
8	male yelled, "If you come inside, she will die."
9	Q And what happened after that?
10	A 09:25, a K9 unit from Oregon City is
11	dispatched.
12	Q And is that, from your training and
13	experience just as a as a police officer, do you
14	find that sometimes neighboring counties and
15	neighboring law enforcement agencies will offer
16	resources if the Portland Police Bureau cannot gather
17	the resources they need within a certain period
18	of time?
19	A Yes, they will.
20	Q What happened after that?
21	A 09:28, Portland Police K9 units are
22	dispatched to the scene and the Oregon City K9 is
23	canceled.
24	Q What happened next?
25	A 09:28, the SERT team begins to respond to a

1	staging location.
2	Q Next.
3	A 09:34, Crisis Negotiation Team personnel
4	arrive at the scene.
5	Q What happened next?
6	A 09:36, uniformed personnel broadcast that
7	Ochoa is picked up picked up the phone when they
8	called, but would not speak to them.
9	Q Next?
10	A 09:37, hotel room evacuations begin.
11	Q What happened next?
12	A 09:39, uniformed personnel broadcast that a
13	suspect appears to be barricading his doors, windows.
14	Q Next.
15	A 09:42, full SERT team activation.
16	Q So just to take a pause right there. So the
17	initial call happens at 9-1-1 call's at 9:10 a.m.
18	The first dispatch is at 9:11 a.m. And in 31 minutes,
19	if my math is correct, there's a full SERT activation
20	at that point?
21	A That's correct.
22	Q And is from your understanding and
23	experience, is that is that common with this type
24	of scenario, hostage scenario, in a motel room?
25	A That that a SERT team activation would be

1	that rapid?
2	Q Yes.
3	A Yes. Yes, it is.
4	Q What happened next?
5	Thank you.
6	A 09:50 hours, officers conducting interviews
7	at 7-Eleven broadcast that the suspect has a knife and
8	attempted to stab someone at the 7-Eleven with it.
9	Q So at that stage in the investigation, there
LO	was confirmation through witnesses that there was
L1	a knife?
L2	A That's correct.
L3	Q What happened next?
L4	A Again, 09:50, SERT personnel begin arriving
L5	on scene.
L6	Q Next.
L7	A 09:53, SERT personnel receive permission to
L8	hang to to be able to create holes in the wall.
L9	Q Okay.
20	A 09:56, SERT personnel are making plans to
21	utilize K9 to deny the suspect access to Room 16 in
22	the event that he comes out of the room.
23	Q What happened after that?
24	A 09:59, radio broadcast of an open line on a
25	cell phone whose GPS matches the location. The phone

1	number of the open line was the same number associated
2	with Room 16.
3	Q What happened next?
4	A 10 o'clock, Aaron Diesel calls dispatch
5	asking for money.
6	Q And is that a summary of kind of the 9-1-1
7	call we heard where he's telling you about the wallet
8	and new identification and other ramblings?
9	A Yes, it is.
10	Q What happened next?
11	A 10:01, dispatch broadcast that the, quote,
12	"Aaron Diesel was talking a mile a minute about
13	prostitution which shouldn't be happening and other
14	ranting."
15	Q What happened next?
16	A 10:02, dispatch broadcast that Aaron Diesel
17	does not want to speak any females.
18	Q Next?
19	A 10:03, a radio broadcast is made stating
20	that the door to Room 16 opened a tiny bit, then
21	slammed shut.
22	Q After that?
23	A 10:08, SERT personnel report sounds of
24	furniture being moved around in Room 16.
25	Q Next?

1	A 10:11, radio broadcast of suspect making
2	rambling statements about stacking things.
3	Q Next.
4	A Radio broadcast that CNT personnel are on
5	the phone with the suspect.
6	Q 10:13?
7	A That there was a a radio broadcast that
8	the suspect's last statement was if police don't
9	leave, that he'll cut her throat.
10	Q And that was, of course, was transcribed
11	from the CNT call?
12	A Yes. And I also found at shortly before
13	that that a member of the SERT intel detail broadcast
14	that the suspect said go fuck yourself or he'll cut
15	her throat.
16	Q Next.
17	A 10:15, a radio broadcast of a SERT sniper
18	shot taken from the south side of the motel.
19	Q What happened next?
20	A 10:16, radio broadcast of the suspect down,
21	the hostage is safe and the SERT medics respond to the
22	room, to Room 16.
23	Q And what happened next?
24	A 10:17, a radio broadcast of medics with SERT
25	team with Rice, who was subsequently declared

1	deceased.
2	Q Now, after you were able to do that, but you
3	didn't do that at that time, but did you also examine
4	the scene when you responded to the crime scene?
5	A Yes, I did.
6	Q Let's talk about that real quick. Does this
7	capture the Del Rancho Motel?
8	A Yes. That's an entrance off 82nd Avenue.
9	Q And these two vehicles, what are these
LO	vehicles?
L1	A Those are armored vehicles assigned to our
L2	SERT team.
L3	Q And this red tape, what does that signify?
L4	A The crime scene.
L5	Q And when that red tape is set up that way,
L6	what is the purpose of doing that as far as
L7	investigative protocols?
L8	A To log all all people who enter the
L9	scene.
20	Q And is that to preserve to scene as is
21	without contamination?
22	A Yes, it is.
23	Q What are we looking at here?
24	A That is another view of the Del Rancho from
25	the middle of 82nd Avenue. That's looking east and to

1	the right, you'll see the sort of breezeway
2	drive-through of the motel office.
3	Q And this vehicle right here, is that the
4	what vehicle is that?
5	A That is a I believe that's an ambulance
6	used by SERT team personnel.
7	Q Which angle is this?
8	A Again, another view from from the west
9	looking east into the parking lot down towards
10	Room 16.
11	Q And this row of rooms right here, is that
12	where Room 16 would have been situated?
13	A Yes, it is.
14	Q This photo up here, is this zeroing in on
15	the location of where the hasty teams and Room 16
16	were at?
17	A Yes.
18	Q And what about this photograph right here,
19	what are we looking at?
20	A So on the left is the the ambulance and
21	then just immediately to the right of that where the
22	mouse cursor is, that's the door to Room 16. And then
23	that's the door to Room 15.
24	Q And this device right here?
25	A That is a handheld battering ram.

1	Q And, again, as this photo is taken, these
2	are the items as left as is, to preserve to crime
3	scene?
4	A That's correct.
5	Q Obviously, the medical vehicles were moved.
6	What is this photograph of?
7	A The door on the far left of the photo is for
8	Room 17, the middle door is Room 16, and then the door
9	just to the to the right of Room 16 is Room 15.
LO	And another straight-on view. The door on
L1	the left there is for Room 16 and the door on the
L2	right is Room 15.
L3	Q And were there certain things that caught
L4	your eye about Room 16 even from the outside looking
L5	in?
L6	A The broken window and broken glass and the
L7	curtains hanging out of it.
L8	Q And it appears as though you can see the
L9	mattress situated in front of the window from this
20	angle; is that accurate?
21	A That that's correct.
22	Q Is this Room 16 right here?
23	A This is Room 16, yes.
24	Q And what angle is the photo on the left?
25	A The photo on the left is taken from

1	approximately the threshold of the door, looking into
2	the room, which is more or less due south.
3	Q And then as you're looking into the room
4	from the threshold, is that the distance from the
5	threshold approximately to the bathroom where Mr. Rice
6	was found?
7	A That's the view, yes.
8	Q And the picture on the right, is that just a
9	closer-up view of the front window to Room 16?
LO	A Yes, with the curtains out.
L1	Q All right. Why don't we pan, start with the
L2	are we now inside the room with these photographs?
L3	A Yes.
L4	Q And first photograph on the left.
L5	A There's some furniture in the foreground.
L6	Directly straight back is the bathroom with Mr. Rice
L7	laying.
L8	Q And there was some damage here to the left.
L9	What was the cause of that?
20	A From the holes made in the wall.
21	Q Okay. And that's just a closeup picture of
22	that?
23	A Yes.
24	Q I notice some furniture here. Is this
25	consistent with having to move this furniture from the

barricade that Mr. Rice established? 1 2. Yes, it is. 3 Picture on the right, what are we looking at 4 here? It is just a view of the, sort of the right 5 6 side of the room where there's mattresses pulled up 7 and stacked in front of the -- the window. And, I'm sorry, turn to the middle picture 8 9 Were you able to get an angle of the other 10 bedroom area with the mattresses barricading that 11 window as well? 12 Yes, there is. And was that consistent with the other 13 14 accounts that -- not only the view but the area was 15 obstructed for inner-perimeter teams to see what was going on inside the residence? 16 17 Yes, it is. 18 And how -- how big would you describe the 19 surface area of this motel room from, like, say Point 20 A bathroom to Point B, this other bedroom? Is it a 21 large motel suite or small? 2.2 It is small. I would say that the bathroom 23 is approximately two to three feet away from the --24 the back bedroom area, if you will. 25 What angles are we looking at in the room 0

1	from here?
2	A So this is standing on the inside of the
3	room facing the parking lot. And the window you see
4	beyond the mattress there is the broken window seen in
5	the previous photos. And so what we see is two box
6	springs and a mattress stacked up against the what
7	would be the parking lot window of the Room 16.
8	Q And this hole up here?
9	A That was a hole made in the wall by SERT
10	team personnel.
11	Q And is this just photo on the right, is
12	that just a closeup of the kind of barricade set up in
13	front of the window?
14	A That is, yes.
15	Q And you have a small (indiscernible)
16	barricade here in front of the door that was pushed
17	aside by SERT team; is that right?
18	A Correct.
19	I'm sorry, which one did you want me to
20	speak about?
21	Q No, you go ahead. You tell me
22	(indiscernible).
23	A So from the left again, it's another photo
24	from the of the inside of the room where the front
25	bed, if you will, the mattress and box springs are

1	stacked up.
2	The middle photo is a similar viewpoint.
3	You see the bed frame on the floor in both of those.
4	And the right photo is a view from the room
5	looking towards the back bedroom area, if you will,
6	with a mattress stacked up in front of the window.
7	Q And what are we looking at here?
8	A On the left is a photo of the bathroom with
9	Mr. Rice laying on his back. And on the right is a
LO	is a closeup of the knife that Mr. Rice was found
L1	holding in his right hand.
L2	Q And, again, when these incidences arise,
L3	this is the scene as found when frozen after the
L4	situation turned into a hostage situation to a crime
L5	scene?
L6	A Correct.
L7	Q What are we looking at from this angle?
L8	A That is a view looking at Room 16 from the
L9	south.
20	Q And in which perspective would this have
21	been from from your understanding of the witness
22	statements and the interviews?
23	A This would have been consistent with the
24	view that Officer Harris and Officer VanBlokland had.
25	Q And what's what are we looking at here?

1	A That is a truck that Officer Harris and
2	Officer VanBlokland were and that Officer VanBlokland
3	fired a shot from.
4	Q And the items that he left at the scene, is
5	that protocol for these types of investigations after
6	the scenario shifts from a response to a crime scene?
7	A Yes.
8	Q And what is this a picture of?
9	A Those are further away and a closer-up photo
LO	of where the shell casing from Officer VanBlokland's
L1	rifle was found.
L2	Q And it looks like it's (indiscernible) are
L3	these the containers they're describing trying to, if
L4	they had the opportunity to get more leverage and
L5	height in trying to peer into Room 16?
L6	A That would be, yes.
L7	Q What is that a picture of?
L8	A That is a closeup photo of the shell casing
L9	fired from Officer VanBlokland's rifle.
20	Q And that's the casing that was later
21	submitted to Mr. Glover for analysis comparing it to
22	the firearm found that Mr or Officer VanBlokland
23	submitted?
24	A Correct.
25	Q And what are we looking at here?

1	A Those are overall photos taken during
2	Officer VanBlokland's countdown of
3	Officer VanBlokland.
4	Q Countdown. Describe that for us. What does
5	that mean?
6	A That the you know, we will examine the
7	involved officers to count the number of rounds that
8	are missing from magazines to know how many rounds to
9	look for at the crime scene. How many shell casings,
10	excuse me.
11	Q And is that to ensure or corroborate the
12	versions of events given or recorded based on the
13	various pieces of evidence that was collected?
14	A Yes.
15	Q And were you able to do a round count and
16	confirm that there was only one round fired by
17	Officer VanBlokland?
18	A Yes.
19	Q Is there anything else that we have not
20	discussed oh, there is one.
21	After the investigation at the scene, the
22	scene being frozen, analyzed, witnesses being
23	interviewed and the interviewers briefing you on the
24	accounts of what happened, was there a postmortem
25	examination that occurred the next day?

1	A Yes.
2	Q And did you attend that postmortem
3	examination personally?
4	A Yes, I did.
5	Q And we've heard from the medical examiner as
6	it relates to the cause of death. But you were there
7	and present for fluids to be drawn for a toxicology
8	screen?
9	A Yes, I was.
10	Q And did you personally have a chance to both
11	review the Medical Examiner's report as well as the
12	toxicology screen?
13	A I did.
14	Q And was there any evidence to indicate there
15	was methamphetamine use in this case?
16	A No.
17	Q So based on your training and experience
18	from what you observed on the behavior coupled with
19	the toxicology screen, were you able to draw a
20	reasonable conclusion related to the behavior of
21	Mr. Rice as this situation unfolded and escalated on
22	this particular day?
23	A Yes.
24	Q And what would that based on your
25	training and experience, what would that conclusion

1	be?
2	A He was involved in some sort of a mental
3	health issue.
4	Q Is there anything else related to the
5	investigation that I have not asked you about that you
6	can recall as it relates to evidence gathering and
7	fact gathering?
8	A Not that I can recall, no.
9	MR. HANNON: Do the grand jurors have any
10	questions for Detective Broughton?
11	May this witness be excused unless you have
12	any further questions?
13	Okay. Thank you. And I think that will
14	conclude the testimony.
15	* * *
16	(Conclusion of Grand Jury proceedings,
17	11-30-18 at 3:42 p.m.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript, of the audio record in the above-entitled cause, as recorded on CD and transcribed to the best of my ability and in accordance to the quality of the audio CD.

KATIE BRADFORD, CSR 90-0148

Court Reporter (503) 267-5112